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In this study in political theory I challenge the way in which national identity 
and liberalism are traditionally counterposed, by arguing that this opposition does not 
obtain in the work of one of the key figures in liberal thought, John Locke.  This 
controversial assertion is supported by arguing that the conventional reading of 
Locke is tainted by Hobbesean preconceptions. Rejecting the view that Locke builds 
upon, or enhances, Hobbes’s position, this thesis instead maintains that Locke is 
replying to, and moreover divorcing himself from Hobbes. Thus Locke’s stance is 
portrayed as a distinctive and far more substantial contribution to political theory 
than he has traditionally been credited with. Furthermore, the distancing of Locke 
from Hobbes serves to expose the roots of the misconception of Locke’s political 
thought as a precursor of, and foundation for, a boundary-free cosmopolitanism.  
It is argued here that Locke’s political theory has become entangled with 
Hobbes’s due to a lack of attention to the formative relation between metaphysics 
and politics in their thought. This has obscured the metaphysical foundation of the 
social problem they are attempting to resolve, reducing it to the language of a clash 
of conflicting interests, so that the difference between their political prescriptions is 
presumed merely to echo the different degrees of potential conflict they observe, 
rather than being a substantive difference. The conventional framing of such conflict 
as a security problem, a concern for the harm of one’s person and possessions, is 
replaced here with that of an insecurity problem: an anxiety about the inability to 
identify regular rules that attach attributes, including possessions, to persons. In 
social terms, the future having not been secured, it cannot be trusted to connect with 
the past and present in a continuum. 
 On the interpretation proposed here, Locke and Hobbes offer radically 
different measures for the artificial generation of this ‘continuum’. Their divergence 
concerns the degree of control they assume political solutions can exert over the 
social parallel of the metaphysical ‘continuum’ problem.  It is maintained that 
Hobbes proposes to reverse the causes of anxiety about the future by artificially 




of existence rooted in time and space. On the proposed understanding, Locke’s 
position is a reaction to Hobbes’s demand for the complete surrender of individual 
particularity in exchange for an immutable state of perfect stability.  It is argued that 
Locke appreciates the requirement of stability for generating future-oriented 
motivations in individuals, but exhibits a more humble approach to the human 
capacity to rule its own existence. The unbound autonomy to take charge of reality 
that Hobbes grants to humanity is replaced by a constrained ability to administer its 
existence within the corporeal confines of time and space. It is argued that the time-
space constraints that Locke insists are metaphysically inherent to humankind, 
conflict with the boundary-free assumptions of cosmopolitanism. Conversely, it is 
maintained, Hobbes’s radical argument for dislodging humankind from spatio-
temporal constraints serves as a platform for a cosmopolitan outlook, albeit a 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
1.1  Liberalism, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism 
 
Contemporary liberal thought has for the most part converged with 
cosmopolitan thought, to the extent that cosmopolitanism
1
 has come to be regarded 
as derivable from classic liberal positions
2
. It is widely held that even if classical 
liberals were unaware of the cosmopolitan implications of their own writings, these 
are logically entailed by the liberal idea they set in motion.  At the core of the liberal 
idea is a respect for individual identity that cosmopolitan thought proposes must be 
reflected in the disjoining of traditionally parcelled groups of individuals. The 
unleashing of the authentic, autonomous individual requires liberating the human 
experience from binds and boundaries. The divisions imposed by national identity 
are considered at odds with the process of liberalisation. Moreover, national 
sentiment is regarded as supported by the counter-liberal collectivist argumentation 
of communitarianism, according to which, by contrast with liberalism, the authentic 
individual is the ‘naturally’ occurring community-immersed one. This parcelled 
unity of environment and individual is held to be not only inescapable, but also 
invaluable for the creation of social consensus, thus striking a similar chord to 
traditional associative notions of nationalism.   
                                               
1
 Understood here as a sense of liberation from physical and territorial attachment  that is conducive to 
the establishment of a single universal-governing body, or world State. 
2
 Charles Jones asserts that ‘Cosmopolitanism as a moral perspective is closely akin to 
liberalism…Accordingly, we might understand cosmopolitanism as the ethical standpoint underlying 
modern liberal political theory.’ (Jones in Conway In Defence of the Realm: The Place of Nations in 
Classical Liberalism 2004: 16) 
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 This thesis challenges the opposition traditionally posited between national 
identity and liberalism
3
, by arguing that this opposition does not obtain in one of the 
cornerstones of liberal thought, John Locke. This somewhat controversial assertion is 
substantiated by proposing that the conventional reading of Locke is tainted by 
Hobbesean misconceptions. On the traditional interpretation of Locke, his 
contribution to political theory is seen as no more than a modification of Thomas 
Hobbes’s social contract position, replacing Hobbes’s bleak portrayal of unmediated 
natural human interaction in the state of nature with an inclination towards civility. 
Consequently, the artificial mediatory intervention he prescribes is of a less drastic 
nature, avoiding the Hobbesean empowerment of a draconian sovereign.   In this 
view, the revision that Locke is thought to have made to the Hobbesean political 
stance is not considered to have strayed far enough from the original mould to be a 
significant departure from Hobbes. On the contrary, Locke is often viewed as having 
‘cultivated’ the individualist foundation of social interaction initiated by Hobbes.  
This thesis offers an alternative understanding of the relation between Locke 
and Hobbes. It rejects the view that Locke builds upon, or enhances, Hobbes. 
Instead, it maintains that Locke is replying to
4
, and moreover divorcing himself from, 
Hobbes. Thus his stance is portrayed here as distinctive, and his contribution to 
political theory as much more substantial than the one with which he has traditionally 
been credited. Furthermore, this distancing of Locke from Hobbes exposes the roots 
                                               
3 The notable attempts by Yael Tamir and David Miller to marry nationalism with liberalism, rather 
than with communitarianism, are acknowledged in the conclusion of this thesis, and differentiated 
from the Lockean-based argument for liberal nationalism purported here. 
4
 That is not to say that Locke is consciously replying to Hobbes, but rather that in retrospect the 
analysis of his thought reveals that it stands in contrast, or in logical response, to Hobbes.  
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of the misconception of Locke’s theory as a precursor of, and foundation for, a 
boundary-free cosmopolitanism.  
It is argued here that Locke’s political theory has become entangled with 
Hobbes’s due to a lack of attention in the literature to the formative relation between 
metaphysics and politics in their thought. The discussion of their politics in isolation 
has obscured the metaphysical foundation of the social problem they are attempting 
to resolve, reducing it to the language of a clash of conflicting interests.   The 
solutions offered to this formulation of the problem take the form of mediation 
bodies, whose character matches the assumed degree of inherent conflict. For 
example, Hobbes’s absolutism reflects the perception of an invariable spill-over from 
conflict of interests to violence, whereas Locke’s pluralist constitutionalism is a 
reflection of the state of conflict of interests as an inefficient, albeit not perilous, 
condition. Thus the difference between their political prescriptions is presumed 
merely to echo the degree of potential conflict they observe, rather than being a 
substantive difference. It is conventionally assumed that they are both concerned 
with what is essentially a security problem, the degree of threat they identify 
generating differences of nuance in basically the same strand of liberal thought.  
By contrast, the metaphysically saturated reading adopted here rejects the 
reduction of the social problem, addressed by both thinkers, to a clash of interests. 
The conventional framing of the conflict as a security problem, a concern for the 
harm of one’s person and possessions, is replaced with that of an insecurity problem: 
an anxiety about the inability to identify regular rules that correlate attributes, 
including possessions, with persons. In other words, they are addressing a crisis in 
the generation of long-term identity, which presents itself as a problem in employing 
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rationality: if personal identity, and by extension entitlement to possessions, cannot 
be preserved over time, rational future-oriented considerations in the interaction are 
made redundant. The future, having not been secured, cannot be trusted to connect 
with the past and present in a ‘continuum’. 
In the interpretation to be presented here, Locke and Hobbes propose distinct 
measures that need to be taken for the artificial generation of this continuum, in the 
absence of which they agree that social interaction would degenerate. They diverge 
in their views on the degree of control that political solutions can exert over the 
metaphysical sources of this social problem, namely the irregularity of uncontrolled 
change.  It is maintained that Hobbes proposes to reverse the causes of anxiety about 
the future by artificially generating, indeed creating, an immutable environment 
detached from the fluctuations inherent to a mode of existence rooted in time and 
space. He thus endeavours to form a body of governance of such immense power as 
to enable it to grind time and change to a halt.  By contrast, it will be argued that 
Locke’s solution rejects the prospect of unbinding humankind from its spatio-
temporal constraints, since it finds these definitive of individuality itself.  
Indeed, in the proposed understanding, Locke’s position is a reaction to 
Hobbes’s demand for the complete surrender of individual particularity in exchange 
for an immutable state of perfect stability.  It is argued that Locke appreciates the 
requirement of stability for generating future-oriented interest in individuals, but 
exhibits a more humble approach to the human capacity to rule its own existence. 
The unbound autonomy to take charge of reality and infuse social interaction with 
certainty that Hobbes grants to humanity is replaced with a constrained ability to 
administer a secure existence within the corporeal confines of time and space. Locke 
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allows individuals to invest themselves in the future, by instituting a State that 
provides institutional guarantees for the vessel of their corporeal preservation, 
namely their property.  
It will also be argued that the time-space constraints that Locke insists are 
metaphysically inherent to humankind, conflict with the boundary-free assumptions 
of cosmopolitanism. Conversely, it will be maintained that, despite the contention of  
the realist school in international relations theory, Hobbes’s radical argument for 
dislodging humankind from spatio-temporal constraints serves as a platform for a 
cosmopolitan outlook; albeit a highly authoritarian one. It is conceded that an 
alternative, non-authoritarian, platform is to be found in Friedrich Hayek’s 
adaptation of what may be termed the ‘Smitho-Humean’ market model. However, it 
is demonstrated that despite the similarity in terminology, the Lockean market should 
be distinguished from conceptions of the market that claim their origin in Smith and 
Hume, namely Hayek’s supposedly liberal model and Robert Nozick’s libertarian 
one.  It is argued that for Hayek and Nozick the individual is, in effect, generated by 
the market, so that preserving the market necessarily preserves particularity. By 
contrast, for Locke individuality is a condition for the market, not its product, and to 
protect individuality from encroachment requires recognition of its primality and its 
conceptual separation from the market. Thus while the Smitho-Humean model is 
essentially compatible with cosmopolitanism, it is at odds with Locke’s brand of 
liberal individualism.  
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1.2 Time and Space – The Metaphysical Leash on Politics 
 
This thesis can be seen as attempting to put a human metaphysical leash on a 
perfectionist strand of the social contract tradition it proposes can be traced back to 
Thomas Hobbes. The leash consists of the finite constraints of corporeality, 
boundaries that restrict human existence and by extension the perspectives that are 
humanly attainable. In the first instance it insists that we are mortal beings, our 
mortality pronouncing itself in the limited lifespan of our existence. In the second 
instance it asserts that our corporeality not only restricts our temporal existence, but 
also constricts our spatial existence by barring us from being in two places at the 
same time. These constraints are found to be definitive of the human condition, 
differentiating the bound human from the unbound deity, which is by definition 
incorporeal, immortal and omnipresent.  As humans we are bound to bodiliness; 
consequently, it is argued, we cannot be expected to be socially motivated by insights 
gained from an unbound perspective.  
 The object of the proposed metaphysical leash is Hobbesean rationality. 
Applying rationality, both in science in general, and in politics in particular, is 
considered here as an exercise in ‘rule making’. In making or formulating rules we 
take particular experiences and extend them to other occurrences by generalising 
them into other-referring statements. It is suggested that Hobbes, anticipating Kant, 
takes rationality in itself to be unbound; like mathematics in itself, it tells us nothing 
about the world and is therefore liberated from worldly constraints. Yet it is argued 
here that our inherent material constraints prevent us from living out the liberty of 
 a1]: Prepare to elaborate on]הערה
Kant 
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perfect rationality. Moreover, it is maintained that not only can we not achieve such a 
state of liberty naturally, we cannot achieve it artificially either, by means of the   
ambitious ‘rule making’ projects of the social contract and the State.  Indeed, the 
Hobbesean rationalist tradition is here charged with attempting to achieve the 
impossible, namely to artificially bypass human constraints by magnifying human 
rationality into perfect, Godly proportions.  
The leash metaphor has been chosen with the intention of conveying a sense 
that the rationalist position has let rationality loose from the material world.  It has 
allowed rationality to outstep human boundaries, thereby engaging in the self-
deception of likening the human condition to the incorporeal condition of God. 
Consequently, it utilises unbound perspectives in time and space to form a social 
structure that is theoretically sound, yet actually unbefitting of a bound existence – it 
is in this sense unreal. This charge differs from that of the Humean conventionalist 
and also from the somewhat related communitarian critique of contractarianism. 
Humeans charge contractarianism with being unreal on empirical grounds: it is 
accused of being a ‘folly of the mind’ that does not match empirical facts. 
Communitarians have criticised contractarianism on sociological grounds for 
abstracting itself out of reality, conjuring up an imaginary solitary position that no 
one could ever occupy in a real existence.  
The charge of unreality made here is neither empirical nor sociological; it is 
metaphysical. All three critiques highlight the detachment of contractarianism from 
the real world. For the empiricist it is detachment from historical fact, and for the 
communitarian it is detachment from the formative impact of actual social 
surroundings. By contrast, for the corporealist position defended here it is 
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detachment from the metaphysical constraints that define us as human, namely the 
finitude of our existence as projected in time and space. Moreover, while the 
conventionalist and communitarian critiques reject contractarianism altogether
5
, it 
will be argued here that the metaphysical critique divides contractarianism into a 
rationalist, Hobbesean strand, that grows distant from materialism, and a Lockean 
strand that rectifies the Hobbesean drift away from the constraints of time and space.   
While time and space are woven together in this thesis, this does not imply 
that they are one and the same, nor that they are symmetrical. Consider the mundane 
fact that we can visit a single point in space at different points in time, but we cannot 
be at two distinct points in space at a single point in time. Yet time and space are still 
interlinked. If we dispose of time we dispose of space as well, since if it takes me no 
time whatsoever to travel between point A and point B, I am effectively omnipresent 
at both point A and point B, making their spatial distance or location inconsequential.  
The time-space constraints I employ here are borrowed from Kant's famous 
epistemological claim about human perception (Kant 1973: 203) and converted into 
an ontological claim. Time and space in this thesis are not lenses through which we 
perceive the world, but the confines of our material existence, boundaries that we 
part with only upon parting with our life. In life we are bound to time and space, and 
while we can attempt to artificially challenge these natural binds, we cannot and 
should not hope to relieve ourselves of them. However, that we cannot escape time 
and space does not entail that we cannot temper their effects upon us as individuals. 
Indeed it is acknowledged that the dispiriting effect of our limited lifespan on our 
                                               
5 With the notable exception of Jean Hampton (Hampton Political Philosophy 1997) and Russell 
 s2]: Check page number, book]הערה
in lib .1932/s20 
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motivation to contribute anything to the world requires serious attention. Without 
such redress, we may come to consider life to be in vain, resigning ourselves to 
passivity as our contributions to the world would seem to have only momentary 
value that ceases with the demise of our bodies.  
In the Hobbesean ‘equation of life’ time is identified as the villain.   
Accordingly the objective is to take time out of the equation altogether, thereby 
silencing the disheartening considerations of temporality.  This is achieved by 
disputing the distinction between life before and after death. It is argued that Hobbes 
diverges from the orthodox Christian divide of his era, between a material earthly life 
and the immaterial existence of the afterlife, replacing it with the original Jewish and 
early Christian Church conception of the afterlife as a resurrection that recaptures the 
‘flesh and blood’ condition. He does not merely lengthen life by delaying death, thus 
creating long term incentives for shortsighted individuals, he makes death 
inconsequential.  
The flaw that is identified in Hobbes’s position is the overambitious pursuit 
of an airtight solution to the problem of temporality. It is maintained that in an 
attempt to avoid 'temporal remissions', he sets out to surgically sever time from 
humanity. Once this procedure has made time immaterial, space becomes 
meaningless as well, and the emulation of deity conditions is complete. It will be 
argued that Hobbes is the founder of a rationalist brand of social contract tradition 
which, in its attempt to escape 'once and for all' the misery of the natural human 
condition, i.e. the state of nature, deludes itself that humans can artificially mimic a 
                                                                                                                                     
Hardin (Hardin Collective action 1982), who attempt to forge a Humean variant of contractrianism. 
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condition that is natural for God but impossibly contrived for mortal beings. 
Anticipating Rousseau, the envisaged process allows for the metamorphosis of the 
natural human being into the rationalised demigod of the citizen. In other words, it 
allows the mortal to raise itself to the stature of the immortal. It wishes to establish 
the Kingdom of God by populating it with Godlike creatures.  
 In reaction to the Hobbesean conclusions as developed here, it is maintained 
that as theoretically attractive as this proposed route to perfection may seem, in 
practice it is bound to lead to dissonance within the individual. There is a conflict 
between the particularity of material individuation and the generality of immaterial 
perfection. While the human individual is physically bound to a singular existence in 
time and space, the demand upon him is to shed these inherently human limitations, 
simulating God and entering into the realm of the unbound.  
As is already apparent, God figures strongly in this thesis, but as a metaphor 
and not as a performing entity. Although the argument is not antagonistic to belief in 
God, it does not require it. God is employed here to summon the traits that have 
come to be associated with the term, namely: creation, perfection, immateriality, 
omnipresence and immortality. The concept of God as encompassing the above 
attributes, and therefore oblivious to time and space, is juxtaposed with the concept 
of ‘the human’ as set in the material world, from which it can be completely 
detached only in death. Indeed, the Hobbesean tradition is charged with 'deifying' 
mere mortals, or with seeking to establish ‘heaven on earth’. In its attempt to seize 
ultimate rational control over the material world it neglects the fact that we are 
trapped in that very same world we are trying to control, rendering the attempt to 
completely relieve us of material constraints a futile exercise.  
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In this context we should remind ourselves that even the technologically 
feasible virtual existence that some contemporary 'techies' are said to have adopted, 
still requires the consumption of real material food sourced at the other end of the 
online takeaway service. They have not escaped corporeality; their takeaway food 
does not appear magically out of thin air. It is not ‘created’, rather it is manufactured. 
Accordingly, when this thesis refers to God in his capacity as the creator, it is not an 
assertion of religious belief, but a reference to the concept of something that is 
immaterial, transcendental and beyond question. Indeed, the Hobbesean is here 
charged with confusing the human capacity to manipulate matter, with the capacity 
for creation. He is accused of attempting to perform the impossible feat of uniting 
the corporeal and material with the immaterial and transcendental. 
Those who, despite the above disclaimer, still feel uncomfortable with such a 
secular employment of God, or by contrast wish to avoid the religious connotations 
which it might summon, should consider replacing occurrences in this thesis of the 
term 'God' with the alternative 'Nature'. This particular ‘Nature’ should, however, 
conform to the Hobbesean attribute of rationality in addition to the traditional 
attributes of God; in other words, nature must conform to rationality, thereby 
allowing for rationally equipped creatures to study it. The makeup of the God, or 
‘Nature’, is one of ultimate rationality that reveals the one and only Truth. 
Consequently it exhibits a sound reassuring consistency that defies any challenge – it 
is at peace. Like the mathematical expression 1+1=2, it has no exceptions and does 
not succumb to any circumstantial changes - it is unbound, it is free.    
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1.3 Locke, a rejoinder to Hobbes 
 
Unconventionally, the Lockean position is not portrayed here as redressing 
the Hobbesean stance by introducing some 'liberal niceties'. Rather, it is asserted that 
the divergence between their conceptions of metaphysical individuation places their 
political stances radically at odds with each other. Unlike Hobbes, who is attempting 
to rationally perfect the corporeal, Locke is attempting to address the difficulties 
spawned by the complexity of humankind’s split constitution between the material 
and the ideational. Locke is attempting to balance the perfection of rationality with 
the imperfection of corporeal existence. It is proposed that the Lockean position is a 
response to the impossibility of the Hobbesean stance, offering a distinctive 
alternative to it. Moreover, this alternative should be considered a substantial 
contribution to the social contract tradition, one that accommodates the theoretical 
difficulties in applying the unbound tool of perfect rationality to an imperfect 
existence that is bound by time and space.  
The confusion of the Lockean position with the Hobbesean one is attributed, 
in the first instance, to the wrongful divorce of their political positions from their 
metaphysical positions, which disguises the opposing character of their respective 
approaches to individuation, both metaphysical and political. In the second instance, 
the confusion is attributed to a related unsubstantiated carry-over, of their widely 
acknowledged analytical convergence on the identification of distrust as the culprit 
of social tension, to an alleged shared resolution they proposed to apply. It is argued 
that the prevalent tendency to discuss their positions on distrust solely in a political 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
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context lends itself to their differences being reduced to nuances of an essentially 
identical theoretical position. 
  Taking account of their metaphysical theories as well as their political ones, it 
is maintained here that the problem of distrust is on both accounts an expression of 
the ‘continuous personal identity’ problem. The source of friction in interaction 
outwith familial circles is a sense of insecurity about the continuous identity of one’s 
counterparts. Individuation entails that each and every one of us holds the key to our 
own identity. We are therefore at liberty to transform ourselves at will, thus causing 
confusion, if not chaos, in future encounters.  
As an illustration, consider that you and I met yesterday and encountered 
each other again today. Yesterday you presented yourself as an Italian wine merchant 
and I presented myself as a Scottish restaurateur. We agreed on the purchase and 
delivery of a case of wine every week thereon. Yet with nothing to hold us to the 
identities of the previous encounter, neither of the parties could securely attach 
anything of the past stranger to this present stranger that stands before them.  Either 
side could detach itself from the obligation to carry out the transaction by shedding 
its former identity and inventing a new one. Such a scenario would render the long-
term possession and exchange of goods among us impossible. In a village setting, 
where our encounters would be frequent and repetitive, we might form a persistent 
idea of other individuals and ‘pin’ them with it. But once we leave the village and 
begin to associate on a grander scale, the integrity of ‘the other’ would not hold, and 
friction would abound.  
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This essentially descriptive analysis of individuation has, it will be argued, 
wrongfully led to the attribution of normative individualism to Hobbes, and to the 
assumption that it is mirrored in Locke. Instead, it is maintained that while 
Hobbesean theory does much to uncover individuation, it does not do so in order to 
celebrate it, but rather in order to ‘treat it’. Individuation is considered a disorder that 
renders us semi-rational and holds back the grand potential of rational social 
prosperity. It is a by-product of material particularisation that needs to be remedied if 
the prospects of unity are to be gained. The prescribed cure for the semi-rational 
individuated human condition is an extra dose of rationality administered by the 
sovereign. This is either overseen by an external super-rational sovereign or is self-
administered by a super-rational Kantian-like being. The dose of 'artificial' rationality 
complements the natural future-promoting rationality embodied in the aversion of 
death principle: our natural desire for life that is pronounced in our inclination to 
forestall our exit from this world.  
Applying or administering rationality is understood as an exercise in ‘rule 
following’ or succumbing to the rule. On the proposed understanding, rationality for 
Hobbes is reduced to repetition. The ruler is rational in as much as she imitates God, 
and the individual vicariously imitates God by imitating the ruler. Thus Godly 
rationality enters into the individual’s conduct and transforms him into the citizen – a 
keeper of rules. The ruler is charged with creating a consistent environment, the 
State, which would relieve us of the constant questioning of identity and possession 
that is brought about by individuation. It is a condition in which acting on the basis 
of a continuum of experience ‘makes sense’.  
 tU3]: still not quite sure about]הערה
this sentence 
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The setting to be constructed is one designed to defeat insecurity in the 
interaction among strangers. Such interaction no longer need be disconcerting, as the 
integrity of ‘the other’s’ identity is set and guaranteed by the sovereign. This is 
achieved by instilling, or rather enforcing, a propensity to follow a prescribed set of 
rules. If everyone followed the lead of the ruler to the letter, there would be no 
surprises whatsoever in conduct among strangers.  The rules, having been set in 
‘absolute’ stone, are clear and constant, to the extent that they leave no room for 
change of circumstances brought about by shifts in time and space. This airtight 
security provides for an ease of mind in following the rules, converting the cautious 
semi-rational being into a fully-fledged rational and carefree one.   
The objection voiced here to this ‘chain of reactions’ is that although it 
produces an infallible rational being, that being is no longer human. A cognitive 
dissonance emerges between a theoretically flawless Hobbessian construction, and 
the real experiences of actual human beings. The term human rationality reflected 
upon here suggests that the material shell that constrains human existence cannot be 
ignored. It is argued that Locke counters Hobbes by rejecting the proposition that any 
earthly power could insulate individuals from the effects of individuation. Indeed, 
from the Lockean perspective particularisation is distinctly human. This imperfection 
is not an ailment to be rectified, it is a defining feature of who we are. As long as we 
are alive, we are trapped in a state of material restrictive imperfection. As creatures 
that by definition inhabit time and space, we are unable to abolish them. Yet we must 
contend with the negative impact of individuation, as failing to do so would unleash 
the social trust problem highlighted by Hobbes and acknowledged by Locke. It 
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reduces the horizon of non-familial exchanges to ‘here and now’ interactions of 
short-term benefits, reducing the human to the beast. 
It is further maintained that the State-generated ‘memory’ offered by Hobbes, 
which puts an absolute hold on identity in order to escape regression into a ‘here and 
now’ perspective, is related to a monist tradition in which the abstract and the actual 
are essentially one and the same. For Hobbes one can literally place mind over 
matter, and rationalise oneself out of individuation. It is a notion of control, or 
creation, of one’s environment by imitating the creation exhibited by God. It is 
argued that the Lockean position stands in contrast to the Hobbesean monistic 
resolution of social tension through adoption or mimicry of a stance of perfect 
rationality.  The Lockean stance is rooted in an opposing dualist tradition, in which I 
am in this world in as far as I have a material corollary in it, a body; I am in the next 
world in my self, as an idea.  
For Locke, creation is a Godly prerogative not availed to living humans due 
to their being bound by time and space. As humans we are inherently restricted to 
manipulating creation. We do not create liberty, we can merely administer license. 
Therefore, it is within the scope of manipulation, and not of creation, that we can 
hope to find resolution to social conflict. In contrast to Hobbes, within the Lockean 
paradigm the problem of continuous identity is addressed by establishing a licensing 
agency that registers individuals and their possessions, allowing public access to a 
perduring and reliable source of identity. By alienating or mediating the relationship 
among strangers via the official sovereign record, a consistent environment is 
achieved. Yet it is not the Hobbesean closed and set environment, achieved by 
rendering the changes of time and space immaterial; rather, it is open to inputs of 
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identity and conduct from the constituency as long as such inputs follow a set 
procedure for registry (e.g. majority rule).  
It is held that the insistence on groundedness in the Lockean position extends 
beyond the critique of rationalist contractarianism, into a debate with a Hayekian, 
materialist brand of conventionalism. The discord is over the latter’s proposal that 
individuation and order emerge spontaneously in the material realm and are 
maintained by a market mechanism. Accordingly, it does away with the dualist 
perfection-imperfection contrast attributed here to Locke. Moreover, although the 
Hayekian derivation from Humean conventionalism develops as a reactionary vision 
that is staunchly opposed to rationalist contractarianism, it is maintained that its 
attitude towards boundaries is remarkably similar to the one extruded from the 
rationalist Hobbesean position, presenting conventionalism as a free market, non-
authoritative and possibly liberal, alternative route to cosmopolitanism. 
Countering this proposition, the unrestricted openness offered by 
conventionalists is construed in this thesis as a mirror image of the unbound 
detachment demanded by Hobbes. While Hobbes is accused of receding into an 
illusory, immaterial and unbound condition, Hayek is charged with releasing the 
bound from the unbound. No longer a constrained form of the unbound, the bound is 
neither incomplete nor imperfect, and ultimately nothing of its boundedness survives 
in any meaningful sense. Indeed, it no longer has any relation with perfection. The 
only relation it allows for is an inter-subjective one between corporeal entities. These 
entities are said to be ‘naturally’ preserved by the act of interaction, a free market 
relation that is expected to regenerate their subjectivity. The Lockean objection 
levelled in this thesis at the conventionalist contention is that a system that is entirely 
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self-contained is conceptually free-floating.  Since it has no anchored understanding 
of the ideas of self and property outwith its own evolving system, it carries the 
potential to evolve away from individuation, rendering it cosmopolitan, but arguably 
no longer liberal. 
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1.4 Outline of the chapters 
 
2. Hobbes: A Metaphysical Interpretation of his Politics 
The function of this chapter is to outline an unconventional metaphysical 
interpretation of Hobbes’s political theory, to be developed in full in the 
following two chapters. It argues that his political stance is derived from his 
general scientific quest for the attainment of an indisputable truth that spans the 
entirety of human knowledge-seeking enterprises. It is argued that at the 
foundation of this endeavour is the monotheistic metaphysical idea that the 
singularity of truth is rooted in the singularity of creation. It is maintained that 
Hobbes believes he has figured out the puzzle of creation. He has found in 
rationality the methodological solution for the reign of a single, interdisciplinary 
and indisputable, Truth.  Once this scientific method is applied to all knowledge-
seeking activities, they will be found to connect together and form a perfect 
equilibrium that revolves around the Truth.  
   
3. Hobbes: A Holistic Interpretation 
This chapter argues that the Hobbesean enterprise is engaged with finding a 
‘once and for all’ geometry-like cure for the social deficiencies of the human 
condition. The disease for which the cure is being sought is a spiral-like ‘fall’ 
into disintegration, and therefore public discord in interpersonal encounters. It is 
a descent from an original non-corporeal unison, free of particularity and 
therefore of competing claims that lead to conflict. Hobbes, it is argued, proposes 
to remedy the ailing condition of society by reversing the process of corporeal 
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fragmentation. Contrary to the traditional understanding of Hobbes as both a 
modernist and an advocate of individualism, it is maintained that he argued for 
the reversal of the natural course of human history by the negation of 
individuation. His position is best thought of in renaissance terms, as seeking to 
reinstate a long lost peaceful Edenic prototype, and to replace the chaos which he 
perceives in his era.  It is argued that in an effort to replace individuation with 
unison, his sovereign is charged with the creation of a fabricated existence in 
which temporality and by extension spatiality become redundant. The production 
of an ‘earthly Eden’ effectively raises all to a godlike stature, establishing a 
perfect equilibrium in which all remain at a ‘stand still’, since perfection is 
already at hand.  
 
4. Rationality as recurrence 
An extension of the previous chapter, here it is argued that Hobbes 
conceptualises rationality as part of a holist paradigm that is defined by resistance 
to change, or recurrence.  It maintains that Hobbes strives to achieve an existence 
in which complete predictability in social conduct will replace fear; one in which 
rationally deficient ‘fooles’, who exert their energy aimlessly, will be converted 
into rational objective driven citizens. It is asserted that far from being a theory, 
comparable to Machiavelli’s, on how to utilise force to one’s advantage, he is 
advancing a theory of peace in which force becomes redundant. The chapter goes 
on to compare this interpretation of Hobbes with David Gauthier’s attempt to 
recreate Hobbesean authority without resorting to a sovereign, arguably 
removing from Hobbes’s theory the striving towards perfection and modelling on 
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God that are attributed to it here. While acknowledging the credibility of 
Gauthier’s interpretation, it is argued that his position exacerbates the problem of 
continuous identity that Hobbes set out to solve with his strong sovereign and 
matching State.  
    
5. Locke: Removing the misconceptions   
The objective of this chapter is to dispute conventional misconceptions of Locke. 
Firstly it aims to refute the orthodox association of Locke with Hobbes, arguing 
instead for a unique Lockean property-focused political stance, which stems from 
his distinct metaphysics. It is put forward that contrary to Hobbes, who wishes to 
solve the irregularity generated by motion by grinding the world to a halt, 
Locke’s vision is one in which human boundaries and imperfections are taken as 
a given. Consequently, his theory aims to accommodate rather than eliminate 
them. Moreover, Hobbes is posited as antagonistic to both metaphysical and 
political individuation, whereas Locke is presented as its defender metaphysically 
and therefore also politically. The chapter goes on to differentiate Locke’s 
defence of individualism and his market orientation from the Smito-Humean 
market vision of political exchange. Finally, it distances the Libertarian ideas 
trumpeted by Robert Nozick from the interpretation of Locke provided here, by 
claiming they originate in Hobbes instead.   
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6. Locke: The Self, The State and the Continuous Identity of Property 
This chapter expands upon the distinctly Lockean understanding of metaphysical 
individuation and transposes it onto his political theory. It attempts to establish 
that although the Lockean position borrows the Hobbesean analysis that 
corporeal individuation results in difficulties in the integrity of one’s social 
counterparts, it seeks an ongoing solution, as opposed to a ‘once and for all’ 
solution, to what it views as an ongoing inescapable metaphysical problem. It 
further argues that while for both theorists the resolution consists in erecting a 
reliable source that assures the integrity of one’s counterparts, for Hobbes this is 
achieved by reversing the process of individuation and replacing it with an 
institution that enforces solid unity, whereas for Locke it is attained by 
institutionally mellowing it via a repository, namely the State. Finally, it is 
suggested that while the State is perfectly equipped to sustain elements of 
identity that lend themselves to commodification, it is unsuited for preserving 
identity that cannot be commodified. 
 
7. Locke: The Nation – A depository of Heritage 
This chapter argues that Locke’s position is incompatible with a cosmopolitan 
stance. Following upon the preceding chapter, the objective here is to 
demonstrate how a concept of ‘national identity’ is both necessary for and 
compatible with Locke’s notion of the State as an identity-fostering apparatus. 
The nation is understood as complementary to the State in the provision of a 
future outlook that motivates individuated beings to interact with each other in 
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the creation of prosperity. The parallel between the function of the State and 
national bodies, within their respective realms of commodity and non-commodity 
preservation, is demonstrated. The possibility of replacing national identity with 
alternative Statist or cross-national identities is explored but rejected.  
 
8. Conclusion – A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
This final chapter briefly considers the implications that the metaphysically 
saturated readings of Hobbes and Locke have for the foundations of 
cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and nationalism, on the other. The first 
section reconsiders who the custodians of the Hobbesean legacy are within the 
schools of thought in international relations. It applies the metaphysically 
inspired conclusion that Hobbes’s political aspiration is for rest and peace, to 
challenge the traditional association of Hobbes with the realist school and its 
vision of international relations as a struggle for domination. By contrast, 
according to the unconventional understanding of Hobbes presented in this 
thesis, he becomes a proponent of a world absolutist State, as a direct extension 
of his own argument for the peace-generating benefits of the State.  The second 
section explores the type of national identity that Locke’s metaphysically 
saturated political position lends itself to, and distinguishes this both from 
communitarian versions and from the views of arguably ‘liberal nationalist’ 
theorists such as David Miller and Yael Tamir. Finally, it attempts to define the 
national, or at least the anti-cosmopolitan aspect of Locke’s metaphysically 
saturated political position, by contrasting it with Jeremy Waldron’s depiction of 
cosmopolitanism. 
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1.5 A note on Text and Context 
 
It should be noted that my use of political theory texts follows the method 
that Charles Tarlton, in an essay examining scholarly approaches to the analysis of 
Hobbes's Leviathan, discredits under the label 'rewriting Hobbes'. I have no qualms 
with the label chosen by Tarlton; I do however object to his discrediting it. Indeed, 
the label is a true representation of an approach that is not seeking to expose the truth 
about the author or the text, but is rather seeking truth within the authored text
6
. 
Consequently, the intentions and the formative historical context are sidelined in 
favour of theoretical modeling and logical argumentation
7
 from which we may derive 
insights as to contemporary political conditions
8
.  
Tarlton's concern is to criticise contrived rehabilitating readings that turn a 
blind eye to what he views as Hobbes's inherent despotism. He seems intent on 
forcing commentators to take a 'political' stance, either sanctifying
9
 the text as a 
whole, thereby implicitly condoning anything it might contain, or vilifying
10
 it as a 
                                               
6 In line with David Gauthier’s assertion that ‘The underlying rationale of our study…is that Hobbes 
has something of value for us, confronted with moral and political problems, even if what is of most 
value is not what he intended’ Gauthier Logic of the Leviathan in (Tarlton The despotical doctrine of 
Hobbes, part I: the liberalization of Leviathan 2001: 602).. 
7 Under the assumption that the text is ‘intelligible in its own terms as some kind of classical 
expression independent of both time and space’ (Tarlton The despotical doctrine of Hobbes, part I: 
the liberalization of Leviathan 2001: 607). .  
8 See Jean Hampton Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition in (Tarlton The despotical doctrine of 
Hobbes, part I: the liberalization of Leviathan 2001: 602): ‘the principal reason for studying Hobbes’s 
work is that doing so will improve our understanding social contract theories generally’ eventually 
leading us to ‘construct new philosophical views about our contemporary political life in this case 
about the very regimes in which many of us live.’  
9
 As he claims commentators from Jeremy Bentham onwards have tended to do. 
10
 A position sympathetically attributed to C.E. Vaughan see (Tarlton The despotical doctrine of 
Hobbes, part I: the liberalization of Leviathan 2001: 614) ‘Vaughan cast Hobbes in the part of the 
villain…’  
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whole, thereby opposing the crux developed therein.  His position implies that once 
sealed by the author's intentions and context, the text is 'parceled', and offered to us 
either to reject or accept. On this view, the text is not a logical framework worthy of 
intellectual dissection, it is a social agenda promoting platform
11
. Accordingly, the 
authenticity
12
 of the text cannot be 'messed with' or, employing the words of Max 
Weber, as Tarlton does, it is 'not a hired cab which one may stop at will and climb 
into or out of as one sees fit' (Max Weber in Tarlton 2001: 603).  
By contrast, the approach taken in this thesis is close to the one set out by 
Gregory Kavka in his Hobbessian Moral and Political Theory:  ‘This book is less 
concerned with what Hobbes said for its own sake than with what may be learned 
from what he said.’ (Kavka 1986: xiv) and ‘The ultimate goal of this process is to 
explicate and defend a plausible system of moral and political hypotheses suggested 
and inspired by Hobbes.’ (Kavka 1986: 3).  Thus the references within this thesis to 
the authored text are not intended to support a definitive interpretation, and it is not 
suggested that the ideas or conclusions derived may be attributed to the original 
author, or connected to the context of their historical period. Its commitment is not to 
                                               
11 The Marxist ‘theory versus praxis’ debate that no doubt informs this position, is evident in Tarlton’s 
disapproving remark: ‘We should not be surprised, however, that when the main question has become 
the ‘truth’ of the political theory [with which Hobbesian contractarians are presumed to be engaged], 
then the idea of theory as a political act, as a provocation to action in a particular kind of situation gets 
lost.’ (Tarlton The despotical doctrine of Hobbes, part I: the liberalization of Leviathan 2001: 601). 
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be true to the 'authentic text', be it Hobbes’s or other ‘Old Masters’’, but rather to 
uncover and examine the logic of the timeless argumentation it claims is found 
within the text.  
                                                                                                                                     
Seeking the theoretical ‘truth’ in the logic of the words having eclipsed the praxis of action that the 
words hold.   
12 The intent to promote a social stance. 
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Chapter 2. Hobbes: A Metaphysical Interpretation of his Politics 
 
This chapter outlines an unconventional interpretation of Hobbes’s political 
theory, to be developed in full in the following two chapters. It argues that his 
political stance should be understood as an integral part of his general scientific quest 
for the attainment of an indisputable truth that spans the entirety of human 
knowledge-seeking enterprises. It maintains that underlying this endeavor is the 
monotheistic metaphysical idea that the singularity of truth is rooted in the 
singularity of creation. Once the puzzle of the Truth is deciphered, once all the pieces 
that compose it are in place, the order of creation will be restored to its perfect 
original state. The indisputability of the reign of Truth will make this the most secure 
of existences. Everything will unfold according to a predetermined plan; the world 
will come to the standstill of a perfect equilibrium.  
The first section of this chapter unravels the idea that the political stability 
which Hobbes strives to achieve is rooted in theological holism. It distinguishes this 
understanding from the conventional interpretation of Hobbes, as demarcated by 
Sharon Lloyd (Lloyd 1992), as well as from her own unconventional amalgamation 
of his theology and politics. The latter comparison is especially helpful, as it 
highlights the metaphysical nature of the proposed theological argumentation. While 
both Lloyd’s position and mine are divergences from ‘the standard’ view, defended 
by an appeal to logical consistency, she is making a narrow claim for a logical 
connection between the religious idea of belief and Hobbes’s political stances, 
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whereas I assert a wider logical claim that places the metaphysics of monotheism at 
the core of his system of thought as a whole.  
In the second section, the argument for a monotheistic creationist foundation 
for Hobbes’s notion of order is further unfolded. It sets out to piece together 
Hobbes’s eschatology, politics and science, into a consistent system of thought. 
Essentially adopting J.W.N. Watkins’s holistic approach to Hobbes’s system of 
thought, I supplement it with an account of the source of this holistic attitude, namely 
metaphysical monotheism. Thus, I challenge Watkins’s own reduction of the 
theological themes in Hobbes’s works to prudential ‘lip service’. I am equally critical 
of Michael Oakeshott’s attempt to harmonise Hobbes’s academic activities by 
compartmentalising them into complementary non-competing jurisdictions of 
knowledge-seeking disciplines. Contrary to both Michael Oakeshott and Gordon 
Hull, who assert that Hobbes’s political theory is a product of his realisation of the 
incompatibility between biblical and scientific knowledge, I claim he is reacting 
against the subjectification of knowledge. What he prescribes is therefore, not the 
separation of conflicting types of knowledge, but a countermeasure against conflict 
between autonomous agents that motion for themselves, making competing claims in 
the name of their particular truth. 
It is argued that the political ‘once and for all’ surrender of autonomous 
motion that Hobbes envisions, is derived from a metaphysical understanding that 
views both individuation and motion as deviations from an original state of 
perfection. This assertion draws upon a comparison of Hobbes’s theological 
metaphysical position with that of Lady Anne Conway. Additionally the comparison 
reveals that Hobbes is troubled, rather than impressed, by the notion of atomisation.  
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It is maintained that the political system he devises, is aimed at countering a 
negative, but contingent, social process of fragmentation that he observes 
empirically. Although he cannot deny the empirical evidence of the individuation of 
social interaction, he does not view it as an innate feature of humankind, rather he 
views it as a deviation from humankind’s nature as originally instilled by creation. 
His prescription should not be deemed a positivist surrender to reality, it is an 
ambitious attempt to reform humankind’s existence on the basis of the lost direction 
of creation, namely that of a motionless and timeless eternal Truth.   
 
2.1 Metaphysical Monotheism – All for One and One for All 
Sharon Lloyd proposes a ‘rough grouping’ of analytic philosophical (i.e. non 
“contextualist” (Lloyd 1992: 323 note 2)) Hobbes scholarship, according to its 
affiliation with the ‘standard philosophical interpretation’. Adherents of this 
interpretation hold some significant subset of the following
13
 views (Lloyd 1992: 
7,14):  
a. The essentials of Hobbes’s theory can be captured without 
reference to religious interests; 
b. That according to Hobbes might makes order, and correspondingly 
that fear of death and the desire for self-preservation are the 
strongest motivators of human action; 
                                               
13
 Note that the sequence in which these are here ordered is of my choosing, and merely reflects the 
order in which I will address them hereafter. 
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c. Hobbes intended to derive a necessary form of political 
organisation from fundamentally [individualist] egoistic human 
nature; 
d. Hobbes was a materialist reductionist; 
e. That political obligation in Hobbes’s theory is solely prudentially 
based; 
f. Hobbes was a moral subjectivist or relativist; and, 




Lloyd concedes that within this standard bent, interpretation may vary considerably, 
nevertheless, she contends one can still demarcate commentators into three camps: 
protagonists, complete antagonists, and substantial antagonists. Variants of the 
conventional stance include in her view the writings of authors such as Gauthier, 
Watkins, Macpherson, Nagel, Plamenatz, Skinner, Kavka and Hampton.  
Interpretations ‘deeply at odds’ with the standard view are attributed to Taylor, 
Warrender and Hood. Whilst positions that require ‘rejection of substantial portions’ 
of the standard are found in Barry, Oakeshott and Johnston.  Although one might 
differ with Lloyd on the positioning of certain authors, overall I find the sketch of the 
traditional understanding of Hobbes, against which she measures them, accurate
15
.  
                                               
14 The discussion of this last attribute falls somewhat outside the scope of this thesis. I do however 
address it in part in with reference to the differences between David Gauthier and Jean Hampton in 
chapter 4, section 2.   
15
 It is worth noting, however, that adherents of the standard seem to share more as a group than its 
detractors. For instance, the grouping of Oakeshott and Johnston within the camp of ‘substantial 
antagonists’, does not reflect in the least on a shared attitude towards the political role, if any, of 
Hobbes’s eschatology. As noted by Overhoff  (Overhoff The Theology of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan 
2000: 545), Johnston arrives with J.G.A. Pocock to the conclusion that  Hobbes’s eschatology plays a 
political role, whereas for Oaekshott knowledge is acquired in distinctly different ways in these two 
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A brief review of Lloyd’s concise list of the conventional perception of 
Hobbes’s views will help to flesh-out the inverse understanding that is to be 
defended here. Lloyd herself discusses this list critically as a prelude to her 
alternative interpretation. Although I share some of Lloyd’s criticism of the 
traditional understating, the theoretical grounding for our respective arguments is 
distinctive. While we both find the conventional interpretation lacking, we disagree 
on the causes and the remedies for its deficiencies. In order to avoid any confusion, it 
would be prudent to differentiate my divergence from the conventional 
interpretation, from Lloyd’s.  
In Lloyd’s view the difference between the conventional interpretations of 
Hobbes and the one she proposes stems from opposing views taken to the 
relationship between Hobbes’s politics and his theology, as well as from a somewhat 
related dispute over the prescriptive moral stance, if any, which Hobbes holds. She 
finds that Hobbes’s theology provides an insight to the unrecognised significance of 
passionate beliefs as a counterbalance to rationality in Hobbes’s thought. Her 
concern is that the standard interpretation overemphasises the role of might, thereby 
distorting the indispensable contribution of faith to the political system that Hobbes 
devises. She claims that by ‘dismantling’ the Hobbesean social enterprise of the 
‘tool’ of faith, the traditional interpretation subverts his contribution to political 
theory. Detached of his ‘theological backbone’, he is degenerated into a materialist 
reductionist, a theorist of self-obsessed prudentially-oriented entities, whose only 
mode of communication is force and whose sole moral criterion is Power. By 
                                                                                                                                     
fields, therefore  while Hobbes engages in both, he does so separately (Oakeshott Hobbes on Civil 
Association 1975: 20) 
 a4]: Be prepared to explain]הערה
Lloyd 
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contrast, armed with ‘faith’, the Hobbesean position implies the conversion of 
passionate false beliefs to passionate true beliefs, not by duress, but solely by means 
of education. Moreover, according to Lloyd passionate belief is invaluable to the 
maintenance of an undisputed truth, and therefore to the perdurance of the 
unchallenged peace that Hobbes strives for (Lloyd 1992: 43).  
Like Lloyd (Lloyd 1992: 17) and others
16
 I am not content to reduce  the 
recurrence of theological themes in Hobbes’s works to mere ‘lip service’. I equally 
dispute the depiction of Hobbes as a theorist of power relations
17
. Furthermore, I 
endorse Lloyd’s identification of the maintenance of the singularity of truth, as key 
to Hobbes’s argument for stability and peace. However, I do not share with her the 
theoretical foundation for these conclusions.  I view Hobbesean theology, not as an 
insulated religious source of belief that infuses the Hobbesean system with a unique 
passionate hold on the rational truth, but as the foundation for a holistic 
understanding of order. I claim that Hobbes’s sense of order draws upon the 
monotheistic idea of a single indisputable design, ordained by God in his capacity as 
the creator. I wish to highlight the overlooked logical importance of the idea of a 
single Creator to Hobbes’s understanding of the singularity of order, and examine 
how this affects the interpretation of his idea of political rule. I draw my political 
conclusions from the logical implication of the metaphysical aspect of creation in 
Hobbes’s theology, whereas Lloyd draws hers from the logical application of the 
religious idea of faith to social interaction.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
16
 Such as J.G.A. Pocock  and Richard Tuck (Tuck The civil religion of Thomas Hobbes 1993)). 
17
 I will return to this point, and expand upon it with reference to the employment of Hobbes in 
international relations theory, in the conclusion. 
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This is not, however, the only difference between my unconventional 
interpretation and Lloyd’s. My divergence from the ‘standard’ interpretation 
additionally reflects a discord with what I view as a conventional simplified, perhaps 
even positivist version of Hobbes, in which his prescription is defined by an 
empirically observable, unavoidable conflict of desires between firmly set 
individuals. By contrast, I would argue that his normative stance is the polar opposite 
of his description, demanding the reversal of the cause that brought about the state of 
war of all against all, i.e. individuation itself. It is my understanding that in the 
standard view, the task of Hobbesean rational governance constitutes continually 
ameliorating recurring conflict between ‘set’ individuals by ‘routing’ their desires 
through the calm-inducing filter of the sovereign
18
. In my unconventional view, 
Hobbes’s demand for rational governance is not an exercise in conflict management, 
but rather an attempt to achieve its total elimination. It follows that the observed 
conflict of desires is not set. Moreover, the contingency of interpersonal conflict 
suggests that it can be avoided altogether.  
In my view, the solution that Hobbes proposes is to trace (scientifically) 
social instability back to its source, to rectify the causes of disorder, and to start over 
afresh. In the newly imposed ‘revolutionary’
19
 order, in which selves have 
surrendered their voice to the ruler, a subdued peaceful interpersonal coexistence is 
enabled. The mad havoc of a world inhabited by a cacophony of unsustainable 
                                               
18
  That this understanding blurs the difference between Hobbes’s prescription and that of Locke into 
mere nuance, is a point that I take up later on and attempt to refute. 
19
 In the sense of starting from scratch, or borrowed from the context of computers: restarting, 
rebooting. 
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individual voices, is subdued by the silencing, within the public sphere, of 
unsanctioned individual claims and desires.  
The individuals are more than willing to impose these restrictions upon 
themselves, since in Hobbes’s view they only stand to gain from them. In the pre-
restrained state of nature each individual was sovereign ‘de jure’ over their desires, 
however, due to insufficient assurances as to the conduct of others, could not 
securely exercise them ‘de facto’. The conflict as understood here is not reducible to 
multiple individuals making opposing claims, for example to the same object, and 
without any other recourse employing violence in an attempt to dominate one 
another. The risk is not so much a corporal one, as a socially debilitating one that has 
a detrimental influence on grand scale enterprise. It is argued that what troubles 
Hobbes is the threat posed to rational conduct by the detachment of actuality from 
rationality.  His concern is that the rationale behind farsighted social engagement 
with non-familial others (with whom one does not have inherently repetitive 
encounters) dissipates in the absence of a matching, actual stabilizing recurrence to 
sustain it. It is his recognition of the lack of a naturally-occurring order that prompts 
him to advocate an artificial order imposed by the State.   
Hobbes’s affluence aspiring individuals acknowledge that in order to increase 
prosperity, commercial interaction must be expanded to distant strangers. 
Unfortunately, there is a social obstacle in the path to such potentially profitable 
dealings; a persistent stalemate as a consequence of empirically observable distrust 
among strangers. Hobbes proposes to overcome this impasse by substituting the 
naturally lacking direct mutual trust in one’s counterpart, with a trust in ‘the other’ 
that is mediated by an artificially constructed, trusted third party. This external entity 
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enables carefree commerce by issuing guaranteed certification of persons and goods.  
For without such assurance, the identity of persons and the attachment of belongings 
to them would remain forever in a state of dispute. What the State offers in this 
respect is the comforting peace of mind that tomorrow’s social experiences will not 
be radically different from those of today; a frictionless coexistence that is conducive 
to prosperity.  
Hobbes further develops this idea of a connection between recurrence and a 
carefree economical state of rest, by employing an ongoing analogy between Physics 
and Politics; using the tenets of one to explain the other. Indeed, it is purported that 
this is part and parcel of his holistic ambition to reunite reasoning into a singular 
original Truth. Friction, a futile exertion of force, produces nothing but waste in both 
Physics and Politics. I suggest that Hobbes is intent on repairing the social 
mechanism by reengineering it so as to perfect its efficiency. Should the elements of 
his reconstruction of the world as we know it (i.e. from empirical observation), fit 
neatly together into an ultra-efficient orderly mechanism, friction will have been 
removed and the highest productivity will have been gained with minimal 
expenditure of energy.  
It is the appreciation of this cost-benefit equation, and not the standard 
egoistic one (Gowdya and Seidl 2004: 345), that makes the Hobbesean individual a 
variant of ‘economic man’. It is not only preservation that is yearned for in the state 
of nature, but prosperity as well: ‘all controversies are bred hence, that the opinions 
of men differ concerning meum [mine] and teum [yours]….it belong to the same 
chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, 
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by which every man may know what might be called his, what another’s’ (Hobbes 
1998 (1656, 1642): 178 De Cive, VI, 9).  
The assumption is that the toll of exchange without certification is spread equally 
among individuals. In the absence of supplied assurances by the mechanism of the 
State, lack of confidence in the act of exchange would prevail. 
 It is further argued that in order to assure the perpetual perdurance of such a 
mechanism, so that it will not revert back into unreliability, Hobbes resorted to 
modeling it after a ‘perpetum mobile’. It is maintained that here he enters into yet 
another phase of his holistic outlook; one which would join the metaphysics of 
theology to the already conjoined Physics and Politics. The condition for an 
everlasting mechanism is its achievement of perfection. If such an infinite loop of 
comforting repetition could only be ‘jump started’ and left undisturbed, its state of 
perfect equilibrium would allow it to carry on perpetually.  
The only mechanism known to humankind that functions in this manner is 
God. It is therefore proposed that the Hobbesean ambition was to artificially 
construct a social ‘perpetum mobile’, mimicking the natural ‘perpetum mobile’ that 
is God. Yet, it is asserted that not only does Hobbes draw upon the special ‘Physical’ 
attributes of God, but he also draws upon the metaphysical engagement with the 
concept of God in monotheistic theology, and more specifically upon the idea of 
‘rule following’ as the route to salvation in Jewish theology. Indeed, it is proposed 
that Hobbes’s understanding of rationality itself is as an exercise in seeking rules to 
follow; an endeavor that should inevitably lead to the realisation of the unison of 
order as pronounced by creation. 
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The focus on creation and the creator places God, not man, at centre stage. 
The conventional understanding of Hobbes as an advocate of individualism is 
consequently disputed. It is proposed that the source for this confusion is 
inattentiveness to the split in Hobbesean theory between description of the state of 
nature and the prescription of ‘the State’. It is maintained that in the former we are 
motivated by a fear of death, whereas the latter acts as a peril-free sanctuary that 
makes life worth living. It is asserted that while Hobbes describes in detail a 
condition of individuation, he does so not in order to celebrate it, but in order to gain 
an understanding of how to uproot it. His political organisation is therefore derived 
not from an acceptance of egoistical behaviour as the standard interpretation would 
have it, but from its defiance. The political state is structured in order to negate such 
behaviour at its source.  In a similar vein, it is maintained, against the traditional 
understanding, that the materialist reductionism he employs is no more than a 
methodology for the attainment of descriptive data on the individuated condition; and 
therefore, does not, as the standard interpretation holds, positively define his 
prescription.  
It is argued that Hobbes is not a modernist revolutionary, rather he is a 
renaissance reformist. Individuals and their desires are not the fundamental building 
blocks, which Hobbes need only ‘sort out’ by prescribing a mechanism that will 
allow them to live in harmony, despite their inclination towards hubris. Egoistical 
individuals are instead understood by Hobbes to be the product of a setback in the 
originally created reign of rational conduct. The metaphysical fragmentation of 
humankind is for Hobbes the primordial cause of ‘the fall’ into interpersonal tension. 
Subjectivism and relativism are a contingent feature of a contemporary-perceived 
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world, they by no means reflect on the future-normative world. Indeed, it is here 
maintained that the condition that Hobbes aspires to, is one in which the insecurity 
rendered by subjective disputes has been ‘once and for all’ resolved.  Prudence is a 
safety measure that directs us in the flux that is the state of nature. Once individuated 
selves are relieved of their autonomy by the ruler, the perfect efficiency of the 
originally created order will have been reinstated. Once the State is established, it 
ends the folly of risk-encumbered engagement, replacing it with the rational orderly 
conduct of civility.  Under absolute sovereignty prudence becomes redundant, 
replaced with the liberty to trust in the future and consequently to act industriously. 
This section has briefly outlined my proposed departure from the list of views 
conventionally attributed to Hobbes. The foundation for this challenge is the claim 
that the standard interpretation wrongly makes Hobbes into a positivist, whose 
political prescription is defined by an immutable observable ‘real politique’. Instead, 
he is here understood as a reactionary thinker, who endeavors to take control of a 
reality that indisputable empirical indications suggest has gone mad. Moreover, he 
holds that the features and motivations that he identifies in this mad existence need to 
be extracted from it, if sanity is to be restored.  
In a rule-based society, the anxiety produced by the instability of interaction 
between individuals ruled by contingent power relations needs to be replaced by 
predictable conduct. Fear of the future, and by extension fear of death, are not to be 
utilised in the ‘restored order’, as they are implicated in the condition of disorder that 
we are attempting to rectify. Misguided, shortsighted self-preservation considerations 
are to be eliminated, and replaced by ones overhauled in the context of a secure 
future. In such a state, prudential reasoning is replaced by trust in a recurrence 
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imposed by an enduring sovereignty. The subjectivity of social reality is replaced by 
a scientifically deducible objectivity. This is not however a new and enlightened 
science that divorces itself from the ‘old ways’, it is a renewed science that 
rediscovers the lost unison of Truth. 
 
2.2 Seeking the Truth - Perfectionism not Positivism 
 
The main argument in J.W.N. Watkins’s seminal book Hobbes’s System of 
Ideas: A study in the political significance of philosophical theories (Watkins 1965) 
is that one can piece together the Hobbesean philosophical ideas of nature, of man, 
and of civil society into one coherent system that spans moral, psychological, 
epistemological, metaphysical and political thought. Watkins notes that for the most 
part, with the exception of Michael Oakeshott’s Introduction to Leviathan, modern 
studies of Hobbes either did not assert that the pieces fit together, or positively 
asserted that they did not fit together. He contrasts this modern trend with a tendency 
of Hobbes’s contemporaries, identified by I. Mintz in The Hunting of Leviathan, to 
regard Hobbes’s moral and political theory as part and parcel of his world-view. 
Although Watkins commends Oakeshott for not overlooking the unity of the 
Hobbesean system, they clearly do not share an understanding of how the pieces fit 
together.  Watkins is seeking to demonstrate that Hobbes employs a single method 
and a single set of ideas in his discussion of the natural sciences and in his discussion 
of the social sciences, thereby merging them into one art. By contrast, Oakeshott 
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asserts that the Hobbesean system of ideas holds together precisely because it is 
compartmentalised into complementary, non-competing jurisdictions.  
In his Introduction to Leviathan Oakeshott is keen to present Hobbesean 
‘civil philosophy’ as an integral part of the Hobbesean understanding of philosophy. 
For Oakeshott this ‘division’ of human understanding restricts itself to analytically 
plotting an image of the world in which every event can be accounted for in terms of 
cause and effect. Oakeshott asserts that Hobbes differentiates this reasoning ‘take’ on 
the world, from other outlooks, namely, the sensual ‘take’ that produces an 
experience outlook, the empirical ‘take’ which produces a scientific outlook, and the 
‘take’ of faith which produces a theological outlook. The subject matter is what 
divides these ‘takes’.  Clearly delineated, they do not ‘step on each other’s toes’, 
rather they are structured so as to complement one another.  
The image produced by the senses is a necessary condition for the 
development of the reasoning image, as it provides the raw data for the mind to 
process. Yet the processing activity that sorts out the causes and effects by 
manipulating the data in the imagination, is not subject to the restrictions of the 
senses. It is free to shuffle sensory memories. It can dissect these memories into bits 
and pieces, reforming them into a coherent system of causes and effects. Oakeshott 
acknowledges that the distinction between the scientific engagement and the 
philosophical engagement is not as clear-cut in Hobbes. However, he claims that it 
anticipates the later division ‘between a knowledge (with all the necessary 
assumptions) of the phenomenal world and theory of knowledge itself.’ (Oakeshott 
1975: 20). Finally, the image produced by faith complements that of reasoning by 
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addressing a transcendental to which one has no sensory access, and therefore to 
which reasoning could not be applied.  
It is Oakeshott’s contention ‘that the system of Hobbes’s philosophy lies in 
his conception of the nature of philosophical knowledge, and not in a doctrine about 
the world. And the inspiration for his philosophy is the intention to be guided by 
reason and reject all other guides: this is the thread, the hidden thought, that gives it 
coherence, distinguishing it from Faith, “Science”, and Experience. It remains to 
guard against all possible error.’ (Oakeshott 1975: 27). I support Oakeshott’s 
conclusion that the Hobbesean aspiration to faultlessness requires a divorce from the 
world, however, I challenge his assertions that ‘The lineage of Hobbes’s rationalism 
lies, not (like that of Spinoza or even Descartes) in the great Platonic-Christian 
tradition, but in the sceptical, late scholastic tradition. He does not normally speak of 
Reason, the divine illumination of the mind that unites man with God; he speaks of 
reasoning.’ (Oakeshott 1975: 27).  
As opposed to Oakeshott who argues that the Hobbesean ‘civic philosophy’ is 
an exercise in analytically charting the causal route that would unite personal desires 
into society, I maintain that Hobbes is engaged in devising a method to force reason 
back on to a world that has gone mad with desire.  Detachment from the corporeal is 
not only the method he applies, it is also the objective. A goal that is presumably 
derived from the prevalent medieval conception of ‘man’s greatness’ as ‘embodied in 
his ability to rise above nature – indeed, to be “saved” from nature altogether – and 
to achieve eternal association with God’ (Netanyahu 1982: 113). He is not simply 
engaged in analytically making sense of ‘a reflection’ of the world, in a positivist 
manner, he is analysing the reflection in order to prescribe the reformation of the 
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world itself, so that it may regain its original lost sensibility; he is reshaping it into a 
single coherent reality along the holistic lines ascribed by Watkins. 
It is here claimed that Hobbes draws on the parallel between the detachment 
of both God and reasoning from the corporeal, to form a system in which reasoning 
and God are interchangeable terms. Indeed it is held that he is on a quest to replicate 
the unison of God in the corporeal context. The order that he seeks must be one that 
can unite theology and science into a ‘one and only’ indisputable art. Hobbes wishes 
to assure the endurance of peace by commensurating the two ‘once and for all’ into a 
single system of ideas, an unquestionable Truth. He would appear to follow the 
dictum: one God, one Truth, one Reasoning. 
Neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our Senses and Experience; nor (that 
which is the undoubted word of God), our naturall Reason. For they are the 
talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our 
blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the Napkin of an Implicite 
Faith, but employed in the purchase of Justice, Peace, and true Religion. For 
though there be many things in Gods Word above reason; that is to say, which 
cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is 
nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskillful 
Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination. (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 255-6 
Leviathan Ch. XXXII).  
 
My understanding of this statement is that Hobbes is attempting to achieve the 
harmony of the unison of the ‘two book’ doctrine, according to which God has 
spoken to us in two great books: the Book of Nature, in which created things speak to 
us directly, and the Book of Revelation, where God himself reveals to us his own 
inner nature and his free gifts and special plans for humanity. As Norris Clarke notes: 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 43 
‘These two books, both written by the same Author, cannot contradict each other; if 
there is an apparent contradiction, either one side or the other, natural reason or 
theological interpretation of the revelation, has made an error, and each possibility 
must be re-examined more carefully. (Clarke 2001: 7).  
The political implications of such a doctrine are especially troubling to 
Hobbes.  The traditional medieval theory positively welcomes an ongoing debate 
between a theological outlook on politics and a scientific approach to it, supposedly 
leading ultimately to a harmonious coexistence; yet for Hobbes, this is both a lengthy 
and dangerous route to the reconciliation of the two. I maintain he fears that although 
the two books should be reconcilable, the culture of deliberation would deteriorate 
into a competition over authority between scripture and science.  
The solution to this difficulty, conventionally attributed to Hobbes, has been 
the severance of scripture from politics altogether. Gordon Hull asserts that Hobbes 
takes his cue from the prominent medieval reading of the book of Job by 
Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas, as a parable intended to humble man’s reasoning 
abilities, divorcing them from the infinite capacity of God and by extension from 
theological matters. He provides textual evidence to this effect from De Corpore and 
Leviathan respectively:  
Against this Empusa I think there cannot be invented a better exorcism than to 
distinguish between the rules of religion, that is, the rules honouring God, which 
we have from the laws, and the rules of philosophy, that is, the opinions of 
private men; and to yield what is due to religion to the Holy Scripture, and what 
is due to philosophy to natural reason. (Hobbes, De Corpore, in Hull 2002: 14) 
 
and 
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The greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are 
either consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the Kingdom 
of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the present Church, or multitude 
of Christian men now living, or that, being dead, are to rise again at the last 
day:… (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 419 Leviathan Ch. XLIV).  
 
Yet, contrary to the spirit of Hull’s argument, Hobbes does not disengage with 
theology altogether. Instead, he takes steps to split it into an otherworldly strand and 
a worldly one.  It is a division between the marginalised prerogative of the church to 
speculate on the afterlife, and the privilege of the civil sovereign to administrate a 
worldly theology. The church is free to engage itself in theological matters, as long 
as these are restricted to the realm of faith, and therefore have no temporal public 
consequences
20
. Hull himself admits as much when he asserts that Hobbes went to 
great lengths to demonstrate that the age of prophecy is over, and therefore questions 
of scriptural exegesis are subordinate to the will of the sovereign. Indeed, Hobbes 
states so unequivocally: 
Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to 
acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private man;  
(Hobbes 1991 (1651): 259 Leviathan Ch. XXXII) . 
 
                                               
20
 ‘For internall Faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all human 
jurisdiction; whereas the words, and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our Civill obedience, 
are injustice both before God and Man.’ (Hobbes Leviathan 1991 (1651): 360). See also Richard 
Tuck’s comment that ‘An important and surprising feature of Hobbes’s argument [in Elements of Law 
as well as Critique of  White]… was to protect theology from philosophy – more or less the opposite 
of what is conventionally supposed to have been his intention.’ (Tuck The civil religion of Thomas 
Hobbes 1993: 126). 
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Moreover, he clarifies that prophecy was the sole privilege of the ancient Jews:  
there may be attributed to God a twofold Kingdome, Naturall and  
Prophetique: Naturall, wherein He governeth as many of Mankind as 
acknowledge his Providence, by the naturall Dictates of right reason; And 
Prophetique, wherein having chosen out one peculiar nation (the Jewes) for his 
Subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not only by Naturall Reason, 
but by Positive lawes, which he gave them by the mouths of his holy Prophets. 
(Hobbes 1991 (1651): 246 Leviathan Ch. XXXI).  
 
The Hobbesean stance is understood here as a variant on the position Benzion 
Netanyahu attributes to St. Augustine: 
Augustine’s City of God was not an established power, as was the Church of 
medieval times, but a utopia which was once achieved by man, then lost, and 
which should be the final goal of all humanity’s efforts. The City of Man was not 
accepted by Augustine as a legitimate phenomenon, as the temporal power was 
by the Church. The purpose of history, as he understood it, was constantly to 
minimize and narrow the limits of the City of Man and broaden those of the City 
of God. These two domains were antagonistic to each other and their conflict was 
beyond compromise. The full materialization of one ideal meant the total ruin of 
the other, and the purpose of history was, indeed, completely to eliminate the 
City of Man and to establish the sole reign of the City of God. (Netanyahu 1982: 
190) 
  
I assert that Hobbes believes he has figured out the formula for artificially hastening 
the Augustinian progress of history, a theory that will allow for the ‘once and for all’ 
vanquishing of the City of Man, which he observes empirically. The difference 
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between Augustine and Hobbes is that the latter’s messianic version pertains to the 
here and now, and is to be administered politically
21
.   
To the extent that I am here engaged in theology, I do so in the ‘Hobbesean 
spirit’. Namely, I illustrate my argumentation by utilizing scriptural exegesis as 
historical narrative
22
. Like Hull I am convinced that Hobbes was troubled by the 
issue of the possibility of knowing the will of God , and applying it correctly to the 
interpretation of concrete political situations (Hull 2002: 19). But I would assert, 
contrary to Hull and  Michael Oakeshott, that the difficulty which Hobbes identifies 
is not a consequence of mismatch between two distinct types of knowledge, biblical 
and scientific (Hull 2002: 24), but rather the difficulty  of multitude of opinion. 
Social tension does not arise out of the lack of proper demarcation between biblical 
and scientific knowledge, it arises out of individual differences of opinion as to the 
implementation of their reconciliation. The hubris exhibited by human beings is 
individual, as opposed to the collective hubris of the rational ambitions of 
humankind, against which Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas were arguing. I would 
assert that Hobbes does not separate contemplation of the divine from contemplation 
of the political.   
Indeed, I agree with Jürgen Overhoff’s statement that: ‘The Scriptures, as 
Hobbes believed, certainly contained nothing of the kind of speculation as to whether 
and how incorporeal soul might dwell in heaven. And the Bible was, as he stressed, 
                                               
21 See also J.G.A Pocock ‘His [Hobbes’s] politics have taken on a messianic dimension, just as the 
messianism they entail is almost brutally political.’ and ‘his “world to come” so closely replicates this 
world that the distinction between the worlds tends to disappear.’ (Pocock Politics, language and time 
: essays on political thought and history 1972: 173-174)  
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the ultimate yardstick by which Aristotle’s or any other man’s philosophical views 
on this matter were to be measured.’ (Overhoff 2000: 534). What Hobbes wishes to 
divorce is not biblical and political forms of contemplation, but rather to detach the 
act of contemplation from the individual and relegate it to the sovereign (See also 
Martel 2004: 3). The individual is barred from acting in God’s name, while the 
sovereign is entrusted with ‘deciding for God’. The reason the church cannot 
undermine the ruler’s absolute monopoly over contemplation, or for that matter rule 
itself, is because engagement in ecclesiastical matters of the afterlife is irreconcilable 
with administration of the temporal. ‘Internal’ beliefs, and ‘External’ reason, are 
incommensurable.  
 I wish to extend the Hobbesean holism, as defined by Watkins, to include 
what I contend is its underlying monotheistic theology. Watkins himself argues for a 
secularised materialist understanding of the Hobbesean project. He believes that the 
hostility of Hobbes’s contemporary religious orthodoxy was aroused by  
their realization that he [Hobbes] was attempting to transform their God-
supervised, man-oriented, law-bound and comfortably articulated cosmos into 
something quite alien: into a material expanse within which lonely individuals 
are driven by terror to manufacture a Leviathan whose definitions will create an 
artificial morality for them, and whose sword will impose an artificial unity on 
them. (Watkins 1965: 9-10).  
 
I think Watkins is confusing the Hobbesean unorthodox approach with a secular one. 
Hobbeseanism is unorthodox in replacing God’s direct supervision with a surrogate 
                                                                                                                                     
22
 Reaffirming Megan Clive and Iain Hampsher-Monk, Jürgen Overhoff suggests that it was Hobbes’s 
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manufactured human one, yet it does not cross the secular line because it does not 
consider the manmade version of law as having been created anew. Instead, it 
considers itself as engaged in the revival of natural law. 
The Hobbesean position artificially pursues the restoration of an original 
perfectly created peaceful condition. Therefore its employment of God does not 
require a belief in God’s authority to command us, on which Watkins challenges 
Warrender (Watkins 1965: 87). It merely demands the acknowledgement of creation 
itself. Moreover, I would suggest that the ‘creationist’ version of Hobbes actually sits 
very well with the crux of Watkins’s own argument, i.e. the unification of Hobbes’s 
ideas into a singular cohesive system. What Watkins fails to appreciate is that on a 
philosophical monotheistic understanding, the abstract conception of God is that of 
the unity of ideas, which he himself claims is Hobbes’s aspiration. In the argument 
proposed here, the holistic interpretation of Hobbes that Watkins endorses, including 
his absolutism, is not only modelled after staunch monotheism, it is positively 
derived from it.   
I am not denying that Hobbeseanism is essentially reformist, I am arguing 
that it is, however, not modernist in the revolutionary sense that is often attributed to 
it. Hobbeseanism does not consider itself as ushering in something ‘alien’, but rather 
something ‘familiar’. It is unfortunate that Watkins chose the term ‘alien’ with 
relation to the reception of Hobbesean ideas among the religious orthodoxy of his 
time   (Watkins 1965: 9-10), when he himself goes to great lengths to show that 
Hobbes’s scientific method came under the influence of the Platonist metaphysics of 
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remembrance (Watkins 1965: 61-63). According to which, while the language and 
laws of humankind appear to be fabricated, to the extent that they are effective, they 
are actually reconstructed in the mould of the original natural law as instilled in 
humankind by creation.  
 
2.3 Out of Time, out of Space - The reign of an immutable Truth 
 
At the heart of ‘Hobessian renaissance’ is a conceptual fusion of God, 
perfection, standstill and rationality. It is an idea that is shared and expounded upon 
by Hobbes’s contemporary, and sometimes critic, Anne Conway
23
. Lady Conway 
was staunchly opposed to what she perceived as Hobbes’s essentialist materialism, 
(Loptson 1982: 13, 57), due to the implication she found it to have on the status of 
God. Her contention was that if, as she understood Hobbes to be arguing, everything 
were a body and all bodies were by definition corporeal, it would follow that God 
must be corporeal as well. This conclusion was not only demeaning to God, it was 
for her a logical impossibility. For Conway held that while corporeal bodies are 
defined by their susceptibility to change, God stands for perfection, and as such is 
immune to change. In her view only corporeal, imperfect bodies, which require 
change in order to perfect themselves, are amenable to motion and by extension to 
time as well: 
                                                                                                                                     
(Overhoff The Theology of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan 2000: 543). 
23
 On a biographical note, it is worth mentioning that Anne Conway suffered from chronic headaches, 
and that her physician was none other than Hobbes’s close friend William Harvey (Loptson The 
Principles of the most ancient and modern philosophy 1982: 4)  
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 ...Time is nothing else but the successive Motion or Operation of Creatures; 
which motion or Operation, if it should cease, Time would also cease, and the 
Creatures themselves would cease with Time: Wherefore such is the Nature of 
every Creature, that is in Motion, or hath certain Motion, by means of which it 
advances forward, and grows to a farther perfection. And seeing in God there is 
no successive Motion or Operation to a farther perfection; because he is most 
absolutely perfect. Hence there are no Times in God or his Eternity. And 
moreover, because there are no Parts in God, there are no Times in him; for all 
Times have their Parts, and are indeed infinitely divisible, as before was said. 
(Conway in Loptson 1982: 155). 
 
 Her vision of God is that of an anchored Archimedean point, a singular stationary 
instance of equilibrium towards which corporeal entities strive, but which by 
definition remains forever beyond their reach. 
Conway’s argument is reiterated by Aloysius P. Martinich (Martinich 2005: 
203-206). On similar grounds, he too finds Hobbes to be implying that God is 
material.  The consequences of which are twofold. In the first instance, by binding 
God to materiality, God’s infinite incorporeal liberty is severely limited. In the 
second instance, the playing field of humankind and God is leveled. If both are 
corporeal entities credence is given to the equation of God’s creative liberty to ‘put 
things into motion’ with the rationally generated human autonomy (the ability to 
direct the motion of one’s destiny).  
Yet, both Conway and Martinich, wrongly identify Hobbes with a subjectivist 
position that displaces God’s uniqueness as the transcendental anchor of the material 
universe, trading it for self-imposed rules manufactured by the human ‘ratio’. I 
propose an alternative reading of Hobbes that presents him as a reformist, rather than 
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the revolutionary he is often made out to be. Moreover, I would argue adopting such 
an interpretation lends one a much more coherent Hobbesean outlook on 
metaphysical and political issues alike. I charge the modernist interpreters of Hobbes, 
Conway included, with confusing his description with his prescription. The 
contention advanced here is that while his description submerges God into 
corporeality, his prescription is its contrasting mirror image. It wishes to lift 
humankind into virtual incorporeality; to make its conduct Godlike. The 
empowerment of humankind is thus achieved, not by lessening the eminence of God, 
but by raising its own stature to meet God’s. 
Despite the reservations voiced by Conway, Peter Loptson argues that she 
and Hobbes would appear to share a remarkably similar account of substance and 
essence (Loptson 1982: 57). Amplifying Loptson’s assertion, I claim that the 
foundations for their respective arguments can be understood as essentially identical, 
save one crucial element – the sourcing of motion, and the consequent implications 
on our attitude towards it. Consider the proposition that Conway and Hobbes share 
an understanding of God as the epitome of perfection, as well as the identification of 
perfection with an effortless standstill, outwith time and motion. Consider that they 
equally share the idea of God as the creator and additionally both observe the 
corporeal world that inhabits humankind to be in motion rather than at a standstill. 
Finally, they share the common purpose of bringing more Godly conduct into 
corporeal life. Where they diverge is on the role of motion and consequently on the 
extent to which humankind can pursue Godliness.   
It is argued that Conway sources motion in God and therefore views it as an 
instrument of perfection, a positive force that is fuelled by creation in order to assist 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 52 
corporeal beings in changing and thereby nearing perfection. Yet, as much as they 
might aspire to perfection, they are barred from reaching it. By contrast, it is asserted 
that Hobbes divorces motion from God. On the Hobbesean understanding offered 
here, creation could not have originally created anything short of a perfect and by 
extension motionless world. The observable motion in the corporeal world is an 
indication of imperfection, it is a departure from the moment of creation, and must 
therefore have an alternative source – a human one. In other words, creation is not 
responsible for the friction-rife state of nature that threatens our prosperity, it created 
the Edenic blissful paradise that logically precedes it. Humankind by its own hand, 
by its own carelessness, could bring the state of nature upon itself.   
Observation of the social condition of humankind in his day and age suggests 
to Hobbes that the continuity of the original harmonious creation was somehow 
impaired. Still in awe of a perfect creator, Hobbes’s analysis cannot presume the 
creation of a faulty world, and is therefore drawn to the conclusion that the worrying 
condition of humankind is self-inflicted. It is the consequence of a departure from, or 
a rebellion against, the original order of creation. Humankind’s rebelliousness is 
identified as having interrupted the orderly progression of creation. This perception 
of human action as the root of social conflict, combined with great confidence in the 
remedying potential of the inherent rationality embedded by the original harmonious 
moment of creation in every member of humankind, empowers humankind on an 
individual level.   
Granted with autonomy, each and every member of the human race can take 
charge of their own destiny. The individual can act to reverse the unruly liberal 
rebellion, by absolute submission to a single sovereign. He can put a stop to free-
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spirited, havoc-producing forces of particularity, and facilitate the return to the 
original, single voice of rational authority. Since humankind introduced the 
imperfection of motion into the world, it is entirely within its capacity to reverse its 
actions, and restore matters to their original motionless, frictionless state; perfect 
equilibrium is within humankind’s grasp.  
Mark Larrimore captures the contrasting attitudes of Hobbes and Conway in 
the prefaces to chapters from their respective works that he includes in his collection 
of texts addressing ‘the problem of evil’. To Conway he attributes, through the 
influence of the Jewish Kabala, the belief ‘that all creation would eventually achieve 
salvation, and that suffering was God’s educative punishment…’, trying to 
demonstrate ‘…that God created a world in which every thing achieves salvation 
through its own efforts over many incarnations
24
.’ (Larrimore 2003: 174). Compare 
with his portrayal of the Hobbesean position in which the volatility (in ‘socio-
physical’ terms constant motion) of social conduct, calls for ‘the establishment of 
states whose sovereigns have virtually unlimited power to set the terms for the lives 
of their citizens.’ (Larrimore 2003: 149). Indeed from the Hobbesean perspective, 
motion, far from nearing us to perfection, distances us from it. Motion is not an act of 
creation, it is an act against creation. Consider that the Hobbesean sense of motion is 
contrasted, both in physics and in politics, with rest or peace. In order to promote 
peace one is required to curtail motion. In a noncorporeal existence peace is availed 
                                               
24
 See also Peter Loptson: ‘Her [Conway] idea [of essence] is that we can conceive of an individual 
substance, whatever its biological or chemical classification, gradually undergoing transformation or 
metamorphosis, like a caterpillar turning into a moth – yet remaining the same individual.’ (Loptson 
The Principles of the most ancient and modern philosophy 1982: 47) 
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strictly by rational argument (i.e. the laws of nature), but in the corporeal world, 
peace requires the application of force as well (i.e. the ruler’s sword).  
Still, Hobbes does share with Conway the idea of a conceptual fusion 
between God and perfection on the basis of a common immutability to time and 
therefore to change (Conway in Loptson 1982: 155). Both also hold strongly that 
motion or change defines materiality. Thereby confronting both with the difficulty of 
marrying the stationary creator with its perpetually in motion creation. For Conway 
only the creator has the capacity to create and therefore motion must be the 
handiwork of creation. Moreover, anticipating Leibniz, creation is not regarded as a 
singular event, but rather a continual occurrence. In line with the vitalist tradition and 
again in anticipation of Leibniz (Loptson 1982), creation keeps feeding motion into  
corporeal existence thereby rendering it perpetually in motion. Furthermore, as the 
handiwork of creation this motion must be an instrument towards the perfection for 
which the creator stands. We are therefore left to ‘ride’ the wave of motion, utilising 
it to steer ourselves towards perfection. The description and the prescription, the real 
and the ideational, are one and the same in her thinking
25
. They converge into what 
Leibniz would later coin as ‘the best of possible worlds’. 
The Hobbesean perspective rejects these last few inferences. On the reading 
proposed here, while its description is positivist, its prescription is reactionary. It 
denies that the ever-changing instability of the perceived world, could represent the 
best of possible worlds. Not only is the misery in it too prevailing, but humankind’s 
corporeal existence is pervasive with the imperfection of inconsistency. Conway and 
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Hobbes like the biblical Job are both in awe of the creator, but Conway accepts 
creation as continually self-generating the potential betterment of humankind through 
the instrument of motion and change, whereas Hobbes rejects the continuity of 
creation and thereby also the positive implications attached to motion and change. 
For Hobbes creation is a ‘once and for all’ perfect event
26
, any change in it could 
therefore only be a turn for the worst.   
The hint of Stoicism in this interpretation of the Hobbesean position is 
fortified by considering Conway as responding to the Stoic position, and by 
extension to the Stoic in Hobbes
27
.  Consider that Conway’s position has a Humean
28
 
or Smithian air to it. Like Adam Smith (Packham 2002: 477) she borrows from 
Vitalism (Loptson 1982) in order to form an alternative to the Stoic formulation of 
the relation between the particle and the whole. If the suggested parallel is indeed 
sustainable, she is conducting her own version of the Smithian challenge to the Stoic 
assertion that one needs to accept one’s place as ‘an atom, a particle in an immense 
infinite system, which must and ought to be disposed of, according the conveniency 
of the whole’ (Smith in Packham 2002: 477). For Hobbes, even more so than for the 
                                                                                                                                     
25 It is perhaps the projection of her own conjecture as to the relation between the real and the ideal 
onto Hobbes, which leads her to consider him a materialist essentialist and moral subjectivist.  
26
 Note that it is probable that God’s ‘once and for all’ act of Creation, serves as a model for the ‘once 
and for all’ endorsement of the State in Hobbes’s version of the social contract.  Once order has been 
established, it may never again be questioned. 
27
 For a detailed account of the resemblance between the Neostoicism popularised by the Flemish 
philologist Justus Lipsius and Hobbes’s social, political and theological ideas see (Burchell The 
Disciplined Citizen: Thomas Hobbes, Neostoicism and the Critique of Classical Citizenship 1999). 
Moreover Burchell notes that ‘John Bramhall, the Bishop of Derry, repeatedly identified Hobbes’s 
arguments for "destiny" or necessity with those of classical Stoics like Seneca and Zeno, but more 
particularly with Lipsius and Neostoicism.’. (Burchell The Disciplined Citizen: Thomas Hobbes, 
Neostoicism and the Critique of Classical Citizenship 1999: 521)  
28
 Peter Loptson repeatedly draws attention to the similarity between Conway and Hume, in their 
ethics as well as their metaphysical stances. He even goes so far as to say that had Hume had a 
philosophy of substance and essence, he would have adopted hers. (Loptson The Principles of the 
most ancient and modern philosophy 1982: 47)  
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Stoic, the atoms must be fused back together. A fusion into singular perfection, in 
which motion has ceased and by extension time has stopped.  
The realisation attributed here to Hobbes of the troubling implication the 
atomist stance has for  political interaction, is eloquently reiterated in the concern 
voiced by his ‘would-be disciple’ (Battigelli 1998: 63), Margaret Cavendish
29
: 
for if Every and Each Atome were of a Living Substance, and had Equal Power, 
Life and Knowledge, and Consequently, a Free-will and Liberty, and so Each 
and Every one were as Absolute as an other, they would hardly Agree in one 
Government, and as unlikely as Several Kings would Agree in one Kingdom, or 
rather as Men, if every one should have an Equal Power, would make a Good 
Government; and if it should Rest upon Consent and Agreement, like Human 
Governments, there would be as many Alterations and Confusions of Worlds, as 
in Human States and Governments. (Battigelli 1998: 62) 
 
Accordingly, I would argue that the ruler that Hobbes seeks is an instrument for the 
provision of a motionless timeless existence, lest we find ourselves spiralling by the 
force of motion into more and more social friction.  
                                               
29
 Anna Battigelli recounts a bemusing account by Margaret Cavendish herself, of how Hobbes, of 
whom her husband was not only a patron but an academic discussant, shunned her invitation to 
dinner, despite her own extensive interest in his writings. Battigelli comments that Hobbes kept 
Cavendish at a comfortable distance ‘despite and even because of her active interest in his philosophy’ 
(Battigelli Margaret Cavendish and the exiles of the mind 1998: 65) Although well aware of ‘some 
striking similarities between Hobbes’s and Cavendish’s views’ (Boyle Fame, Virtue, and 
Government: Margaret Cavendish on Ethics and Politics 2006: 256), Deborah Boyle identifies an 
original contribution to ethics and politics in Cavendish’s work that differentiates her from Hobbes 
(Boyle Fame, Virtue, and Government: Margaret Cavendish on Ethics and Politics 2006: 259). For 
Boyle what distinguishes Cavendish from Hobbes is the motivation for the pursuit of public order. 
Boyle states that Hobbes relies on an innate desire for self-preservation, whereas Cavendish builds 
upon an inwrought ambition for fame.  Yet in so demarcating the two, Boyle is assuming the 
simplified, admittedly somewhat justified reading of Hobbes as concerned primarily, if not solely, 
with corporal preservation. My own employment of Cavendish is as a ‘Hobbes interpreter’, who by 
reiterating Hobbes in her own style often offers an extra lucidity to his arguments. Moreover, as shall 
become apparent in what follows, I contend that the ‘future outlook’ approach that Hobbes’s 
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It might be helpful to think of the Hobbesean ruler as physically restraining a 
group of free-roaming individual madmen, or to use his own term ‘fooles’. For only 
such a ‘restraining jacket’ can provide them with the peace of mind necessary to 
regain the rational orderliness that is embedded in all creation by definition. Contrary 
to the conventional visualisation of the sovereign poised at the centre and circled by 
increasingly distant rings of subjects, over which she would have perhaps less 
control; the Hobbesean sovereign is here understood as encircling her subjects, 
holding them with equal power to their constant positions. She defends them from 
interfering with each other, by directing their every move. Their interpersonal 
wellbeing is guaranteed, if they relinquish their individuality and allow her to define 
them.
                                                                                                                                     
rationality wishes to teach the ‘foole’, relies on instilling in the latter a posterity motivation similar to 
Cavendish’s fame. 
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Chapter 3. Hobbes: A Holistic Interpretation 
 
This chapter develops the idea introduced in the previous chapter that Hobbes 
is guided by a monotheistic metaphysical conception that stipulates adherence to one 
God, one truth and one order. It demonstrates that his metaphysical and political 
positions represent an attempt to piece together a holistic stance that revolves around 
a notion of the ultimate singularity of Truth. It is argued that the objective of his 
system of thought is to achieve the unison of the arts that will render all physical and 
social interaction scientifically predictable and thus restore the world to the perfect 
order of its moment of creation. Once the re-engineering of our existence is 
complete, once perfect order is restored, we will enter a state of perfect equilibrium, 
one of rest and peace.  
Building upon the comparison of Hobbes and Conway in the previous 
chapter, the first section demonstrates the connection between physical and political 
equilibrium and the idea of creation by a perfect being. It goes on to model the 
equilibrium that Hobbes is striving for, relating it to the idea of the creation of 
humankind in the image of a perfect being. Finally, it claims that Hobbes, perhaps 
unintentionally, ultimately elevates humankind to the rank of the creator.  
The second section argues that although Hobbes seemingly empowers the 
individual, he is wrongly understood to be supporting individualism. It is maintained 
that individualism is a subject matter that he studies, but does not endorse. It is not 
his political prescription, it is a descriptive effort ultimately aimed at restoring a 
condition of original unity that has degenerated into fragmentation. Hobbes is 
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understood as borrowing the rationalist method of Descartes, for whom, in Friedreich 
Hayek’s interpretation, individualism is a means to achieving a liberating unity, but 
not an end in itself.   
The third section argues against the notion that Hobbes was a modernist 
thinker whose defence of rationalism is a revolutionary departure from earlier 
political thought. Building upon the previous two sections, it is claimed that his 
conception of rationalism fits the model of achieving equilibrium by echoing the 
perfection of creation, and thus challenges the idea that rationality is an expression of 
human autonomy. Instead, it advances that rationality is understood by Hobbes as 
being an act of following God.  
The fourth section pursues the connection between rationality and following 
God. It asserts that the interconnectedness of his ideas of physical and political 
equilibrium with his theological perception of redemption, lead him to advance the 
‘interdisciplinary’ pursuit of the Truth. The key to the realisation of the Truth is 
uncovering the rational element in these practices.  Once the rational elements are 
extracted and fitted together, like the pieces of a puzzle-board, the puzzle of creation 
will have been solved; it will be complete and final. 
Building upon the fourth section, the fifth section represents Hobbes’s 
realisation that the thread that connects the disciplines, the basis for rationality, is the 
word of God as expressed in media accessible to humankind, namely scripture and 
nature. Consequently, Hobbes understands the placement of the words in the ‘correct 
order’ as key to the realisation of the Truth. This maintains the recurring theme of 
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reassembling existence into its original format, as it was prior to its fall into the rule 
of chaos.  
The sixth section considers the material aspect of the mental process of 
unification that is sketched out in the previous sections. It identifies a dissonance 
between the mental convergence into rational unity and the corporeal reality of 
diversity. It argues that the emulation of the incorporeal that Hobbes prescribes slips 
into an illusionary belief in the ability of inherently corporeal beings to live out a 
virtual state of incorporeality.  
 
3.1 Perfect Equilibrium – The Russian Doll model of order 
 
I would argue that the political equilibrium that Hobbes is striving for is 
intrinsically connected to Hobbes’s physical perception of equilibrium, namely that 
as long as no force is exerted upon a body it remains at rest. Recall that in the final 
section of the previous chapter I argued that contrary to Conway, Hobbes views 
autonomous motion as an act against the bliss of creation. The fragmentation of 
agency has a negative influence on the interaction between bodies, namely loss of 
productive efficiency due to the apprehension of unforeseeable actions by other 
autonomous agents. Uncontrolled change, or motion, produces an unsettling 
instability.   
Politically, unless undue force is applied, society will potentially remain at a 
state of peace. Empirical observation leads Hobbes to the conclusion that humankind 
has lost its natural balance, but fortunately not its predisposition towards order, 
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namely its rationality.  Peace can therefore be rekindled by artificially regenerating a 
state in which unwarranted force ceases to interfere with the human inclination 
towards rational conduct. We should be able to restore stability to social conduct by 
activating the dormant rationality within, thereon remaining in equilibrium; we 
interfere with no one and no one interferes with us, we are at mechanical rest – at 
peace with each other.   
However, empirical evidence suggests to Hobbes that having been disrupted 
by individual autonomy, orderliness in humankind can no longer sustain itself. Once 
each component of society acts with a mind of its own, the unpredictability of inter-
individual relations produces a debilitating social anxiety. The restoration of 
confidence in orderliness requires a champion of the original overarching rationality. 
Our submission to her sovereignty strips us of our ‘right to motion’ of our own 
accord. Relieved of our autonomy we are transformed into mechanical puppets. We 
become for all goods and purposes, the ‘living dead’, reprogrammable zombies. 
Recall Conway’s assertion that ‘...Time is nothing else but the successive Motion or 
Operation of Creatures; which motion or Operation, if it should cease, Time would 
also cease, and the Creatures themselves would cease with Time:’ (p. 49). If, as I 
argue in the final section of the previous chapter, Hobbes and Conway share a sense 
of time and motion, it follows that in the motionless state constructed by the 
Hobbesean ruler, time would cease and with it the creatures themselves.  
Bringing death into life, so to speak, may actually assist Hobbes in resisting 
theological arguments asserting that the betterment or salvation of humankind could 
only occur after death. In the pre-treatment sovereign-absent stage, the rationality-
deficient state of nature, man is as Oakeshott asserts ‘a complex of powers…life the 
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unremitting exercise of power, and death the absolute loss of power.’ Yet the civil 
order is not, as he argues, ‘a coherence of powers’ (Oakeshott 1975: 19), rather it is 
the complete surrender of power. Subjects are compelled to check into the 
sovereign’s ‘rehab clinic’ and undergo drastic treatment, due to the debilitating social 
apprehension from which they suffer. Accordingly, they agree to allow the ruler 
complete access and control over their person. It is in this uninhibited, putty-like, 
state of mind that they are reintroduced to the rules that allow for the restoration of 
the frictionless, motionless existence they came to lose. The entire re-education 
process is held within an artificial sanctuary, a reservation in which motionlessness 
order prevails and can therefore thrive – the State.  
Hobbes does not only portray the absence of a State as a grim condition of 
chaos, but also as an expression of foolishness. The volatility of the state of nature 
and its sporadic coalitions motivate the Hobbessian rational individual to seek a more 
permanent haven. The Hobbesean ‘foole’ is introduced as one who ‘hath said in his 
heart, there is no such thing as justice’(Hobbes 1991 (1651): 101 Leviathan Ch. XV), 
wishing to convey the notion that the foole cannot conceive a state which would 
dispense justice. The Hobbesean foole has a ‘reasoning disability’: he is incapable of 
‘reckoning’, calculating his actions in relation to the actions of others, far enough 
into the future to realise the benefits he may individually reap from conducting 
himself in a social manner. His inability to elevate himself beyond current events and 
practices drives him to deny the long-term benefits of an orderly State. By doing so 
he is in fact denying the personification of justice.   
The Hobbesean attempt to rationalise justice is further highlighted by 
identifying the substitutions Hobbes chose to make while paraphrasing the original 
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biblical text: ‘the scoundrel/wicked said in his heart, there is no God’30. Hobbes 
replaces God by justice and the original ethical term ‘scoundrel’ by the foole. The 
implications of this parallel, I would argue, are farreaching. Hobbes attempts to 
reconcile faith and reason by portraying them as analogous efforts. Both are 
understood as rule-following enterprises that must ultimately converge on a ‘one and 
only’ truly viable order. They are not posited as factions that compete for the title of 
the Truth, but rather as its two champions. Reaching an uninterrupted, unchallenged 
order, ‘The Truth’ depends on the integration of these two knowledge-seeking 
enterprises.   
The resolution of the potential conflict, as offered by Hobbes, is that 
underlying these activities is a single method instilled in existence by creation. The 
structure of existence that I interpret Hobbes to be suggesting, resembles in its 
construction the layered manufacture of a ‘Russian Doll’ toy. The classic Russian 
Doll, known also as nested doll or stacking doll, is a collection of hollow figurines 
crafted with precision as incrementally larger sized replications of an original solid 
doll that is nested at the core. Due to the precision with which the doll-layers are 
made to mimic one another’s features, albeit increasing in size, the multiplicity of 
layers stack together to form a singular unity. Similarly, in the proposed model of 
creation the harmony of nature or coexistence without friction, is sustained since 
each layer of ‘creation’ has been fashioned to echo its predecessor; stretching back to 
the original mould of creation - authentic God. By extension a social state of peaceful 
coexistence is to be achieved by submission to an artificial order that emulates a 
                                               
30
  Psalms, 53, 2. 
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natural one that has unfortunately been lost. For social order to function, i.e. to 
remove friction from social interaction, each social layer needs to echo a preceding 
layer. An ordered society is one whose components echo the original source of order. 
In the corporeal existence of humankind, the reverence with which God is 
held as the original source of creation needs to be transposed on to a reverence with 
which the State is regarded, and more particularly on to the reverence of the ruler. 
Indeed, I maintain that Hobbes conceptually fuses God with rationality and stability, 
and utilises the constructed corporeal medium of the State, in an attempt to infuse all 
three into the ailing society he perceives. The method of infusion and the objective of 
said infusion are one and the same, echoing the rules. A society in which all follow 
the rules is one of complete subordination. It is an existence in which permanent 
order prevails, thereby relieving its inhabitants from concerns about what the future 
might hold.   
I would argue that the level of security that Hobbes promises requires the 
complete dislodgment of humankind from its corporeality and the uncertainty that 
goes with it. Admittedly, by placing governance into the hands of a corporeal 
sovereign, Hobbes acknowledges the barrier to direct Godly rule and seemingly 
reinforces the division between the corporeal and the incorporeal. However, he also 
realises that the indisputability of rule to which he strives is that of a perfect order, a 
Godly one. Anything short of perfection risks receding into the anxiety of 
indeterminate social conduct, igniting a cycle of distrust.  He therefore proposes to 
overcome the difficulty in synthesising the corporeal and incorporeal by picking up 
on the echo of the original order and reproducing it. A chain of imitation is 
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established, the sovereign mimics God and the public mimics the sovereign, thus 
vicariously the public follows God.    
Yet the Godlikeness which Hobbes aspires to achieve by means of the 
Russian Doll model, soon slips from ‘emulation of God ’, which regards God as a 
role model, to assuming the position of ‘native God’; in other words it elevates 
humankind to the rank of God. From frail foolish beings who are incapable of 
managing their interaction with each other, it is presumed we undergo a 
transformation into perfect rational citizens. Thus Hobbes tries to improve upon the 
sorry human condition in the state of nature by ‘surgically removing’ the source of 
the problem, namely the psychologically debilitating effects of corporeality. 
Challenging this position, it will here be argued that even if it were possible to lose 
one’s corporeality through a process of rationalisation, the advantage of a frictionless 
existence comes at the cost of individual particularity: being at one with the Godly 
comes at the expense of purging what defines us as particular selves.  
 
3.2 Hobbesean rationality as hostile to individualism 
 
Both J.W.N. Watkins (Watkins 1965: 71-72) and Gregory Kavka cite a 
passage from  the English translation of De Cive (Philosphical Rudiments),  from 
which they derive  conclusions as to Hobbes’s dissection-based scientific method as 
well as his attitude towards individualism. 
For as in a watch, or some such small engine, the matter figure, and motion of 
the wheels insunder and viewed in parts; so to make a more curious search into 
the rights of states and duties of subjects, it is necessary, I say, not to take them 
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insunder, but yet that they be so considered as if they were dissolved, that is, that 
we rightly understand what the quality of human nature is,…and how men must 
be agreed among themselves that intend to grow up into a well-grounded state. 
(Kavka 1986: 83).  
 
Watkins suggests that the adoption of the dissection method implies empowering the 
lowest level of deconstruction as the source of the construction itself, which in the 
political context he translates into the liberal empowerment of the individual level 
(Watkins 1965). By contrast, Kavka concludes that the primary function of the 
proposed dissection method is to determine ‘what the proper function of the State is, 
what undesirable conditions or features of the state of nature it serves to ameliorate’ 
(Kavka 1986: 83).  
I wish to lend support to Kavka’s position, arguably pushing it further than he 
had intended. The argument being defended here is that Hobbes disassembles society 
into individuals, merely in order to reconstruct them in ‘the correct’ order. He sets 
out to solve the puzzle of   reconstructing them into a single coherent rational body. 
It is argued against Watkins’s assertion that dissection only implies reductionism, if 
the outer layers of the dissected ‘onion’ are sheltering an explanatory primary 
component that is found at its core. The liberal conclusion is only warranted if one 
considers dissection as a process of peeling away distracting layers in order to reveal 
an essentiality.  
In order to assist in conveying an alternative function of dissection in 
Hobbesean theory, I propose to re-label it ‘decomposition’. This new label insinuates 
that the primary matter, the prevalent individualism that Hobbes observes 
empirically, is the result of a ‘rotting process’. Contrary to Watkins’s suggestion, it is 
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here maintained that Hobbes does not employ dissection as a means towards 
understanding the primary building blocks that generate reality. Rather, he is 
studying the ultimate product of decomposition (i.e. the individual) as a means 
towards the end of understanding the process that is eating away at a harmonious 
productive society, to the extent of threatening its very existence.  He is observing 
the phenomena of social matter (i.e. society) disintegrating into anti-social matter 
(i.e. the individual), in order to prescribe measures for halting the debilitating effect 
of the fragmentation process. The antidote he consequently devises against the 
encroachment of the malignant process is the application of rationality to counter 
what he perceives is an increasing distance between individual action and rational 
conduct. Individuation within Hobbesean theory is thus no more than a reflection of 
a chosen scientific method. It has no intrinsic value whatsoever. It is an ‘as if’ 
postulation for the perfection of a collective ‘well-grounded state’; no more than a 
‘ladder’ en route to rational liberty, to be discarded as soon as the objective is 
achieved. 
I would argue that Hobbes’s individualism falls under what Friedrich Hayek 
terms ‘pseudo-individualism’ (Hayek 1949: Ch. 1 'Individualism: True and False'). 
For Hayek proper individualism is founded on a process of constant questioning, 
similar to Karl Popper’s idea of scientific method (Popper 2002: ch. 1). It pronounces 
eternal doubt as the means by which the end of individualism is to be achieved. By 
contrast, pseudo-individualism relies on individualism as a reactionary measure that 
aims to dethrone traditional authoritarianism (i.e. religion and monarchy) in the name 
of a rational and revolutionary commonly shared authority. It is held that liberty 
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consists in the collective eradication of irrational conduct, and that liberation is to be 
advanced by the most effective of means.  
For the pseudo-individualist therefore, individualism is not an end in itself, it 
is merely a means towards the end of an unbound liberty, which is to be achieved 
through the rationalisation of individuals. This position is taken, albeit to a differing 
degree, by such authors as Rousseau, Mill and Marx; or as Hayek would put it they  
‘…are all manifestations of the same basic view which wants all social activity to be 
recognisably part of a single coherent plan. They are the results of the same 
rationalistic “individualism” which wants to see in everything the product of 
conscious individual reason.’ (Hayek 1949: 25).  
For the purpose of illustration, consider the tale of the metaphorical
31
 
banishment of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. On a true individualist 
interpretation Adam and Eve could no longer be contained in the safe certainty of the 
Garden of Eden because they bit into the fruit of self-awareness and individual 
doubt. They went through a process of irreversible fragmentation into individuals. 
Consequently they find themselves split between the awareness of their actual 
physical individuation and its mental corollary that was previously joined with God, 
seamlessly interlinked into a monistic generality. The difficulty of coming to terms 
with the emerging tension not withstanding, it is acknowledged by adherents of the 
Smitho-Humean school of thought, of which Hayek is representative, as an 
irresolvable dissonance. By contrast, on the rationalistic individualist Cartesian 
school, a remedy to the predicament is within Adam and Eve’s grasp. By biting into 
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the forbidden fruit, they attained a measure of Godly rational certainty, thereby 
unlocking the gates of naivety that held them. Adam and Eve lost their childlikeness 
forever, they were no longer seamlessly interlinked into a monistic generality, yet it 
is proposed by Hobbes that this generality could be recaptured by cultivating their 
rationality. They might rejoin the ‘great link’ of perfect harmony, artificially 
rebuilding the original unity by applying rationality. In doing so they would dissolve 
the tension brought about by physical corporeality, they would cure themselves 
completely of the evils of fragmentation.  
It is the hubris of this rationalist approach, the assumption that perfection is 
attainable through the flexing of our faculties, which threatens Hayek’s sense of 
individuality. The idea of perfection
32
, a perfect equilibrium, would leave no scope 
for contention, no room for competition, no space for alternative individual positions. 
It would be a world, as stagnant and dead as it is complete - an inhuman motionless 
void; the definitive aspect of Humanity, the capacity to rebel, having been quashed. 
By contrast, an aversion to the tendency towards dissent seems to have served as the 
impetus for the Hobbesean enterprise. Although Hayek makes no reference to 
Hobbes in the entire ‘Individualism: True or False’ chapter, and reflects mostly on a 
Rousseau-Kantian authoritarian tradition, I am inclined to agree with Norman Barry 
that it is just as much an indictment of Hobbes:  
                                                                                                                                     
31 While this may or may not be theologically plausible, I am deliberately choosing to interpret the 
banishment of Adam and Eve as a metaphorical banishment rather than a physical one.  
32 That equilibrium contradicts the epistemological boundaries set by Hayek, is well demonstrated by 
Chandran Kukathas in his discussion of the role of competition in Hayek’s theory: ‘…Hayek was 
attempting to draw economists away from their tendency to characterise the competitive order as an 
equilibrium state, arguing that because equilibrium “presupposes that the facts have already all been 
discovered and competition therefore ceased” (NS 184), such a concept was of limited theoretical 
use.’ (Kukathas Hayek and Modern Liberalism 1989: 96) 
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The 'rationalism' to which the theory of spontaneous order is in intellectual 
opposition precedes the Enlightenment and perhaps is most starkly expressed in 
seventeenth-century natural law doctrines. In Thomas Hobbes' model of society, 
for example, a simple 'natural' reason is deemed to be capable of constructing 
those rules which are universally appropriate for order and continuity. (Barry 




And if it is, then Hobbes is neither the sceptic nor the proponent of individualism that 
some (Oakeshott 1975: 60-62) have deemed him. 
 
 
3.3 The Renaissance of Order 
 
Elevating ourselves from the darkness of a disordered human condition, to an 
enlightened Godly conduct is a process that bears some of the marks of a 
revolutionary act. However, it is probably best thought of as a renaissance: a 
realisation of the dormant Godliness within. The Hobbesean aspiration for progress 
is a counter measure to the regression of humankind. It is a yearning for the recapture 
of past glory.  With such an approach, forming a forward-looking perspective is 
intrinsically connected not only with rediscovering the past, but with reviving it, and 
literally reliving it, re-entering an infinite loop in which the predictability of the 
familiar fosters security.  
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Contrary to Arrigo Pacchi’s contention that ‘… Hobbes’ state of nature had 
no biblical connotation whatever [whatsoever]: no God governed it, not even in that 
original and individually savage state’ and that ‘Hobbes mentioned Creation and the 
Fall of man purely in a casual manner’ (Pacchi 1988: 234), I argue that, far from 
being casually mentioned, these form the backbone of Hobbesean theory. On the 
reading proposed here the state of nature is precisely man’s and not God’s. It is 
therefore no wonder that it is not governed by God. By contrast, the original state of 
nature, God’s created one, is explicitly described by Hobbes in Leviathan: 
 And first we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he 
not broken the commandment of God, he had enjoyed it in the Paradise of Eden 
everlastingly. For there was the Tree of Life; whereof he was so long allowed to 
eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil; 
which was not allowed him. And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God 
thrust him out of Paradise…(Hobbes 1991 (1651): 307 Leviathan Ch.XXXVIII).  
 
I therefore contend that the entirety of the Hobbesean enterprise should be 
conceived as an anticipation of John Milton's famous titles Paradise Lost and 
Paradise Regained, answering 'the fall' by proclaiming that the State can 'catch' us in 
a reclaimed corporeal Eden, a realm of artificially induced consistency modelled on a 
long lost natural consistency, in which the original naive trust can be rekindled. It is a 
response to Garrath Williams’s observation that: 
                                                                                                                                     
33
 Barry reinforces this contention by positing Sir Matthew Hale’s reply to Hobbes Dialogue of 
Common Laws, as an argument against rationalism in the tradition of Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, 
and in the present day, Friedrich Hayek. (Barry The Tradition of Spontaneous Order 1982: 6)  
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 It is part of our fallen condition that no transcendent authority speaks to us alike; 
we can and must decide on the meaning of our own acts and lives. (Williams 
2000: 309).  
 
The stance taken here is much in line with the position Pacchi attributes to Klaus 
Michael Kodalle: 
 Seen in this light, the painful march of humankind from the natural state to the 
social contract is interpreted as a movement of reconciliation of man with God 
after the sin of Adam, the restoration of an alliance which evolved gradually 
through a succession of covenants – Abraham, Moses the coming of Christ – 
culminating in the escatological vision of the final establishment of the Reign of 
God on Earth. (Pacchi 1988: 236).  
 
Pacchi himself shrugs off Kodalle’s proposition, citing Hobbes’s ‘effort to keep 
religious tradition and theology at bay never letting them gain control’. It is my 
intention to refute Pacchi not so much on textual exegesis grounds, nor by means of 
Kodalle’s ‘theology of history’, rather, I mean to do so on grounds of coherence, 
claiming that on the whole a renaissance Hobbesean position self-integrates better 
than a modernist one.  
From Hobbes’s perspective, the understanding of the shape that society must 
take so as to recapture the original order is to be sought in the accessible traces of the 
order of creation: namely, the words of scripture and the rules pronounced therein. 
The words of God are a scaled replica of their origin. If we abide by the rules 
dictated by the words, we become a link in the Godly order. Moreover, we become a 
scaled-down replication of it ourselves. By linking up with our origin we consolidate 
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ourselves into a society. Having followed the Russian Doll model, we achieve a 
synchronised harmony. Note that the method and the objective of the enterprise are 
one and the same: the establishment of a faith in rules.  
Jumpstarting this circular, law-abiding eternal loop, out of which we were 
ejected by the ‘incident’ of original sin, requires a leap of faith. But since distrust 
now prevails, a resurrection of law and order requires the assistance of a surrogate 
that will reinstate the long lost link with natural order. The Hobbesean ruler is 
fashioned to function as an artificial substitute for this missing link. We follow the 
ruler and the ruler follows God, so by proxy we follow God, and order is restored to 
the world. Once we have re-established the link it would be foolish to fiddle with it, 
along the lines of: ‘if it ain’t broke don’t fix it’. The assumption is that the only 
viable orderly society is a Godly one that establishes itself in the Truth. As Hobbes 
indicates in Leviathan other forms of order only masquerade as the Truth:  
men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, though never so absurd, 
and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that 
reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to 
change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they 
know at most but that they think so. (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 48 Leviathan Ch. 
VII). 
 
 The lack of viability of competing forms of pseudo-orderly societies is due to their 
inability to ‘deliver the goods’ of perfect equilibrium. Their instability pronounces 
them untrustworthy and therefore ill-fit for restoring faith among the socially 
disillusioned.     
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 The rationality that the Hobbesean State introduces into the lives of the 
fragmented individuals should be familiar to them both in content and in method of 
administration. It is no more than a reproduction of the original order embedded in 
them by the creator. It is reborn as a replica of the original master mould; the 
method, employed in order to school the subjects in it, equally follows a replication 
model. They take their place in a chain of emulations of order: the ruler emulates the 
order as set by the creator, and the subjects emulate the order as set by the ruler, 
consequently achieving a conduct matching that of original creation.  In this respect 
rather than being a break with tradition, the Hobbesean position adopts the scholastic 
method of education by apprenticeship. It is a practice that lives on in contemporary 
schooling, at least in the plastic arts, in which as part of their training students 
literally reproduce masterpieces. It is also a tradition that is supported by the original 
creative act, as described in scripture, in which Man is created in ‘God’s image’ or in 
other words as a scaled down replica of God. Indeed if all of creation were to 
organise itself in a chain of emulation that reached back to God, our puzzle would be 
solved and the original harmony of creation would reign again. 
 Hobbesean empirical observation of humankind reveals that the original 
harmonic order was disrupted. Explanation for the disruption is identified 
analytically by tracing the phenomena of insubordination and the associated 
fragmentation effect back to its original occurrence, namely, the dispersal of Edenic 
human collectivity, symbolised in the shift from the singular appearance of only one 
Adam and subsequently only one Eve, into a plurality of individuated human beings.  
This plurality of human beings places a wedge between it and the singularity of God 
that threatens to place the world in a state of disorder, due to a lack of common 
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ground between the fragmented individuals. The conventional answer to this 
difficulty, under the title ‘divine right theory’, was to establish a privileged lineage 
that connected a sovereign to ancient father figures, working back to direct 
knowledge of the original order. Averse to the demonstrability of divine lineage, 
Hobbes is charged with providing an alternative route to the original common 
ground. 
 The mission taken up by Hobbes is to prevent the unwelcome outcome of 
individuation, namely anarchy. The ambition is to overcome the barrier between the 
necessary singularity of common rule and the effective plurality of fragmented 
individuals: ‘But one and the first which disposeth the to sedition, is this, that the 
knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man.’ (Hobbes 1998 (1656, 
1642): 244 De Cive, XII, 1). The instrument for achieving the objective of 
reintegration is the ruler. The method applied is that of replication: more specifically 
the artificial recreation of a worthy, master-like corporeal figure, who acts as a 
surrogate source of the original lost order. It is an attempt to mend a broken society 
that has lost touch with the original order, by cloning it in the image of a model with 
proven credentials. Much like a broken vase, humanity has been reduced to 
fragments and rendered dysfunctional. Since the fragments can no longer hold 
themselves together, and since God’s ”hands” cannot be soiled in corporeality, the 
sovereign’s hands must actively hold the pieces together. In other words, the 
sovereign is acting for God.  
 The role is essentially one of a coordinator that holds her subjects in their 
place vis-à-vis each other, and in as far as she is merely a conduction vessel for the 
Godly to enter this world, she is not strictly speaking ‘running the show’. That is not 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 76 
to say that ‘the show’ runs itself or self-replicates. The sought after coordination is 
not that of Adam Smith or David Hume which is achieved by means of a correlating 
‘invisible hand’ that relies on the exchange of signals between individuals. The 
sovereign does not teach the individuals to properly communicate with each other, 
nor does she provide them with a method to recognise each other’s signals. Such 
efforts would be futile since direct communication would only reiterate their 
irreconcilable differences. Instead, she offers them a role model to fashion 
themselves after – herself.  
 The subjects are entirely alienated from each other, acting only in accordance 
with prescribed standardised guidelines. If they all follow the sovereign’s order to the 
letter, they will become synchronised into unison. Moreover, she herself is 
compelled to reaffirm her role model status by practicing what she preaches. In her 
corollary relation with God she too works within the strict guidelines that she 
subsequently projects upon her own prescriptions. The trickling down of rationality 
follows a living Russian Doll model. Yet, unlike the solid version in which each doll 
is prefabricated to fit perfectly into its larger facsimile, in the living version the 
perfect match between the components requires that every level shape itself in the 
image
34
 of the previous level, forming a chain of replications that goes back to the 
original master copy.  
For further clarification consider the difference suggested by David Lewis 
between endurance and perdurance (Conn 2003: 95). Endurance is persistence 
through time in a complete form. In each and every time frame nothing is lost and 
nothing is gained. The object persists through time as a replication of itself; its 
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facsimile keeps surfacing again and again. The source of its recurrence is either 
something inherent to it, or is achieved by an external ‘fax-machine’ that keeps 
recreating it. In certain accounts such an external source would be named God. By 
contrast, perdurance is persistence that is stretched through a set of time frames, just 
as a road would stretch spatially. It allows for both losses and gains to the object, 
thereby drawing the essence of its existence from a deeper layer of existence or from 
an exterior source; again perhaps God. The Hobbesean God would appear to be a 
replicating one of the former type. Replication embodies rationality for Hobbes, as it 
achieves a permanent order of things. The sovereign is an artificial replication of 
God
35
. She is charged with replicating our lives, thereby generating a sense of 
familiarity that brews security. We, in turn, are   expected to take part in the 
interlinked replication process by replicating the method of replication, i.e. 
employing rationality in our consideration of the reign of the sovereign. Breaking the 
chain of replication would therefore be both irrational and unGodly.  
Although something of the traditional hierarchy between God, Sovereign 
and individual survives; in Hobbes’s version, the flock are Godly creatures, and as 
such are order-aspiring. It is this aspiration for order that legitimates the sovereign as 
its provider. In sufficiently large groups, due to sparse interaction, natural replication 
of order becomes unviable. If we rarely meet naturally, we might need to meet 
artificially
36
. It is such artificial mediation that is provided by the sovereign. The 
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 Recall that the scriptures speak of Man being made in God’s image. 
35
 Note that the replication analogy would also assist Hobbes in contending with the difficulty of a 
potential conflict between the ruler’s bidding and God’s bidding, which he recognises in chapter XLII 
of Leviathan (Hobbes Leviathan 1991 (1651): 388). 
36
 I believe so called ‘netizens’ (Hurwitz Who Needs Politics? Who Needs People? The Ironies of 
Democracy in Cyberspace 1999: 655) have taken this idea to its extreme, claiming that the ease and 
frequency of virtual interaction could replace sovereignty altogether .  
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State is a rational node
37
, an artificial mechanism that duplicates a process at the 
macro level, with which we are intimately familiar, that occurs naturally at the micro 
level of the family or the village. Once again we are merely expected to reacquaint 
ourselves with an inwrought order; to re-establish contact with the root of our 
creation. 
 
3.4 The Edenic prototype – Reestablishing the peaceful kingdom of God 
 
Following the Church Fathers, the Hobbesean text observes in scripture the 
description of an original sin-related ‘fall’, from the pinnacle of an innocent, 
seamlessly peaceful social unison in the Garden of Eden, to the dire straits of 
individuated social hostility. For Hobbes, contrary to the pessimism often associated 
with his approach (Williams 2000: 312), hope is not, however, lost. Humankind can 
still hope to redeem itself, not only in death, but in life. The evidence for this is to be 
found in the biblical account of the rise of the ancient Hebraic society. Again, in 
accordance with the Russian Doll model, Hobbes views the replication of the course 
of law-abiding society charted in scripture as the medium for re-unification with the 
one and only sustainable order. Life need not be wasted in a miserable solitary wait 
for reunification in death, meanwhile breeding superstitious worldly beliefs. Instead, 
union can be achieved here and now by employing the instrument of reason to clone 
the original position, picking up the pieces of the human condition, the human state 
of nature, and rationally working out the puzzle for putting them back together in just 
                                               
37 A central intersection of information exchange. 
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the right order to reform the Godly state of nature: an order of perfect equilibrium 
that, if achieved, will have an indefinite hold.  
 The Hobbesean rational engagement with worldly matters, as opposed to 
superstitious (or perhaps more precisely awe-struck) attitudes that riddled pre-
Hobbesean Christian theology, amounts according to David Johnston, to no less than 
a ‘transformation of the human psyche that would prepare men and women to be 
assembled….into a truly lasting political community.’ (Johnston 1986: 130). This 
divergence from the orthodox Christian thinking of his contemporaries may be 
related to Hobbes’s adoption of the Mortalist or 'soul sleeping' heresy (See ref. 2 in 
Maclear 1981: 75), (Pocock 1972: 175). I believe Maclear correctly traces these 
differences within the Christian faithful
38
 to the '...tension between the Hellenic 
concept of psychic immortality and the Hebraic emphasis on the Last Judgment…' 
(Maclear 1981: 78). In the former, ‘the waiting’ is an attribute of corporeal life, with 
death pronouncing the end to the queue and the transmutation into a sublime psychic 
form that spends eternity either in heaven or in hell. In the latter, death has no 
liberating connotations, on the contrary, in death one is cocooned in a ‘soul sleeping’ 
state of limbo, awaiting the final judgment. Arguably as Hobbes immerses himself 
more and more in the old-testament, his political theory becomes encumbered with 
Hebraic theology (Pocock 1972: 193-194, 200), which by obscuring discussion of the 
afterlife, forces one to focus on life here and now. Moreover, its “afterlife” is a 
resurrection of the material world of the form depicted in the biblical ‘dry bones 
                                               
38
 As Maclear disapprovingly states: ‘apparently to most modern students denial of immortality 
belongs properly in a secular materialist, or rationalist context, and its appearance in the intensely 
religious atmosphere of the Antinomian struggle is inappropriate.’ (Maclear Anne Hutchinson and the 
Mortalist Heresy 1981: 76)  
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vision’ of Ezekiel (Ezek. 37:1-14), not the nullification and replacement of it with an 
immaterial one.  
 One cannot overstate the importance that the de-glorification of death has to 
the Hobbesean project
39
. Still, the proposition that death is the greatest of all evils is 
a postulation that draws on little more than intuition (See also Johnston 1986: 93). 
Recall however, that theologically, death, like pain and hardship, is itself a 
repercussion of original sin. The aspiration for a reversal of these calamities implies 
an ambition for the defiance of death.  
But where it is said, in the day that thou eatest thereof, though shalt surely die, it 
must needs bee meant of his Mortality, and certitude of death. Seeing then 
Eternal life was lost by Adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should 
cancel that forfeiture was to recover thereby, that Life again. (Hobbes 1991 
(1651): 307 Leviathan Ch. XXXVIII).  
 
While death cannot be eradicated, it can be made inconsequential by erecting a 
political body that will vicariously immortalise its members, the proxy for this 
immortalisation being a conservative State that is immune to change. Indeed it 
requires no change, it is just right – it is perfect.  
 Since the sinful actions of man distanced God from regulating such a State, a 
mortal ruler is required. Modeled after God, the ruler must be immortal, if not 
literally, then at least in spirit in the form of a conservative dynasty. The logic behind 
this move is that what does not change is forever left uninterrupted, even by death. In 
a world guided by consistent rules, nothing changes and nothing dies. In such a 
                                               
39
 On a side note consider that suicide bombers can be considered irrational, precisely because they 
have no appreciation of the value of life here and now. For them the corporeal world is merely a 
gateway to the incorporeal one. 
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world everything is predictable and therefore nothing is to be feared. Thus having 
removed death from the equation, one has ‘willy-nilly’ removed irrational fear as 
well.   
 The aforementioned division between the afterlife as 'God's business'
40
 and 
life (of 'embodied minds'
41
) as 'our business' lends itself to being misconstrued as a 
move towards secularisation. For example, Fania Oz-Salzberger claims that thinkers 
like Hobbes and John Selden followed a modern implementation of a Hebraic model 
that originally ‘achieved the breakthrough of removing civil society from its divine 
cradle…’, thus paving ‘the way for the secularization of modern European politics.’ 
(Oz-Salzberger 2002: 6). My contention is that while Hobbesean texts may have 
been an inspiration for such secularisation in the thought of later thinkers, Hobbesean 
theory loses much of its robustness without its theological metaphysical grounding. 
Although one can make a good case for the secularisation of Hobbes (see Moloney 
1997), one can equally view this secular analysis as a confusion of the Hobbesean 
social prognosis with its prescription.  
 Upon sorting out the two, one appreciates that the Hobbesean 
acknowledgement of a division between the profane and the holy is not meant as an 
endorsement, but rather a description of the malady of society, of which 
individuation is a symptom. Far from advocating individuality, Hobbes seeks to 
annihilate it by re-establishing the long lost orderly unison that has been preserved in 
the words of scripture. The proper use of words, their use according to infallible rules 
of logic, holds the key to an everlasting perfect order of peaceful existence. Once 
                                               
40
 Inaccessible to humans due to their corporealy   
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such perfection is reached, nothing will be wanting, and the world will have come to 
a state of rest. There can, however, be only one order that remains in perfect 
equilibrium – a Godly order
42
.   Godliness imposes only one workable peaceful order  
on the physical world; the same scientific approach that is applied to physics should 
be successfully applied to politics. Indeed the same rules should apply in all orderly 
engagements. As Benzion Netanyahu notes  
the prevalent opinion [across monotheistic theology of the middle ages, from 
Maimonides and Al-Ghazali through Averros to Roger Bacon] was that it 
[scripture] contained not only “wonders of wisdom”, but all the truths 
concerning all the problems which baffle the human mind. It is only through 
Revelation, through God’s word to the Hebrew prophets, that man learned 
what he knew, and it is therefore on the foundations of revealed knowledge that 
all sciences rest. (Netanyahu 1982: 99). 
 
 Nevertheless, this does not entail that reason is superior to revelation. Instead it is 
suggested that for Hobbes, reason and revelation, both being derivatives of infallible 
logic, should be regarded as two sides of the same coin. Netanyahu provides an 
explanation for such a relationship in the context of the theology of the middle ages: 
There seemed to be no question, then, that one must look to Holy Writ as the 
source of all truth. But the question was how to understand or interpret Holy 
Writ. Here human reason, seemingly suppressed and relegated to secondary 
importance, began to manifest its strength. Instead of guiding and controlling 
Reason in accordance with what they found in Scripture, people began to 
interpret Scripture in accordance with the directives of Reason. (Netanyahu 
1982: 100-101).  
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 Borrowing a term used by Jean Bethke Elstein (Elshtain Sovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign 
Self 2006) 
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It is proposed that where Hobbes diverges from the orthodoxy of the Middle Ages, is 
not in the role of reason in the interpretation, but in the understanding of the role of 
sovereign as God’s proxy for the assurance of the reasonable behaviour of each and 
every individual. It is only the sovereign’s singular unquestioned interpretation that 
can restore peaceful order to the world. Only if it does not, can we ascertain in 
retrospect that this particular sovereign was ‘a false messiah’.  
 The Hobbesean theory of State is therefore not a break with God, nor is it 
putting God in ‘his place’
43
: rather it is putting humankind ‘in its place'. It does not 
imply God's redundancy
44 
in humankind's world; rather it implies humankind's 
redundancy in God's domain (Martel 2000: para. 10 & 98) . Thus, contrary to the 
dominant view that Aloysius P. Martinich attests is shared by both atheist and theist 
interpreters, I contend Hobbesean theory is not attempting to ‘domesticate religion, 
in order to make sure that it served the interests of civil government’ (Martinich 
2005: 176), but that it is domesticating civil government to make sure its serves 
religion. God and humankind are never regarded as of equal stature
45
, and it therefore 
makes perfect sense that their relation is not one of reciprocity.  
Indeed Hobbes himself (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 97 Leviathan Ch. XIV) makes 
this exact point, exclaiming that reciprocal relationships are by definition only 
possible among equals. This leads to his denouncement of such relations, not only 
with brute beasts, but also with God. Recall his critique of making believe, by means 
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 More than one point of equilibrium carries with it the implication of Polytheism. 
43
 In the sense of limiting his context. 
44 As P. Monoley states Samuel Parker argues in A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie (Moloney 
Leaving the garden of eden: linguistic and political authority in Thomas Hobbes 1997: 251)   
45
 This correlates with yet another odd biblical tale – the Tower of Babel. Recall that those engaged in 
the construction wished to reach the sky, which could be construed as an attempt to physically 
equalise their stature with that of God in the sky.  
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of a vow, that humans can contract with God. This does not merely rely on the lack 
of clear indication as to whether God is receptive to the 'offer'. It is not strictly a 
communication problem, as it might be with the beasts. It is a complete mismatch 
between humans, who are by definition bound, and God, who is by definition 
unbound. The bound should not therefore deceive themselves into thinking that by 
the trickery of vows they can compel that which is unbound. Humankind cannot 




Consider my proposal that the Hobbesean objective may have been to protect 
faith by distancing it from the earthly realm of doubt. The manipulation of souls is 
recognised as outwith the reach of human knowledge and should therefore remain in 
the realm of faith, over which only God can preside
47
.  By contrast, earthly matters 
are of man's doing and therefore within a mortal jurisdiction. I accept P. Moloney's 
thesis that '…Hobbes comes to realise that the acceptance of his own state-of-nature 
scenario required a radical reinterpretation of its competitor the Genesis story, a 
retelling that severed Adam completely from divine knowledge, language and 
precepts, casting him into the world of an autonomous fabricator of language and 
law.' (Moloney 1997: 248). However, I reject his claim that this entails parting with 
the Godly altogether.  
                                               
46
 This is a recurrent theme in the old testament, beginning with  Cain’s misunderstanding of the 
essence of offerings to a God that by definition ‘already has everything’, carrying on in interpretations 
of the story of the binding of Issac as a pronouncement of Abraham’s conviction, as well as in the 
interpretation of the tragic fate of Iftach’s daughter as the result of Iftach’s vanity rather than his 
conviction. An echo of which might be found in Hobbes’s own attitude towards vows. 
47 Thereby denying acts of religious inquisition. 
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Retelling the story, as demanded by Moloney, one could hold that with the 
consumption of the forbidden fruit of cognition we took matters into our own hands:  
‘Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is 
Judicature of Good and Evill’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 144 Leviathan Ch.21).  We 
were expelled from the seemingly immaterial bliss of Eden into the material 
hardships
48
 of this world, including death. As a repercussion of Adam's actions a 
corporeal world materialised into which we were banished and left to our own 
devices (on the Hobbesean account, two devices to be precise: passions and reason). 
Left to fend for ourselves
49
, we would be foolish to sit idle and await redemption, 
since on the ‘soul sleeping’ account redemption occurs post-mortem, and in God’s 
good time. Having not lost our gift of rationality we can, just as scripture tells us the 
ancient Israelites did, put time on earth to good use by recreating a land of milk and 
honey: we can clone a heaven for the living. Moreover, in so acting we might be 
promoting redemption itself.  
I am further puzzled by Moloney's employment of the phrase 'cheat of words' 
(Moloney 1997: 249) with reference to the solution that the Hobbesean divorce from 
the 'Edenic discourse' (Moloney 1997: 248) incurs.  He implies that in order to 
challenge the mechanical passing of 'true words' from God through Adam and Noah 
to a select few, Hobbes not only had to assume that human language and law were 
                                               
48 Contrasted with the imperfect corporeal state, in which sustenance depends on work, the immaterial 
Eden is defined by effortlessness and lack of friction.  
49
 See also James Martel: ‘For Hobbes, the absence of a clear and authoritative divine voice, far from 
being the cause of our woes enables and even requires the possibility of human agency. Our reason is 
a gift from God, a "talent" given to us in order to negotiate a world marked by God’s (relative) 
absence. Rather than despair, we must endeavour to become aware of our own power to discover and 
produce truths in God’s name.’ (Martel Strong Sovereign, Weak Messiah: Thomas Hobbes on 
Scriptural Interpretation, Rhetoric and the Holy Spirit 2004: 2)  
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 86 
necessarily fabricated, but also had to adopt Francis Bacon's notion, widely accepted 
by his contemporaries, of language as an agent of perversion. This encapsulates a 
vision of a pure Godly language that is lost on an impure world, for which an entirely 
new language inflicted with imprecision has been humanly devised, and thus 
insinuates that the Hobbesean stance subscribes to the idea that in the Machiavellian, 
earthly political arena, words are employed to disguise the truth rather than reveal it.  
Moloney finds textual evidence for the proposed mischief of language: in the 
disharmonious and discontentful effects attributed to it in Leviathan Chapter 17, in 
the disturbance and error ascribed to it in De Homine, and finally in its being 
accredited as a 'trumpet for war and sedition' in De Cive (Moloney 1997: 260).  I am 
inclined to accept Moloney's general assertion that if language were immune to 
manipulation, it could stand its own ground, and would not require the aid of a 
political body to enforce it. However, it is quite a leap from this to the conclusion 
that language is untrustworthy. Although the Hobbesean concern with lack of trust 
among strangers might be reduced to communication problems induced by the 
fluidity of language, distrust could be equally attributable to subjective perspective 
within a solid language. Moloney seems to assume that human beings are 'hardware', 
whereas language is amendable 'software'.  But the mirror image of this view, 
wherein human beings are softly conducive to perspective and language is soldered 
hardware, would seem just as plausible.  In this understanding it is not that language 
requires unification by means of the ruler, but rather the correction of the distortion 
of perspective by the adoption of a single outlook. For Moloney, the ruler establishes 
(fabricates) language and law anew, whereas on the proposed reading the ruler does 
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not write her own law, but rather enables or revives the pre-established
50
 natural law 
that all would follow naturally if they only could.  
Preventing natural law from being relegated to a dead letter makes the ruler 
an agent of God, not in the divine right sense, but as an instrument that enables 
individuals to act in accordance with the laws of nature, or in other words in a Godly 
manner. The crux of the argument is that the Hobbesean position is wrongly 
understood to have discarded God, replacing him with a mortal ‘God’. The 
Hobbesean stance may have detached the umbilical cord between God and the ruler, 
however, the ruler still facilitates the pursuit of God in a corporeal existence. She 
ceases to be God on earth in the divine right sense. She is not a vehicle for rational 
Godliness to reach us
51
, a vessel through which God speaks; she is instead a vehicle 
for the pursuit of rational Godliness.  Moreover, as suggested above, our relationship 
with God is perceived by Hobbes as a unilateral one. As a result God's direction will 
not pursue us - we must pursue it.    
The secularisation of Hobbesean thought fails to generate a legitimacy of 
authority that would, once and for all, put to rest the Hobbesean social nightmare of 
mutiny. Understood in a secularised fashion, apart from reducing human interaction 
to a material struggle over the source of social motion (i.e. material power), the 
Hobbesean position does nothing to finalise the struggle for power. Indeed it may 
even be perpetuating it
52
. It is on the grounds of ineffectiveness at advancing this 
foremost goal of the Hobbesean endeavour, i.e. peace, that the secular interpretation 
                                               
50
 Arguably by God. 
51
 Such an assumption would place a restriction on God, essentially binding God to the ruler. 
52 I will elaborate on this point with relation to Hobbes’s contribution to IR theory in the conclusion. 
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is rejected.  Without the appeal to the singularity of a ‘one and only’ ordained order, 
so perfect that no one could reasonably object to it, and no one in their right mind 
would hope to unseat it, the entire project collapses. 
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3.5 Worshipping the power of words to conserve the Truth 
 
 According to the interpretation being proposed here, for Hobbes rationality is 
a feature of Godly origin, perhaps related to the Jewish tradition
53
 that the world was 
created, not by the causal actions that are required of those of corporeal existence, 
but rather by the transcendental power of a Godly utterance
54
. A tradition that lives 
on not only in charms and amulets, but also in a reverence of words to the extent, 
perhaps most strongly pronounced in the Kabala, that their misuse is believed to be 
the cause of real world calamities. Within Judaism, as well as outwith it, the tradition 
of ‘Word worship’ splintered into magical and rational offshoots. For the magically 
inclined the mastery of words was a recipe for manipulating the elements from 
proper witchcraft to alchemy, whereas for the rationally disposed it held the key to 
deciphering the truth. Yet both strands converged in their ambition, not only to 
understand nature, but to control it. Most telling in this respect are the various 
incarnations of the Jewish Golem myth dealing with the bringing to life of dead 
matter. The most prominent of which is a tale that attributes the 16
th
 century real life 
figure Rabbi Judah Loew, the Maharal of Prague, with the act of bringing to life a 
creature formed of mud by inscribing the Hebrew word ‘truth’ on its forehead. The 
creature, who much like Marry Shelly’s Frankenstein, subsequently went out of 
                                               
53
 For a corroboration of the proposed link between Hobbes and Hebraic thought  see also  Fania Oz-
Salzberger’s case in The Jewish Roots of Western Freedom  for  ‘the sustained effort to read the Bible 
politically during the seventeenth century…’ that ‘…affected early modern thinking about the state 
and about political liberty, and took part in the birth pangs of classical liberalism itself.’ (Oz-
Salzberger The Jewish Roots of Western Freedom 2002) 
54
 In this respect the aforementioned ‘foole’ may be said to be acting in an unGodly fashion, or on 
another version, against the laws of nature. 
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control, was said to be subdued by removing one letter from his forehead thus 
forming the Hebrew word ‘dead’.  
 Although in Leviathan Hobbes voices fierce opposition to the occult, he does 
so on the grounds of its irrational implementation by charlatans who abuse the 
public’s fear of the unknown ‘So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, 
from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and 
dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 82 Leviathan 
Ch. XII), rather than on grounds pertaining to the internal methodology employed by 
these arts. It should be noted that in its infancy the grand masters of the scientific 
tradition from DaVinci to Newton, were engaged in a wide array of order and control 
seeking activities including those that contemporary scientists would associate with 
the occult.  Furthermore, fallibility criteria such as have been raised in contemporary 
philosophy of science, are discerning from a Hobbesean stance, since they undermine 
the absolute infallible solidity that is being sought. Or as Alan Ryan puts it, it is  
implausible to suppose that Hobbes was a defender of Popper’s methodology of 
conjecture and refutation avant la lettre; in Hobbes’s account true science 
renders refutation inconceivable…It is more persuasive to assimilate Hobbes and 
Galileo; Galileo thought that geometry was the key to celestial mechanics…once 
it was spelled out, was a matter of necessity. (Ryan 1988: 85)  
 
Accordingly, I find it curious that Michael Oakeshott throughout his Introduction to 
Leviathan is insistent on labeling Hobbes a sceptic. It would be less curious had he 
not chosen to marry Hobbes’s alleged scepticism with an alleged individualism. For 
if Hobbes was a sceptic, it was in so far as he appreciated diversity in the perceived 
world (Lister 1998) and not in a meaningful epistemological manner.  
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 In Hobbesean theory, if a proposed solution is only transitional, it is no 
solution at all, as it provides no improvement upon the current uncertainty and its 
disturbing social distrust side effects. The Hobbesean mission is to reduce the realm 
of the unknown to the point of inconsequentiality, thereby reducing to nil the 
spectrum in which fear mongering could occur. This mission of peace is to be 
achieved by demystifying material phenomena, accounting for it in a systematic 
format that can be conserved and communicated in words and formulas. Once all is 
rationally accounted for, the demons of irregularity will no longer haunt us. We will 
come to control our mortal fears; we will be in possession of the Truth. 
  Words are considered vessels of rationality, carrying it either verbally or 
scripturally. The advantage of script is in its endurance. It defeats the frailty of 
corporeal individual recollection and enables inter-personal relations to build upon 
past experiences, thereby opening the door to a collective form of progress. Or as 
Oakeshott eloquently puts it: ‘the achievement of language is to “register our 
thought”, to fix what is essentially fleeting.’ (Oakeshott 1975: 24). This analytical 
approach, is opposed to Aristotle's empiricism (Hobbes 1991 (1651): Leviathan Ch. 
XVII) that observed predetermined sociability on the basis of a perceived ability to 
cooperate towards the achievement of a common goal. As well as differing from 
Smitho-Humean perceptions of rationality as a process that relies on the interaction 
between creatures endowed with no more than signaling abilities.  Aristotle's bees 
and ants are excluded because their actions are merely pseudo-social. Their 
predetermined objective, combined with signaling abilities, lead to efficient 
automation that mimics social autonomous interaction based cooperation. The hive is 
not social, because it is not rational. It cannot be rational because, although its 
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members can communicate information to each other, they do not have access to the 
tools of reflection (i.e. written language and mathematical equation). Lacking 
autonomy to reflect they are reduced to automation. Their routine does well to 
sustain them in an evolutionary sense, but it also bars progress beyond their 
predetermined characteristics. It inhibits their advance to perfection through self-
betterment. The hive and the hoard have reached the height of their development, 




  Setting us apart from the beasts
56
, in Hobbesean theory, rationality and 
sociability are interchangeable. Primates, although not addressed within the 
Hobbesean text, would probably have earned the title 'modicum rational'. Indeed, 
Zenon Bankowski in an attempt to illustrate rationality, makes use of a David 
Attenborough nature program depicting monkey behaviour:  
The monkey displays rationality when it universalises and transcends the 
particular experience.  When it sees that what happened is not something that 
stands alone.  It sees the event as something that can be connected with past and 
future experiences and it so connects them…. It is a refusal to see the world as a 
chaotic universe of particular instances which have no connection. (Bankowski 
2001: 24).   
 
It is my understanding that in a Hobbesean view the human advantage over the 
primates' ‘modicum rationality’ is derived, from our ability to build upon a legacy of 
accumulated rational discoveries. Modicum rationality allows one to transcend 
particularity, arriving at general rules. Nevertheless, comprehensive rationality that 
                                               
55
 Understood in this fashion Hobbesianim feeds into Marxism. 
56 By contrast to Aristotle’s notion of society. 
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transcends the limits of a mortal lifespan must rely on traditionally written 
documentation. Although contemporary forms of documentation such as video and 
pre-historic documentation in the form of cave-art may serve as records as well, the 
written word remains the most efficient medium for communicating data. Consider 
how much more information is conveyed in a novel than its film adaptation, or how 
much longer it would take you to listen to an audio recording of the pages you have 
just been reading. 
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3.6 Escaping corporeal boundaries. 
 
 By using words we are emulating God
57
 in at least two ways. Firstly we are 
emulating his aforementioned action of creation and secondly we are emulating his 
immortality. Utilising the registrar
58
 of the written word, we may be said to be 
‘defying death’. Leaving the finite and the particular behind, we attempt to join with 
God on the eternal plane. Still, recognising a distinction between emulation of 
perfection (imitating God) and perfection itself ('native God'), which I argue it soon 
loses track of, the Hobbesean position acknowledges the weakness of the binding 
effect of human utterances. If we were not the moral weaklings that we are, we could 
rely on each other's word. This not being the case, in order to achieve Godly conduct 
(preserving the intentions behind the words), humans need to crutch themselves on 
the State.  
Without this artificial support we would collapse into the ‘momentariness’ of 
the foole and the beast. By safeguarding rationality, acting as a guarantor of words
59
, 
the State brings God into our lives. Since words are of God's image, they carry with 
them the essence of perfection; they carry the endurance and decisiveness that the 
human state of nature, as opposed to the Godly state of nature, lacks. With the 
assistance of the sovereign’s sword, words can be upheld in the earthly context, 
literally ‘making heaven a place on earth’. The State acts as a proxy in the service of 
                                               
57
 ‘The first author of speech was God himself’ (Hobbes Leviathan 1991 (1651): 24) 
58 ‘Speciall uses of speech are these: First, to Register what by cogitation wee find to be the cause of 
any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which, in 
summe, is acquiring of Arts.’ (Hobbes Leviathan 1991 (1651): 25) 
59
 Which are presumed to be of God’s domain, and to have preceded the creation of the physical 
world.   
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perfection. In order to accomplish this it takes on (clones) Godly features, 
pronouncing itself as an earthly irrefutable source of endurance. It bridges the gap 
between the corporeal and therefore bound, and the incorporeal unbound.    
 Hobbes never wholeheartedly acknowledges the ‘boundedness’ of humankind 
to its corporeality, most certainly not as an inherent and therefore inescapable feature 
of human existence. No sooner does the Hobbesean argument recognise individual 
human imperfection, than it ‘moves to strike it’. At once the State shifts from a form 
of prescribed medication aimed to relieve the chronic frailty of the human condition, 
to an absolute cure. Hobbes plays the role of the rational physician that is intent on 
solving, what he views as our fatal ailments, by applying drastic measures of social 
engineering. He identifies that the human social body, very much like the physical 
body of the individual, is imperfect in that it is prone to breakdown and ultimately 
death. Again seemingly relying on an analogy between the physical body and the 
body politic, he would appear to be attributing malfunction to the unavoidable 
existence of friction in a corporeal world. In order to remove the friction, the State is 





 are bound to result in friction of the joints, which 
would eventually lead to the pains of conflict.  
 Hobbes, as opposed to Hume, clearly does not believe that nature has blessed 
us with enough innate ‘lubrication’. Moreover, he seems to be implying that we 
brought ruin upon ourselves
62
. But is he advocating a bionic society? Is he 
suggesting that we replace one type of fragile material bond with sturdier 
                                               
60
 Presenting a positive ‘take’ on what Marx would later term ‘alienation’. 
61
 Authentic relations in Marxist terms. 
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reconstructed material variants? Is the solidity of the new form of authority he 
aspires to the product of mastering a chemical recipe, thereby producing the political 
equivalent of super-reinforced concrete? In a section entitled Hobbes's Materialist 
Psychology (Hampton 1986), Jean Hampton argues for the orthodox view of Hobbes 
as a strong physical reductionist that builds upon the emerging ‘natural philosophy’ 
of his day to establish a physics of the body politic. Relying on exerts from De 
Corpore she concludes that not only does he insist ’…the explanation of human  
behavior is to be found in the study of physics…’, moreover she contends that he 
adopts the view that the behavioural functions of humans can be reduced to 'the 
(deterministic) natural laws of motion that the ultimate [atomistic] particles always 
obey’ (Hampton 1986: 12), and finally she deduces from ‘the tone of his discussion 
in Chapter 6 of Leviathan…the more controversial thesis that there was a unique 
reduction of a psychological state to a physical state..‘ (Hampton 1986: 13).  
 The breadth and depth of textual evidence, notwithstanding, accepting this 
radical reductionist portrayal of the Hobbesean stance supports the conclusion that 
his is a bionic project. On this understanding it proposes to reconstruct faulty 'fooles' 
by manipulating the physical occurrences that induce their social motivations. The 
worry I have about such an interpretation is that should this construction be anything 
short of perfect, surely it would eventually suffer from the same physical ailments, 
and by extension social ailments, that it was put in place to eradicate. Consequently, 
either the eradication is left incomplete, or it relies on a ‘perpetuum mobile’ device 
                                                                                                                                     
62 Alluding to the story of the banishment of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. 
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that would either be inapplicable outside the vacuum of theory, or would defy the 
very laws of physics in practice
63
.  
 It is tempting to answer this dilemma by projecting Gregory Kavka’s 
assertion as to the idealised sense in which Hobbes conjures up a state of nature 
populated by idealised individuals (Kavka 1986: 84), onto its ‘negative’
64
, the State. 
On Kavka’s account, in the context of the counterfactual state of nature, the 
hypothetical idealised individual serves a heuristic purpose. In the factual world, 
could the idealised rational individual not serve as a model, an ‘ideal type’, to be 
aspired to, if never to be fulfilled? I would argue that coherence considerations 
would suggest otherwise. It would be difficult to detach Hobbeseanism from its 
absolutist, all or nothing, tenets. Hobbesean theory places individuals on a slippery 
slope. They are either rational agents or ‘fooles’. Either there is an absolute captain at 
the helm, or the social vessel goes completely out of control. There is no room for 
partial allegiance, those who comply are friends and those who do not are foes. The 
citizenry either complies absolutely, or it does not comply at all.  
The Hobbesean project is not about controlling the fire within, but rather 
about extinguishing it. It is a 'once and for all' act of contracting apprehension of ‘the 
other’
65
, out of existence. The Hobbesean logic asserts that distrust is like a bonfire, 
if one does not put it out, it will spontaneously reignite. To the extent that we are 
presented with a choice at all, it is an all or nothing choice between: gaining the 
security that goes hand in hand with submission to the sovereign, or facing the 
                                               
63
 Positing him with such mystic contemporaries as Robert Fludd. 
64
 In the photographic sense. 
65
 Gregory Kavka asserts that in a Hobbesian state of war ‘the parties need not actually be fighting 
each other…All that is required is a known willingness.’   
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insecurity of incompliance. The latter being for the most part a hypothetical deterrent 
that no one in their right mind would choose over the former. As Kavka contends 
(Kavka 1986: 84), it serves as motivation for making the grade, for stopping ‘the fall’ 
into the state of nature.  However, just as much as the state of nature remains an 
impossibility, the ‘negative’ image of a perfect State populated by rational citizens 
must be real. It must be achievable in its entirety, or not at all. It cannot be 
hypothetical, not even in part. Once the puzzle has been pieced together, it has been 
solved once and for all. It is the attainability of the Truth through the tool of 
rationality that puts all discord to rest. It is a single Truth that spans all of creation. 
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Chapter 4. Hobbes: Rationality as Recurrence 
 
This chapter further develops the relationship between rationality and 
resistance to change, or recurrence.  It maintains that Hobbes strives to achieve a 
political existence in which complete predictability in social conduct displaces fear 
of the unknown; one in which rationally deficient ‘fooles’ that exercise their force 
aimlessly, will be converted into rational, objective driven citizens. It asserts that far 
from being a theory, comparable to Machiavelli’s, on how to utilise force to one’s 
advantage, Hobbes is advancing a theory of peace in which force becomes 
redundant.  
The first section reinterprets Hobbes’s employment of fear as a motivator for 
human action. It challenges the conventional understanding that social anxiety in 
Hobbes’s state of nature stems from fear of damage, if not the irreversible damage of 
death, which aggressors might inflict upon one’s person. Instead, it recasts fear as the 
apprehension of the unforeseeable. It argues that Hobbes is not merely 
‘administering threat’, replacing unsanctioned interpersonal threat with a legitimate 
one imposed by the sovereign. While it acknowledges that the Hobbesean sovereign 
is authorised to threaten the insubordinate, it maintains that her first order of business 
is to generate an anxiety-free environment, a society that is not preoccupied by 
distrust. The sovereign’s primary function is to stabilise the rules of conduct, to 
generate a predictable existence that is conducive to rational behaviour. The 
enforcement of the rules positively reinforces rational behaviour, it is not intended to 
place fear into our minds, but to liberate us of fear. The sovereign has the right to 
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punish the rebellious, because their actions pose a threat to an anxiety-free existence. 
By questioning the given rules, they reintroduce the unknown into interpersonal 
conduct, and with it, fear.  
The second section compares this interpretation of Hobbes with David 
Gauthier’s attempt to recreate the Hobbesean argument without resorting to a 
sovereign; arguably removing from the latter’s theory the strive towards perfection 
and the modelling after God, attributed to it in the preceding chapters. It maintains 
that Gauthier’s system presumes that stability can be generated from the grassroots 
of the individual, a position that is at odds with the top-down application of order, 
attributed here to Hobbes. While it acknowledges the credibility of Gauthier’s 
interpretation, it argues that his position exasperates the difficulty of continuous 
identity that Hobbes set out to solve with his strong sovereign and matching State.  
 
4.1 Hobbes - The reassuring certainty of the outcome of an infinite loop 
   
 Hobbes is a theorist of anarchy, but not of despair
66
. The pre-social, 
sovereign-absent ‘state of war’ he conjures up, does not strictly prohibit reciprocal 
social behaviour, rather it places those engaged in such conduct at risk.  My 
understanding is that the individuated beings he envisages are not necessarily in 
actual jeopardy at any given moment, rather they are numbed by their preoccupation 
with the inconsistency of their social interactions; an irregularity that is associated 
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 See also (Ritschl Can Ethical Maxims be Derived from Theological Concepts of Human Dignity? 
2002: 96) ‘…both Hobbes and Locke operate with presupposition that the destiny of the human race is 
not destruction or extinction (This too, is a parallel to the biblical concept of covenant….’ 
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with peril.  The following illustration and its subsequent modulations articulate the 
differentiation between the immediate threat of bodily harm that Hobbes is often 
thought to be addressing, and the threat to industriousness posed by the erratic 
behaviour of one’s social counterparts, to which I claim he is attending.   
 For example, while I am walking through a meadow I encounter an apple 
tree. Seeking to benefit from it I claim it for my own. Not an hour goes by before a 
stranger comes along claiming the same tree for herself, disputing my possession and 
threatening my exclusive access to its benefits. Lacking any manmade rules to 
govern our conflict, we are guided by shared natural corporeal inclinations, split 
between passions on the one hand and reason on the other. Additionally, being a 
product of sin-imposed corporeality, we cannot help being entirely self-centered. 
Accordingly, in the worst-case scenario, we completely succumb to our passions
67
, 
misguidedly waging war on each other and effectively risking our own survival. It is 
conventionally assumed that Hobbes is responding to this kind of threat, attempting 
to steer individuals away from an inevitable clash between desires.   
 Among the upper classes, resolution of the conflict of desires historically 
often led to a somewhat alternate approach that would equally lead to risking one’s 
survival; challenging our adversary to a duel. Hobbes himself labeled such an option 
as honorable yet unlawful and most certainly irrational:  
private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawful, till such 
time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for 
them that make the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; 
and the ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though 
for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in 
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one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the Lists 
to avoid disgrace.(Hobbes 1991 (1651): 67 Leviathan Ch. X) .  
 
Hobbes’s staunch opposition to dueling as a mode of conflict resolution was 
probably not due to the lack of stability it generated nor the lack of procedural 
structure, since as we learn from Sivert Langholm, in practice duels were not only 
conducted in a strict orderly fashion, but also: ‘with the aid of (controlled) violence 
appear to have produced a large frequency of definitive conflict 
resolutions.’(Langholm 1965: 324).  
 Perhaps he branded it an irrational act of ‘rashness’, since the stability of the 
resolution was reliant upon a clear-cut outcome achieved only by leaving at least one 
party dead. He could also have foreseen retaliation by members of society affiliated 
with the deceased and not compelled by the finality stipulated in the rules of 
engagement. More interestingly however, he also deems the act illegal. He might 
only be mirroring irrationality as illegality, but he might also be reacting to the 
commonplace idea that dueling, much the same as medieval battles between knights, 
was in essence leaving the decision to God. The widely held expectation being that 
God would intervene on side of the righteous. Not only can the imposed involvement 
of God in the conflict be considered demeaning to God and an infringement of his 
unboundedness (related to the discussion in the previous chapter on p. 84 of the 
disapproval of compelling God to one’s ambitions through personal vows), it may 
serve to perpetuate aggression, encouraging an endless array of would be ‘God’s 
                                                                                                                                     
67 As a complete ‘foole’ might do. 
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 champions’ challenging each other for the throne.  
 The conventional understanding of Hobbes is that he replaces these ‘barbaric’ 
life-endangering exchanges of aggression and the never-ending cycle of retaliation 
thereof, with a civil conduct imposed by a sovereign who monopolises the use of 
force.  Yet I would argue that there is more to Hobbes’s forward-looking and reason-
based society than the resolution of day-to-day survival. The State does not merely 
function as minder of ‘unruly children’
68
, preventing them from physically 
challenging each other; instead, it is argued that it is an instrument of economic 
prosperity that allows us to overcome the material worthlessness of brief non-secure 
possession. The primary condition for possession is, as the conventional view would 
have it, survival
69
. The secondary is however the ability to introduce meaningfulness 
into possession. The latter is achieved by securing our hold on possessions beyond 
the inconsequentiality of the momentary. In other words, true possession must be the 
reasonably lasting possession provided by the stability and security of law and order.  
 It is at this juncture that Hobbes introduces time as a factor in the rational 
equation. The establishment of rational conduct requires the establishment of a time 
continuum; a mode of consistency that assures that the engagements of tomorrow not 
only follow on the engagements of today, but that the rules of conduct stay roughly 
the same. Evidently, however, this cannot be achieved by sheer human will, relying 
on its natural inclination towards rationality.  Even if we make an effort to 'open the 
                                               
68
 The imagery is borrowed from Jean Hampton (Hampton Political Philosophy 1997: 63) 
69
 Recognising that survival is posed as a logical condition for possession may serve to relieve worries 
attributed by Jean Hampton to J.W.N. Watkins: ‘that one might judge Hobbes’s entire political theory 
as unsound on the basis that it appears to be founded on the unqualified and thus implausible 
psychological assumption that death is always feared above all else by the normal human being.‘ 
(Hampton Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition 1986: 15). Although it does require a further 
development of the role of acquiring possessions within Hobbes. 




 by thinking rationally, it would appear that mere verbal commitments (the 
product of 'the ratio') are too weak, in the context of a human corporeal existence, to 
naturally withstand the internal pressure presented by our 'passions side'.  
 In order to illustrate this inner conflict I return to the apple tree example. 
Reason might guide us to explore non-violent resolutions of the conflict of interests 
we have encountered. In this particular case we could resort to a form of 'power-
sharing'. Yet, sharing responsibilities for the tree demands a close relationship that 
would perhaps lead, due to communication problems or professional disputes over 
methods of cultivation, to further friction between us. An alternative would be a 
rotation agreement. One of us would have the tree for the initial two years, the other 
would have it for the following two years.   The issue of who will have the tree first 
is probably most conveniently addressed by randomly drawing straws, or as some 
might have it, a benign version of ‘leaving the decision to God’
71
. Still, even the 
intricate procedure we have attempted to develop is bound to leave some doubt in the 
minds of recently acquainted strangers. The original rational good will might very 
well be eroded by the temptation
72
 of short-sighted gain
73
, as the critical point of the 
transfer of possession draws nearer. After all, we are only human.  
                                               
70
 The expression is borrowed from Roberto Bernasconi discussion of Hobbes (Bernasconi "Opening 
the Future" - The paradox of promising in the Hobbessian  social contract 1997) under the title: 
"Opening the Future--The Paradox of Promising in the Hobbesian Social Contract." 
71 Note that as the results are random, this version does not involve second-guessing God or 
presumptuously claiming his affiliation with one’s cause. 
72
 It is worth noting that drawing upon Eve’s role in the Edenic narrative, monotheistic thought came 
to  associate temptation with women, perhaps originating the alignment of passions with femininity, 
and rationality with masculinity, and on an extreme version of women with the devil and men with 
God. Once such a division is accepted and the project of the State is understood as a project of pure 
rationalisation, the exclusion of women from Statesmanship is explained.   
73 The position of Hobbes’s foole..  
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 Our primary problem seems to be one of distrust of others with whom we 
might not share future interaction, strangers as opposed to relations
74
. Indeed this 
may have prompted the ancient practice of inter-marriage as a means of achieving 
trust and peace. Yet there are boundaries to familial acquaintance. Moreover, our 
aspiration to prosperity takes us out of the familiar clan and village and into 
encounters with ‘the other’ in the town and the city. It is the shift from the micro to 
the macro level of engagement that is disconcerting to Hobbes.  
 He appears to hold that the macro-interaction is a qualitative leap that 
requires artificial administration in order to achieve the orderly conduct that is 
naturally maintained in micro-interaction. As Russell Hardin observes  
Hobbes thinks immediately of such large societies as his own, in which one may 
interact with new people almost daily…To resolve problems of a large society, 
Hobbes supposes we require the imposition of a powerful sovereign so that our 
relationships with thousands of others are regulated by dyadic relationships with 
the sovereign. (Hardin 1993: 70).  
 
Hobbes further contends that if we are to enter into peaceful commerce with each 
other on a grand scale, not only must rules of conduct be in place, but all participants 
must be party to them.  Indeed, by remaining outwith the peaceful arrangement one 
would be contributing to its destabilisation, in effect declaring war on it, and by 
extension on its constituency.  In other words, third parties may cause us to renege on 
our promises.  
                                               
74
 Note this problem is avoided in a divine right based theory, since strictly speaking all humans are 
kin going back to the original forefathers of humanity. Authoritative figures are understood to have 
gained their stature by a mythical direct line to the truth originally handed to their ancient ancestors by 
God himself. 
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 For instance, say I have reached a sound agreement with a city business 
partner as to the exchange of my cows’ milk for the apple cider she produces of fruits 
acquired elsewhere. Can she and her dependent apple farmer, truly be assured75 of a 
white coffee each morning hereafter? Surely not, since a third party who has not 
signed up to our rules of conduct may decide to acquire my farm by conquest. The 
threat of injury or death that I might incur should I not submit to the transgressor not 
withstanding, my business partner’s standing is reshuffled. At best she must 
renegotiate the terms with the new proprietor. Moreover, if she employs her 
rationality, she may very well consider dividing her time between securing her 
ciderworks against a recurrence of the actions of the transgressor, to the extent that 
the surplus of tradable goods would no longer be generated. Although the interaction 
described does involve violence, or the threat thereof, at the end of the day the threat 
is to commerce rather than to one’s corporal being.   
 This is further illustrated in an altered, violence-reduced scenario, in which 
the transgressor steals my cows and sells them to a slaughterhouse, not only 
depriving my friend of her coffee and myself of cider, but also leaving us both 
without any recourse
76
. This condition of helplessness in the face of the unreliability 
of trading might put us off trading altogether. On a similar note, Gregory Kavka 
finds a disparity between the Hobbesean definition of the condition of war and the 
‘sorry state of affairs’ it is said to bring about. Kavka summarises the characteristics 
of the Hobbesean state of war in three points:  
                                               
75
 When I use the term assured, I mean assured to a reasonable degree. 
76
 In line with Hobbes’s insistence that no one remain outwith the contract. Since, having retained the 
ability to threaten our contracted stability they have identified themselves as the foe of our efforts to 
achieve a peaceful commonwealth. 
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a. a relational concept that may exclude or include others parties; 
b. a known willingness to fight that does not necessarily pronounce itself in 
actual violence at any given moment; and, 
c. a disposition to fight unless assurances are provided. 
Baring these characteristics in mind, he observes that actual occurrences of ‘violence, 
and the injury, death, and the fear that it engenders’ would not be prevalent (Kavka 
1986: 90).  He therefore concludes that it is the alternative threat of an ‘absence of 
the fruits of social cooperation and of the incentive to labour productively’ that 
makes remaining in the state of nature so unattractive.  
 Yet, Kavka might be selling the Hobbesean argument short. The ‘fear of 
death and injury’ can also be understood in a much less literal manner. I am not 
denying that in the first instance the Hobbesean argument identifies corporeal 
existence as primary, and consequently its demise as detrimental to any social, 
cultural or commercial activity.  Still, I would argue that in the second instance the 
survival of the body, must be matched within the Hobbesean framework with a 
survival of identity: a name, an address, a deed to property. Without the preservation 
of such attributes the rational differentiation between man and beast that Hobbes 
cultivates is left meaningless.  On a broader interpretation of ‘fear of death’, it 
involves an insecurity of identity over a time-continuum that might be secondary to 
corporal insecurity, but is necessary for the employment of rationality. Such an 
interpretation is complementary to the earlier identification of the fundamental 
Hobbesean problem of distrust, as one that occurs among strangers. It also accounts 
for an extremely bleak portrayal of the state of nature. Matching the Hobbesean 
proclamation that: ‘In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 108 
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation…no 
society; and which worst of all, continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the 
life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 89 
Leviathan Ch. XIII). 
 Without identity there can be no consistency, and without consistency there 
can neither be commerce nor science. Echoing Hobbes, the version of the famous 
description of the state of nature composed by his contemporary Margaret 
Cavendish, is arguably more lucid: 
If [there is] no safety [there is] no propriety, neither of goods, wives, children nor 
lives, and if there be no propriety there will be no husbandry and the lands will 
lie unmanured; also there will be neither trade nor traffic, all which will cause 
famine, war, and ruin, and such a confusion as the kingdom will be like a chaos, 
which the gods keep us from. (Cavendish, Orations, in Boyle 2006: 258) .  
 
The lack of propriety that worries both Hobbes and Cavendish, is in my view 
intrinsically connected to a concern about continuous identity. This is exemplified in 
the above illustration of commercial exchange.  If I am offering you an exchange of 
my cows’ milk for your cider, as much as we should mutually be concerned about 
the physical availability of the product and the well-being of its producer, we should 
equally be concerned about the consistency of each other’s identity.  Am I who I 
present myself to be, and how can you be assured that I will continue to represent 
myself in the same fashion. If I do live up to my responsibilities I will have generated 
a consistency of credit. But this welcome condition cannot be established on 
goodwill alone, it requires a ruling body to provide longstanding reliable assurances.  
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 In comes the ruler to administrate our identity, to steer us in the Godly 
persistent way of language and law, and if necessary utilise force to keep order 
within and transgressors of our established identity at bay. The State apparatus can 
be regarded as an extension of the ruler, with the State acting as the ruler's stability 
management firm. Since insecurity is the mother of all ills, causing the future to 
collapse and individuals to react in an irrational unGodly fashion, the enterprise 
aspires to reach a state of stability that can no longer be disrupted. It seeks to provide 
a perfect equilibrium – it aspires to Godliness. Yet, this uncovers tension within the 
Hobbesean system. If the State and the ruler are roughly, as I have suggested, one 
and the same and the ruler is not Godly by divine right, then the aspiration to 
perfection is unattainable and the construction, not being free of the risk of collapse, 
is ultimately ineffective. Alternatively, if the perfect equilibrium is within reach, then 
the ruler, and by extension the ruled, have inexplicably transcended emulation of 
Godliness and entered into a state of 'native God'. We find ourselves elevated to the 
rank of the creator.  
  
4.2 Gauthier – The emergence of perfect equilibrium anew 
 
David Gauthier’s adaptation of Hobbes is a development of the extreme 
conclusion that ends the previous section. He elevates each and every individual to 
the ranks of an autonomous creator, and presumes that the interaction between these 
agents will generate agreement on conduct. Reducing, if not entirely omitting the 
role of the sovereign from his reconstruction of Hobbes’s argument, Gauthier 
seemingly avoids the difficulty of establishing the source of authority for the 
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indisputability of the governing rules. He suggests that the future-oriented outlook 
that Hobbes seeks, does not need to be imposed externally, as it will emerge from the 
cost-benefit considerations of utility-oriented beings. This section questions whether 
Gauthier’s version of Hobbes improves upon the latter’s capacity to generate 
apprehension-free interpersonal interaction.  
  As I have argued in the previous chapters, Hobbes’s concern is to develop a 
structural antidote against the fatal implications of social disorder. His project is 
within the realm of what one might refer to as ‘political engineering’. Moreover, it 
will not allow scientifically questionable considerations derived from disputable 
sources of authority (anything from unfounded superstitions to self-appointed 
messiahs), to interfere with the solidity of his enterprise. In a similar vein, he rejected 
his contemporaries’ appeal to the authority of Aristotle, in place of acceptable first 
principles (Kavka 1986: 4). In fact he was so much impressed with the unequivocal 
testimony of the methodology employed in geometry that according to Kavka he 
credits it, in the Epistile to Philosophical Rudiments, ‘with producing all the 
advantages of civilization’ (Kavka 1986: 5).  Consequently, I would propose that he 
intentionally insulates his theory from the obscurity of a morality of faith, securing 
himself within the scientifically deducible.  
Nevertheless, Gauthier cannot be faulted for diverting Hobbes’s political 
focus on the emergence of the State to a moral one that is concerned with social 
conduct. As long as his methodology remains anchored in ‘geometrical rationalism’ 
his attention to morality can be regarded as ‘refocusing’ the Hobbesean project, 
rather than challenging it (See also Kraus 1993: 254-259). That said, his attention to 
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the moral aspect of contractarianism does generate a divergence with Hobbes on the 
contribution of a sovereign body to social harmony.  
Under the title ‘non-tuism’ Gauthier adopts the Hobbesean utility-oriented 
model of the self, but rejects the idea that order is established by rationalising one’s 
submission to a higher power.  He replaces consensual submission to an external 
entity with an internal rational process, generating morals by agreement that ‘bind 
rationally, and independently of all particular preferences.’ (Gauthier 1987: 328). 
The original Hobbesean remedy that achieves harmonious conduct by means of a 
self-imposed (due to the demand for consent) artificially constructed authority, is 
supplanted with a naturally
77
 distilled authority that every individual, by virtue of 
their self-interest, exercises upon themselves.  While Hobbes employs what could be 
criticised as a logical trick (imposition by consent) in order to internalise a conduct 
that is ultimately externally enforced, Gauthier attempts to integrate rationality and 
morality in order to completely internalise social rules and thus avoid the tension 
between the external and the internal.  
The emergence of these individually internalised social restraints is derived 
from two tiers of rational self-interest motives with which Gauthier attributes his 
individuals: straightforward maximisation (SM) and constrained maximisation (CM). 
Straightforward maximisation addresses social encounters on a singular basis. This is 
essentially the Hobbesean foole’s approach. It divorces the event at hand from prior 
or future interactions and assesses it accordingly. Conversely, constrained 
                                               
77
 Following Rousseau, Gauthier concludes that: ‘If morality is represented as a conventional 
constraint on the natural mode of human behaviour, as a necessary evil rather than as integral to 
human good, then any genuine adherence to morality is undermined’ (Gauthier Morals by Agreement 
1987: 315) 
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maximisation is a more sophisticated, forward-looking, form of maximisation that 
matches current considerations with past performance as well the prospects of future 
encounters. It is argued that repeated encounters (not necessarily with the same 
partners) give rise to the benefits of a socially positive reputation, as over time, by 
weighing the consequences of previous interactions, the parties will reward each 
other for acting out of CM motives and will penalise each other for acting out of SM 
motives, thereby achieving a standard of acting out of CM motives.  
Gauthier is suggesting that the solution arises out of the reiteration of 
promise-making contract situations (reiterated prisoner’s dilemma
78
), where the 
reiteration essentially acts as our coordinator to a cooperation problem. It is worth 
noting that in his version of the reiteration solution, as opposed to the propositions 
made by Michael Taylor (Taylor 1988), enforcement can be achieved even within a 
large non-familial setting. For Taylor it is necessary that individuals be in continual 
frequent contact with each other in order to produce sufficient communal deterrence 
against anti-social behaviour; whereas Gauthier relies on the communicability of 
reputation to carry deterrence much farther. This is not only a change in scope, it  
also redefines the concept of reiteration. For Taylor reiteration consists of a repetition 
in encounters between the same closed group of individuals along a relatively 
lengthy period of time. As such, one would eventually be playing a multiple set of 
identical recurring games with recurring partners.  
                                               
78
 The game-theory mathematical model of a situation in which suboptimal outcomes stemming from 
the inability to trust one’s partner in an initial stand-alone interaction, are commonly understood 
(Schofield Modeling Political Order in Representative Democracies 1996: 94) to be avoided by 
presuming a recurrence of the encounter.   
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For example, if one were placed in a prisoner’s dilemma situation today, in 
all likelihood one could expect to find oneself in a more or less identical situation 
involving the same set of individuals in the future. Reiteration in this context is a 
replication of the particularities of a distinct former situation, and what emerges is a 
multiple-play game. It has been demonstrated by Robert Axelrod (Axelrod 1990) that 
such iterated or multiple-play games promote stable ‘tit-for-tat’
79
 strategies. For 
Gauthier, since encounters are non-familial, reiteration is defined as a mental 
replication of a generalised single-play scenario. Although every repetition may be 
new in itself, it is overshadowed by the inclination towards positive ‘reputation 
building’.  
For further clarity, it might prove helpful to contrast Gauthier’s stance with 
Jean Hampton’s position that in the state of nature we are never required to contend 
directly with a prisoner’s dilemma situation
80
. Like Russell Hardin (Hardin 1993: 71-
72), she reiterates the Humean stance that promissorial agreement is neither fruitful 





), rather they are resolved by the introduction of the 
powerful coordinating ruler, as the original Hobbesean text would suggest
83
.  In 
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 A strategy devised by mathematician and game-theorist Anatol Rapaport, in which on the first 
interaction one attempts to cooperate with one’s counterpart and thereon one replicates the action 
taken by the counterpart in the previous engagement. (Rapoport Game Theory As a Theory of Conflict 
Resolution 1974: 27) 
80
 ‘But we have seen that prisoner’s dilemmas do not underlie the institution of the state in Hobbes’s 
or Locke’s theory. Although they are the sort of problem precipitating conflict for which the state is 
supposed to be a solution, they are not the problem which must be solved to create that solution. 
Another more easily solved problem underlies the state’s creation – i.e., the conflict ridden 
coordination game.’ (Hampton The Contractrian Explanation of the State 1990: 351) 
81 By means of hypothetical rational calculation, or thought experimentation as Rawls’s theory 
perhaps suggests. 
82
 By the historical reiteration of prisoner’s dilemma situations, as Gauthier seems to suggest . 
83
  See also Hardin, R., p.164 (my highlights): 
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order to be resolved matters must be taken out of our hands – alienated. Any 
resolution that we are directly involved in is bound to regress into a problematic 
original promise scenario.  
Gauthier casts Hobbes as a liberal rational-choice contract theorist, with 
essentially no role for the forceful ruler
84
; whereas Hampton wishes to resurrect 
Hobbes’s insistence on the creation of a powerful Leviathan. The sheer extent of 
power of the Leviathan is her solution to the natural mistrust (prisoner’s dilemma).  
Where she thinks Hobbes went wrong is in the explanation of the creation of the 
Leviathan. On her account the Leviathan cannot rely on promises, and for that matter 
it makes no difference if it is a grand-promise (the third law of nature) or an 
aggregation of minor promise situations (reiterated prisoner’s dilemma). The 
Leviathan, the first form of cooperation, can be preceded by coordination alone.  
 Gauthier returns matters to our own hands. He empowers individuals by 
enhancing the original Hobbesean future-oriented rational outlook. Individuals are no 
longer weaklings, susceptible to an inherent human ‘foolish’ frailty of the mind. 
Society is no longer an arena of measured civilised competition, but rather a platform 
for the exercise of rationality enhancing cooperative encounters. Both God and the 
coercive
85
 sovereign State that emulates Him, are rendered obsolete. Instead, a self-
                                                                                                                                     
‘Gauthier and Gewirth seem to think it a matter of logic or self-consistency that we act according to 
their rationally derived principles once these are understood. Hobbes clearly does not think anything 
of the sort for his laws of nature. He thinks we require the sovereign to motivate us to act in foro 
externo as we would want to act in foro interno…’   
 
84 See also (Freeman Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views 1990: 134) 
‘ Gauthier sees no need for a coercive state to enforce these constraints or pre-existing rights among 
rational beings; in contrast to Hobbes, that is not the purpose of his social  contract. ‘ 
85
 See also Jean Hampton’s clarification of Gauthier position: ‘Gauthier is, I believe trying to make 
the following point. If people have decided to enter into a world in which their interactions are 
cooperative rather than coercive, then coercive power and the goods that this power has amassed no 
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contained and self-reinforcing system, as further developed by Robert Sugden 
(Sugden 1989) is relied upon. All that is required is that we turn our attention to the 
rational. Once we have tuned ourselves to the language of logic, long term 
reciprocity will gradually self-regenerate, eventually eradicating remaining strands of 
noncooperative foolishness.  
Society will show its, bionic, superhuman potential, if we allow it to. 
Socialised individuals, having been ‘other encounter-encumbered’, will transcend 
their current particular ‘momentary me’, by means of the rationalised overview of 
‘future me’ contingencies. Our projected ‘future-me’ casts a shadow on our current 
interactions. The possibility of future dependency redefines our here and now 
independency, thereby converting us into pseudo ‘other regarding’ beings
86
; 
effectively generating a self-centered system of morality out of thin air. This highly 
individualistic, if not solipsistic, tendency in Gauthier’s position, implores an 
epistemological respect for the impenetrability of the mind of the other, yet it equally 
encourages their treatment solely as a means for the achievement of one’s own 
satisfaction.  
Gauthier is intent on distinguishing his own rational morality which he 
claims is derived from Hobbes’s early conception of economic man, from the later 
drift by Adam Smith and David Hume into moral sentiment. Much like Rousseau he 
wishes us to rely solely on our own factual judgment, without contaminating it with 
the counterfactual self-deception of imagined empathetic feeling. Placing ourselves 
                                                                                                                                     
longer define the parties’ bargaining positions;’ (Hampton Two Faces of Contractrian Thought 1991: 
43) 
86 For example an employer that introduces a policy that encourages the employment of single-parent 
women, since, almost paradoxically, statistically they will be less likely to risk their employment by 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 116 
‘in someone else’s shoes’ is not a route to empathetic understanding, but rather to 
intrusion. Reasoning has nothing to do with the illusion of an out of body experience. 
Reason is defined as self-reflective and would appear to be trapped within a singular 
self, with which, we have unmediated contact. In order to rule out contextual 
diversions of my current self, it is proposed that I entertain a ‘future-me’ perspective. 
Although Gauthier himself does not put it in as many words, what he appears to be 
doing is merging Rousseau and Hobbes’s rational positions into one.  
Yet, is Gauthier’s demand for a ‘future-me’ perspective not an out of body 
experience akin to the one that he so fiercely rejects with regard to ‘the other’? Is 
‘future-me’ not a form of ‘other-me’? The assumption of an unmediated relationship 
with my own future could fall prey to objections fueled by continuous identity 
debates such as prominently figure in the writings of Descartes and Hume. Gauthier 
could work around this problem by resorting to ‘past-me’ instead of ‘future-me’. 
This would partially address and partially exacerbate a concern voiced by Jean 
Hampton  that ‘for “proto-me” to agree to in some extra-societal bargain seems to 
have little bearing on what is rational for “determinate-me” to accept now.’ 
(Hampton 1991: 47-48). On the one hand, resorting to the past to justify the future 
may result in the in self-sublimation along traditional roles. On the other hand, 
relying on past experience and  a ‘tit-for-tat’  strategy avoids the controversy of 
‘hypothetical contracts among protopeople’ (Hampton 1991: 50) thereby refraining 
from attributing others with more than the instrumental value they were originally 
accredited by Hobbes.  
                                                                                                                                     
missing days off work and are most likely to remain with the company for a long period as the result 
of similar considerations.  
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Further difficulties arise if the past merely simulates the future.  Consider a 
PhD student on the verge of ‘writing up’ who has been struggling with funding 
throughout her studies. As long as this person remains a student, it is rational for her, 
in straightforward maximisation terms, to support the waiving of council tax for 
students. Does this rationale change the instant she completes her studies and begins 
subsidising other students? If she is concerned about her accumulated constrained 
maximisation reputation, it would appear to make sense for her to continue to 
support the council tax waiver even once her status has changed.  
The source for this empathy is not, as perhaps Smith and Hume would have 
it, a sentiment of solidarity to the particular student status which one has 
experienced, it is a general rational consideration about sustaining past reputation of 
sincere intentions. But will this ‘playing it safe’ strategy not ultimately result in an 
inflation of support for any demand by any group or individual. After all, one never 
knows who might end up as one’s future ‘bedfellow’. Moreover, the fear of 
retaliation might deter participants from publicising unpleasant encounters, leading 
to an artificial mutual padding of reputations.   
On a micro-level this can be demonstrated by referring to the phenomenon of 
anonymous online trading, in which documented reciprocal ‘feedback’ acts as moral 
deterrent (Dellarocas, Fan et al. 2004). These virtual bays in which strangers 
encounter each other for the purpose of trade, rely on the provider of the service 
acting as a data banker, compiling an openly accessible yet secure database of user 
profiles containing voluntary reciprocal comments on the users’ past conduct. The 
fraudsters that are attracted to these communities (Güth, Mengel et al. 2006: 2) not 
withstanding, the risk of losing one’s untarnished reputation to retaliatory defamation 
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might deter equally reputable agents from voicing grievances. In the micro-cosmos 
of the online trading community this goes no further than to artificially inflate the 
general sense of confidence, however if as Gauthier claims this is the conduct of the 
rational self-interested individual at large, one must ask oneself whether under this 
populist regiment  will not demand outstrip supply?
 87
  
One could still argue that contemporary research of online trading provides a 
degree of corroboration for Gauthier’s view that self-interested reciprocity is 
sufficient in order to generate trust among strangers. Gauthier’s position is reinforced 
by the reliance of the virtual community on a reciprocal ranking system. Moreover, 
disputes are primarily referred to mutually accepted mediation that holds limited, if 
any, coercive power. However, in the particular case of the exemplar online trading 
service, EBay, a further purchase protection program is offered to buyers; with 
increased insurance provided when purchasing through EBay’s own proxy payment 
service PayPal. Although the effect of buyer protection on trade has yet to be studied 
(Güth, Mengel et al. 2006: 2), it should be noted that in practice self-interest and 
reciprocity do not necessarily emerge spontaneously. The contribution of both actual 
insurance provision, as well as, trust in the brand name under which the trading 
activity is being conducted, should not be overlooked. While coercion might play a 
miniscule role in these commercial exchanges, it is submission to an external 
authority, and not to a rational autonomous one, which generates the observed 
orderly conduct. 
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 Or ‘Overload’ as it is referred to in the title of Anthony King’s address of the ‘Crisis of 
Governobility’ discussion  initiated in the mid 1970’s by Samuel Brittan, Giovanni Sartori, Samuel 
Huntington and others (Parsons Politics Without Promises: The Crisis of "Overload" and 
Governability 1982: 421-423) . 
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EBay is perhaps not the best of illustrations since it is a market of limited 
trust, as indicated by David Lucking Reiley’s finding that although collectables 
accounted for some 85% of listings ‘high priced collectibles (valuable art and 
antiques) have remained the purview of brick-and-mortar auction houses such as 
Sotheby’s  and Christie’s.’ (Lucking-Reiley 2000: 232-3). Lucking-Reiley himself 
observes that this may be in the process of changing due to the acquisition of 
traditional auction houses by their online counterparts, however, it is doubtful that 
high profile artwork would truly follow the anonymous carefree process by which 
less valuable items are exchanged. Equally, although vehicles sales are not 
uncommon on EBay, the completion of the deal would need to involve transfer of 
registration ‘the old fashioned way’. Certainly, even the most imaginative mind, 
would find it difficult to envisage the sale of real-estate by means of EBay without 
the verification of identity and legal transfer of ownership provided by conventional 
State institutions.  
  The reciprocal verification of identity has, and continues to be, the role of 
the State. It serves its citizens as the technical reciprocal guarantor of the singular 
and continued identity of strangers we encounter on a first or occasional basis. Thus 
it extends our trust and opens the door to dealings outwith the intimate circles of our 
family, our clan, and our village, to those whom we have just met. The sovereign is 
the keeper of our integrity, without her, as far as our interaction with a stranger is 
concerned, each and every one of us could wake up every day, quite literally as a 
different person
88
. Without the sovereign, as the keeper of records, spontaneous 
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 Those who find this assertion farfetched should consider the difficulties with which immigration 
services are confronted in identifying individuals from ‘disorderedly’ States, in which records are 
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orderly conduct would only occur as Michael Taylor correctly observes (Taylor 
1988) in a size-restricted closely knit community. While some forms of social 
conduct among strangers may not require coercion, if they are to occur on a grand 
scale, they ultimately rely on a much more substantial role of sovereign authority 
than Gauthier allows for. Moreover, although the registrar of the State serves to 
extend the boundaries of our sociability, it does so at the expense of binding 
ourselves to a singular place.  
One could argue that a demand for singularity does not entail a demand for 
particularity. On the contrary, would a universal registrar not provide the utmost 
value in the facilitation of peaceful interaction among strangers? I do not challenge 
the logical validity of the universalist stance, I question its ability to contend with the 
actuality of a human existence restricted to time and space. The theoretical formula 
which universalists employ defies these restrictions. Their individuals are assumed to 
interact with each other on an entirely detached dimensional plane. This cannot be 
faulted on the formulaic level and must therefore be conceded as a theoretical truth, 
nevertheless, it is in dissonance with our perception of ourselves. Unfortunately we 
cannot be both at the dentist’s and at a relative’s funeral at the same time, nor can we 
deny the finality of our relative’s death
89
. Experience convinces us that we must 
resign ourselves to being in one place at any particular time. In the Gautherian-
Hobbesean formula, time is at a standstill as our future is considered a reiteration of 
                                                                                                                                     
often abused. Thereby, allowing their citizens to ‘re-invent’ themselves when interacting with foreign 
authorities. Indeed, one could argue that the lack of trustworthy authoritative record keeping 
undermines the entire claim to Statehood.  
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our past, and spatial restriction is of no consideration
90
. I have already pointed out 
both ethical and practical difficulties that arise as a result of adopting a past 
reputation-based morality, in subsequent chapters relating to John Locke, I hope to 
demonstrate that any account of the exchange of individuated property cannot 
discount the spatial limitation that real property carries with it.  
                                               
90
 There are interesting parallels between my portrayal of Gauthier’s Hobbesian position and the 
Buddhist aspiration to Nirvana as well a possible relation to such notions as Karma and Samsara, 
unfortunately this observation cannot be further developed here. 
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Chapter 5. Locke: Removing the Misconceptions   
The purpose of this chapter is to remove the misconceptions associated   with 
Lockean theory so as to unearth the uniqueness of the metaphysical position that I 
would argue defines Locke’s distinct political stance. The first misconception is that 
Locke is in all key respects a Hobbesean. The second, which is closely related to the 
first, is that his contribution to political theory
91
 is marginal at best. Finally, the third 
is that his understanding of individualism supports Libertarian notions of the market.  
The first section, pertains to the traditional assimilation of Locke to Hobbes, 
wherein the former is considered merely to have embellished the latter’s theory. It 
rejects the conclusion that the distinction between the two is reduced to a matter of 
nuance, if not personal taste. It argues that the empirically-based account of the 
human condition shared by Hobbes and Locke is misguidedly projected on to their 
normative conclusions, thereby implying a normative convergence as well. It 
maintains that a ‘metaphysically-aware’ examination of their positions finds that they 
draw radically different political conclusions from a shared empirical observation.  
Moreover, it is maintained that the same ‘metaphysical-awareness’ improves the 
integration of Locke’s anthropological observations into his political theory, by 
providing reason for the specific choice of the emergence of property and money, as 
its subject matter. 
The second section considers the nature of Locke’s original contribution to 
political theory. It argues that his innovation is in regarding the State as an 
instrument for the administration of a problem ridden, but metaphysically 
inescapable state of human individuation. Locke’s position is fleshed-out by 
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contrasting it with Hobbes’s. It is argued that Hobbes’s solution to the problem of 
individuation involves establishing a reign of perfection that would completely 
replace the observed reality of disorderliness. The new order he proposes, would 
substitute the observed motion in the world with peaceful stillness. By contrast, 
Locke is understood as devising a system of administration that allows humans to 
contend with the inevitability of imperfection. It acknowledges the inescapability of 
the change brought about by motion, and the inherent constraint of humanity by time 
and space.  
This is demonstrated by highlighting Locke’s attempt to incorporate the 
constraints of ‘the real’ into ‘the ideational’, pursuing his recognition that the bound 
human mortal cannot hope to emulate the unbound deity.  It is argued that by placing 
property on a pedestal, he aligns his political stance with his metaphysical 
understanding of individuation as rooted in corporeality. It is consequently 
maintained that his is therefore a demand for the erection of an earthly power to 
match the earthly individuated manifestation of property, as opposed to the 
Hobbesean demand for the unitary perfection of heaven on earth. By contrast with 
Hobbes, it is argued that Locke is not seeking a political system that would annihilate 
individuation, but one that would reconcile a productive life with it. 
The third section distinguishes Locke’s defence of individuation from that 
provided by theories of convention, and more specifically by Friedrich Hayek in his 
interpretation of Adam Smith’s idea of the relation between individuation and the 
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market. While in this vein of Libertarian thought individuation is guaranteed by the 
market, it is argued that for Locke individuation, and by extension the concepts of 
property and self, must be anchored outwith market forces. Otherwise the market can 
potentially redefine the components of individuation.  
The final section distances Locke’s position from the Nozickean variant of 
Liberterian thought. It maintains that contrary to Nozick’s self-professed affiliations, 
the foundation for his position is neither Lockean nor Smitho-Humean, but rather can 
be understood as related to Gauthier’s evolutionary interpretation of Hobbes. 
 
5.1 Is Locke a Hobbesean? 
 
This section holds that Locke metaphysically breaks with Hobbes, arguing 
that this divergence is reflected politically in his amendment of the sovereign’s role 
from the defence of reason to the preservation of property. Hobbes assigns the 
sovereign with the grandiose role of shifting the bi-polar human psyche from its 
inclination towards passions to its inclination towards reason, re-engineering ‘the 
foole’ into the citizen. By contrast, Locke charges his sovereign with the humble role 
of securing property. Whilst Hobbes’s ruler is a reformist educator charged with the 
enforcement of reason, Locke’s sovereign is merely a magistrate assigned to the task 
of property management. At the core of the former’s notion of a secure, and therefore 
prosperous, social existence is the principle of an enduring rational predictability; 
whereas the latter relies on the preservation of property in order to achieve a degree 
of stability that is conducive to carefree economic exchange.   
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Hobbes defeats interpersonal apprehension in his social enterprise, by 
constructing a mechanism of rule that he believes can redirect the human psyche 
from corporeal fixation on the particular to incorporeal considerations of the general. 
It is a shift from the ‘traitorous waters’ of the chaos of unforeseen conduct, to the 
‘calm’ of predetermined orderly engagement. I have argued that he anchors this 
political construct in a metaphysical idea of perfection, a moment of creation in 
which allegedly, the corporeal and incorporeal were fused together.  His political 
apparatus is designed to emulate the conditions of this moment and thereby revive it.   
Locke too, strives to remove peril from social interaction, however, he 
metaphysically rejects the idea that humankind can be perfected, as this would 
involve a disembodiment that is availed only in death. Locke’s position does not 
deny that this illusionary state of ‘calm’ can be induced by duress, it objects to its 
portrayal as natural and Godly. Moreover, it is my understanding that from Locke’s 
perspective the radical measures taken by Hobbes are unnecessary for the 
achievement of his objective.  
For Locke, the difficulty of multitude of opinion, or personal autonomy, does 
not require the refashioning of all in the single mould of an original indisputable 
Truth. Moreover, the corporeality of human beings, even if it is a repercussion of 
humankind’s doing, namely original sin, is not reversible in life. We cannot 
politically reinvent the condition of corporeality, we do not have the power to 
overthrow our corporeality and recreate ourselves. We are trapped, our redemption 
and recreation is in the hands of God. The logic behind this is the reversal of the 
famous ‘he gaveth and he taketh away’. Locke reserves the ultimate control, the 
creationist control, for God. He who placed us into corporeality, will at His own 
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discretion relieve us of it. Meanwhile, we must find corporeal measures that make 
the best of the condition we are in; we must find the means to prosper.    
 As I suggested before, Hobbes stipulates rationality as an aspect of human 
behaviour that is Godlike. Acting rationally is therefore acting in accordance with the 
laws of nature, or in other words attempting to mimic God. We are attempting to 
escape the misery of the natural human condition (the state of nature) by entering 
into a condition that is artificial for man but natural for God
92
. This put Hobbes on 
the slippery slope of rationalism, gradually diminishing the ungodly (material) 
dimensions of humanity in an attempt, under the supervision of the sovereign, to 
achieve a metamorphosis of the 'foole' into the rationalised demigod of the citizen.  
I claim that Locke drops Hobbes’s bleak portrayal of the state of nature, on 
metaphysical grounds and not due to a discord with Hobbes on the psychological 
nature of humankind. Locke’s state of nature is not to be escaped, precisely because 
it is one and the same as the state of corporeality. The state of nature can and should 
be reorganised so as to ‘best fit’ prosperity, it is not however within human capacity 
to depart from it by overhauling it.  Unlike Hobbes, for Locke the corporeal 
perspective is not a matter of choice, but a matter of fact. It is not a degenerated form 
of the incorporeal perspective, to be restored to an original unison through proper 
guidance. For Locke the barrier between the corporeal and the incorporeal is here to 
stay. The function of the sovereign is not to instruct us in escaping the state of nature, 
it is to assist us in administrating it.  
                                               
92
 Although Hobbes’s approach to morality, as Jean Hampton states: ‘is not an approach that assumes 
there is a naturally good object in the world’ (Hampton Two Faces of Contractrian Thought 1991: 
33), it does not prohibit the existence of a naturally good object outwith the actual world.   
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Locke identifies the state of nature as God’s property in his capacity as its 
creator. I would argue that his discussion of the human acquisition of property by 
means of labour is a reflection of a metaphysical and political distinction he makes 
between the bound material human condition and unbound creationist capacity of 
Godliness. This division not only denounces projecting God’s creative abilities on to 
human capacities, but also rejects projecting unbound perception on to a bound 
existence. We are not in a position to envision the unison of creation, because we are 
the created, not the creator. True to empiricism, we are engaged in discovery, not in 
creation. Trapped within the sandpit that has been constructed for us, we are merely 
mixing and matching a prefabricated world. Humans must settle, both 
epistemologically and politically, for the mere manipulation of creation, while 
paying due respect to the founding principle of creation: making as much as possible 
from what is given.  
From the Lockean perspective the idea of creation is logically inescapable 
and by extension the idea of collective property is inescapable.  
all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in 
common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body 
has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of 
them, as they are thus in their natural state (Locke 1980 (1690): 18 Second 
Treatise of Government Ch.V §26)  
However he also contends that: 
being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate 
them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any 
particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who 
knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a 
part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him 
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any good for the support of his life. (Locke 1980 (1690): 18 Second Treatise of 
Government Ch.V §26)   
 
The implication is that the ‘use of men’ can only be achieved in the particular 
individuated form. In other words, humans do not occupy the generality of a world of 
ideas, but rather the concrete one of particularities.  
I would argue that this essentially political position exhibits a blend of the 
political and the metaphysical, derived from Locke’s metaphysical contributions.  In 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke expressly states that ‘all things 
that exist are only particulars’ (Locke 1997 (1690): 368 Book III, Ch. III §6). 
Although he makes this assertion in an epistemological rather than an ontological 
context, I hold with Christopher Hughes Conn (Conn 2003) that the ontological 
argument, with the exception of God, is implied. Having been created
93
 into a 
material individuated existence, we are confronted by the political requisite of 
administering individual property so as to address the moral concerns it raises: ‘… 
private possessions and labour, which now [post original sin] the curse on earth made 
necessary, by degrees made a distinction of conditions, it gave room for 
covetousness, pride, and ambition, which by fashion and example spread the 
corruption which has so prevailed over mankind.’ (Locke 1997 (1693): 321 Homo 
ant et post Lapsum ). 
 Enter the Lockean acquisition of property through the mixing of labour 
argument (Locke 1980 (1690): 19 Second Treatise of Government Ch.V §27). We 
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cannot resist the logic of adherence to natural law, since we cannot resist the logic of 
creation and the collective property it entails. Equally, we cannot escape the 
individuation of property brought about by the materiality of our existence. In a 
strictly Godly (non material) existence property takes on a collective and secure 
form, God and God's property are one and the same. In a human (material) existence 
the generality is broken. Moreover, material individuation places a logical divide 
between God and God’s property, such that God can no longer be expected to 
guarantee the integrity of property. The State can thus be understood as an artificial 
substitute in the material individuated existence for the perdurance of property that is 
naturally provided by God in an immaterial unison. Indeed such is the end that Locke 
ascribes to government: ‘The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into 
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of 
their property.’ (Locke 1980 (1690): 66 Second Treatise of Government Ch.IX 
§124). 
By metaphysically and politically distancing Locke from Hobbes, the above  
account avoids traditional difficulties in Locke’s  interpretation that have  led 
commentators to reduce the value of his contribution to political theory. The strict 
division between the corporeal and the incorporeal and the understanding of the 
cultivation of prosperity as the corporeal aspect of creation, makes sense of an 
otherwise baffling invitation for conceptual contradiction and actual conflict between 
God’s authority and ownership of property and a parallel human set. It additionally 
explains his descriptive attention to the development of property as part of a 
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 Note that for the purposes of this argument, the theological debate over whether we were directly 
created into the material or ‘materialised’ as the result of  ‘the fall’ is inconsequential.  
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reiteration of his unique theoretical perspective, and not merely as a coincidental 
choice of subject matter that immerses the political theory he inherits in history and 
anthropology.  
Standing in contrast to the interpretation proposed here, Patrick Coby in his 
paper The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesean? 
advances the assertion that Locke's political theory is a milder, more palatable 
version of Hobbesean theory (Coby 1987: 16-17) - 'Hobbes-light'
94
. He contends the 
major difference between the two is that in the latter, society rallies strictly on 
security, while in the former society comes together on the principle of fairness in the 
administration of property. Although Coby eventually finds the Lockean version 
more appealing (Coby 1987: 23), along the way he uncovers discrepancies in Locke's 
attempt to legitimise justice on the basis of his argument for property.  
He is troubled by the two tiered property relationship in which Locke places 
humans, wherein they are at once both the property of God and labour-induced 
ownership creators. He foresees a conflict between the laws of nature sanctioned by 
'man's creatureliness' (Coby 1987: 7) and the autonomy of self ownership, arguing 
that the second and first laws of nature, in drawing  upon the sanctity of God's 
creation, are at odds with his teachings on property (Coby 1987: 10). He grapples 
with a tension between a collective Godly ownership of creation that Locke seems to 
subscribe to, and from which he derives the concept of the sanctity of each and every 
element of creation, and a human self-generating self-ownership that Locke is 
evidently intent on promoting. Subsequently, he attempts to explain these difficulties 
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 My own wording. 
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away by adopting a cynical understanding of Locke's laws of nature, according to 
which they are conceived as legitimisers of the use of power on the part of the 
sovereign, rather than inducers of moral human restraint among the subjects
95
. Thus, 
reiterating his position that Locke is essentially a Hobbesean, and consequently 
severely diminishing Locke's original contribution to political theory. 
Likewise, Jeremy Waldron  worries about an apparent tension between 
Locke's discussion of political morality and rights under the title of the 'social 
contract', and his alternative discussion of an evolving economic drive under the title 
'political anthropology'. He observes that:  
The contrast between the two stories could hardly be greater. On the first 
account, government is explicitly conventional: its institution is the deliberate 
act of free and equal individuals acting consciously and rationally together in 
pursuit of their goals. On the other account, the growth of government is largely 
unconscious – it develops by what Locke calls "an insensible change" (II 76)… 
(Waldron 1989: 7).  
 
Nevertheless, Waldron is intent on retaining both the 'normative punch' (Waldron 
1989: 10) of the Social Contract scenario and the historical validity of the Political 
Anthropology. He proposes that one is necessary in order to serve the other, perhaps 
even to compensate for the other's misgivings.  
                                               
95
  ‘The second law of nature is not a golden rule commanding that we treat charitably our fellow 
human being; nor is it even, in any serious way, a restrictive injunction ordering that we hold back 
from gratuitous harm. What purpose the second law of nature mainly serves is to supply man in nature 
with a license to kill, and to explain how political authority comes by the right to inflict punishment 
on its subjects.’ (Coby The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian? 1987: 
10-11) 
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Having found what he perceives to be Locke's own attempt to defend the 
historicity of his social contract (Waldron 1989: 11-14) unconvincing, and relying on 
a journal entry of Locke's noted by Richard Ashcraft
96
, Waldron argues for a 
functionally complementary relationship between the moral and historical accounts: 
'It is the function of the political anthropology to offer an account of what actually 
happened; while the contract story offers us the moral categories in terms of which 
what actually happened is to be understood.' (Waldron 1989: 17-18).  
Unlike Coby, Waldron gives Locke credit for a substantial contribution to 
political theory, one that goes beyond adding pleasantries to Hobbes. For Coby it is 
the degree of forthcomingness as to power relations, that differentiates Hobbes from 
Locke. He asserts that while they both hold the same political view the latter makes 
more of an effort to conceal it (Coby 1987: 17). By contrast, although Waldron does 
not put it in so many words himself, he implies that Locke adds a 'real' historicity 
aspect to the theoretical template sketched out by Hobbes. Waldron views Locke's 
achievement to be the weaving of 'real' history into the theoretical social contract 
stance. By entering into political anthropology Locke is credited with demonstrating 
the applicability of the virtual political theory in the actual practice of history
97
. Yet, 
by casting the role of the social contract as a provider of 'a moral template' to be 
placed over historical events, Waldron diminishes the role of the particular 'historical 
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  [history is useful only] ‘to one who hath well settled in his mind the principles of morality and 
knows how to make judgment on the actions of men.’ Richard Aschcraft citing Locke in (Waldron 
John Locke: Social Contract versus Political Anthropology 1989: 17) . 
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 See (Waldron John Locke: Social Contract versus Political Anthropology 1989: 4) ‘Treating the 
social contract as a purely normative model is one way of responding to its evident implausibility as 
an historical hypothesis….I shall argue that the political theory of John Locke provides an example of 
a somewhat different approach to the issue of historicity…’. Although Waldron does not explicitly 
name Hobbes as representative of the ‘purely normative model’ it is implied by the lack of identifiable 
‘political anthropology’, to use Waldron’s term, in Hobbes. 
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case study' chosen by Locke, i.e. property. Indeed, it would seem that on Waldron's 
account, Locke could have chosen any number of other developmental historical test 
cases, for example the development of language or of law.  
 
5.2 Locke’s Originality 
 
The division itself between the divine and human manifestations of property 
is not an innovation of Locke’s. As noted by Benzion Netanyahu it can be traced 
back to the Church Fathers who held that: ’According to the law of nature, none of 
the earth’s goods belonged to any one in particular, but property is an institution 
recognised by civil law, as well as the law of nations.’ (Netanyahu 1982: 155). 
Locke’s originality lies rather in the suggestion that distinctively human measures 
need to be taken to secure the individuated property form.  
For Locke, Hobbes's state of nature scenario is unthinkable, since acting 
towards one’s fellow being in such a manner is disrespectful of creation itself. In 
civil society we appreciate creation but we lack procedures that allow us to 
effectively contend with problems that might arise as a result of the shift from single 
general property ownership (God's perspective) to a multiplicity of property owners 
(Human perspective). The State, by means of its institutions and administrative 
procedures, offers perdurence to actual property in its real, materially individuated, 
form. I would argue that for Locke the State’s chief concern is to oversee the fair 
individuation of property. Locke can be understood to be suggesting that in civil 
society 'property disputes' would be difficult to settle, since material individuation is 
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embedded in us to the extent that we would not be able to judge the situation from a 
general perspective.  
that self love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the 
other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in 
punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and 
that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality 
and violence of men. (Locke 1980 (1690): 12 Second Treatise of Government 
Ch. II § 13)  
 
In order to avoid conflict of opinion, we require the establishment of an objective 
institution that would enforce generality.  
An appeal to God to settle earthly differences is of no avail, since it would be 
asking the impossible. Either God would have to lessen himself to the level of the 
particular, shedding his immateriality, unity and generality, or Humans would have 
to raise themselves beyond the material barrier of their existence to become Godly 
themselves. The latter, I have purported, is where Hobbes's theory ultimately leads. 
Hobbes's stately institutions are earthly ones that masquerade as immutable heavenly 
ones, whereas Locke's are earthly contingent ones that are open to change as long as 
they do not challenge the inescapable ‘first principle’ of property. Locke's 
metaphysical divide between the corporeal and the incorporeal not only saves him 
from struggling, as Hobbes does
98
, with the theological implications of strict monist 
materialism, it equally insulates him from being coopted into the Spinozist school 
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  Stewart Duncan discusses at length Hobbes ‘s struggle with outright materialism and its 
implications, observing an inconsistent shift in his views (Duncan Hobbes's Materialism in the Early 
1640s 2005) 
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that ultimately befalls the Hobbesean position
99
.  Having chosen to disregard the 
inescapable division of the mortal and the immortal, the finite and the infinite, 
Hobbes walks perilously close to Spinoza.  
Admittedly, Hobbes unequivocally denounces pantheism since it undermines 
the existence of God: ‘that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of 
the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence: For by God, 
is understood thee cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is 
no cause of it, that is, no God.’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 250 Leviathan Ch. XXXI). His 
assertion is, however, asymmetrical. The statement is one of a list of consecutive 
arguments that are intended to discourage attempts to force the limitation of our own 
corporeal empirical cognition on an unperceivable infinite God. Yet while these 
arguments prevent the ‘dragging down’ of God to the corporeal plane, they do not 
preclude humans from ascending to the rank of the autonomy of the creator.  
Indeed, I have argued in Chapter 3 that humankind is encouraged by Hobbes 
to use the gift of rationality for that precise purpose. By contrast, for Locke such an 
exercise implies an impossible reversal of the reality of humankind’s epistemological 
and ontological experience; an extreme abstraction of existence that occurs only 
when we are literally separated from materiality at death. In Locke’s epistemological 
terms, Hobbes aspires to the reduction of humans into ‘general words’, 
amalgamating them into a unitary system that avoids conflict and contradiction
100
: 
                                               
99 I here follow J.W.N Watkins’s comment that ‘Hobbes goes far and Spinoza goes the whole way.’ 
(Watkins The Posthumous Career of Thomas Hobbes 1957). 
100
 Recall the argument on p.66-68 as to Hobbes’s employment of words in general, and more 
specifically God’s word, in order to generate an endurance that combats the ‘fleeting’ reality that is 
the cause of  social instability and inter-personal friction. 
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Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas: and ideas 
become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, 
and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. 
By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more 
individuals than one (Locke 1997 (1690): 368  An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding  Book III, Ch. III §6) 
 
Our ability to live out the ontology of these ‘general words’ is suspect, 
according to Locke.  In the absence of the particularising circumstances of time and 
space, we would share with God the physical attributes accorded to him by  Hobbes: 
‘God is eternal, omnipotent, the creator and infinite’ (Martinich 2005: 200). As 
omnipresence is a derivative of infiniteness, it should follow that I could be present 
simultaneously both at my office and at the pub, as well as at all the spatial points in 
between. For Locke the empirical evidence dismisses this possibility, and supports 
the inherence of the particularity of time and space to humankind’s corporeal 
experience.  
Once I appear as a phenomenon, I can either be here or there. Moreover, 
making my way from my current position to an intended destination is not 
instantaneous. If it were, not only would I have escaped time, but also any 
meaningful conception of a spatially fixed location. Despite Albert Einstein's famous 
remark about the inconsequentiality of the death of his close friend Besso, since as 
physicists they shared the idea that time is no more than a persistent illusion, it 
appears to be one that is fundamental to the human condition. While time may be 
disregarded in mathematical formulas that are completely reversible, the idea that the 
ruler or the State could make time irrelevant and therefore immortalise all, is one that 
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is difficult to fathom. If time is taken out of the equation, as I have claimed Hobbes 
aspires to do, the divide between the corporeal and the incorporeal sketched by 
Locke instantly collapses; but can it?  
Time and space are woven together here as a defining feature of human 
existence. They are considered ‘real’ in as far as they are applied to corporeal entities 
such as ourselves, but are not necessarily real in themselves. For the most part I 
adopt Christopher Hughes Conn and Eddy Zemach’s  suggestion (Conn 2003: 4) that 
within the time-space experience,  we are availed of several spatio-temporal species: 
‘events’ (e.g. a football match) that are occurrences that are bound to both time and 
space (i.e. they take on concrete dimensions in time and space); ‘substances’ (e.g. 
individuals and objects) that are continuous with respect to time but confined at 
every moment to a concrete spatial dimension;   ‘processes’ that are continuous in 
space (i.e. they lack definitive size) but have a definite temporal dimension; and 
‘types’ that are continuous in both temporal and spatial dimensions.  
It may be helpful to comment on some points of discord between Conn and 
Zemach, in order to further elucidate the notion of time and space attributed here to 
Locke. Although unable to refute it, Conn does not feel at ease with Zemach’s 
original inclusion of ‘types’ (e.g. ‘The Taxman, The American Woman, The Lion) in 
the realm of material objects. I second Conn’s objection. One should consider that 
for an empiricist like Locke ‘types’ are the product of inductive reasoning. That is, 
they are generalisations induced from particular occurrences. Their existence should 
therefore be regarded as ‘once removed’. They exist by virtue of the accumulation of 
‘events’, ‘substances’ and ‘processes’ in memory and the subsequent processing of 
said material. Indeed ‘types’ are the product of the rationalisation of the material, 
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while they are highly related to the material, it is questionable whether they are 
material in themselves.  I have a further minor quibble with the distinction between 
‘events’ and ‘substances’ (Conn 2003: 94-95). I am not entirely sure that 
‘substances’ could not be reduced to ‘events’ and I suspect that they have not been, 
due to what Conn acknowledges is a hierarchal bias towards ‘substances’, to which 
we subordinate other spatio-temporal phenomena (Conn 2003: 5).  This difference 
notwithstanding, I am happy to adopt the general implication of the position Conn 
attributes to Locke: that as humans we capture the world as it relates to us and not as 
it is in itself.  This should not, however, be confused with a constructivist position. 
Constructivists question the reality of extra-mental conditioning occurrences, 
whereas I contend Locke’s intention here is merely to identify the importance of a 
hard-wired perspective.   
This insistence on ’earthing’ one’s perspective is, I would argue, Locke’s 
response to the Hobbesean ‘rationalist drift’, one that is not only definitive of their 
differing conceptions of the control that the human ‘ratio’ can exert over time and 
space, but also impacts their contrasting holistic and pluralist positions. Although 
Hobbes, strictly speaking, holds on to a division between reason and passions, 
between mind and matter, he loses this distinction once he pronounces reason as the 
caretaker
101
 of matter. In subordinating the contingent particular to the constant and 
general, I understand him to be anticipating both Rousseau and Kant; stipulating that 
the contingency of human materiality tends to lead us astray, whereas constant Godly 
reason sets us right. Ideally, the condition in which all men would live, if they could 
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only afford to, would be one that subjugates passions to reason to the point of their 
complete suppression.  
Again, note the similarity in terms employed by Hobbes and Spinoza as 
observed by Noel Malcolm:  
In Part iv of the Ethics Spinoza explains that, while passions are individual and 
particularizing, reason is universal and harmonizing. ”Men can be opposed to 
each other in so far as they are afflicted with emotions which are passions”; men 
necessarily agree with one another in so far as they live according to the dictates 
of reason”. This ”agreement” is a real harmonizing and converging of minds, not 
just an attitude of liberal non-interference; as Spinoza wrote in his early Short 
Treatise, if I teach knowledge and the love of God to my neighbours, ”it brings 
forth the same desire in them that there is in me, so that their will and mine 
become one and the same, constituting one and the same nature, always agreeing 
about everything”. (Malcolm 2002: 52)  
 
Yet, according to Hobbes, weak as we are, we cannot completely rely on our innate 
rational caretaker. In addition to our internal compass we must take on a professional 
curator of rationality who will prevent us from inadvertently harming ourselves.  
Having combined mind (reason) and matter, and having pronounced reason as the 
overseer of matter within a civil society, the material aspect of Hobbes's political 
theory is encroached upon by his rationalist approach. Indeed I have suggested here 
that his rationalism quashes his materialism. Although his analysis of society 
observes material individuation, ultimately his unifying sovereign is instated in order 
to rid society of particularisation. Not being divine God herself, his sovereign must 
be actual and material. However, in order to instil cohesion among independent 




 that inhabit a material (by extension particular, finite and contingent) 
existence, his sovereign must produce the added value of stable eternal immateriality.  
Since Hobbes questions the evidence that this has been bestowed upon the 
ruler by divine providence, the ruler must either be considered a God in her own 
right
103
, or alternatively derives her Godliness from public ordainment. If the ruler is 
an authority in her own right, she in effect replaces God. Yet the ruler’s attempt to 
act as an artificial substitute for God contains a dissonance between her finite 
appearance and the infinite rule she is presumed to encompass
104
.  It is an inherent 
contradiction between her particular actuality, and the generality that no particular 
finite body can hope to embody.  By contrast, public ordainment of the ruler, either 
implies that a shared immaterial stability can be procedurally extracted from the 
multitude of material individuation (in the manner of David Gauthier or John Rawls), 
or alternatively that the sovereign's immateriality is invented by her subjects and 
thereafter this imagined status is adhered to
105
 . 
In both understandings, the resolution of the difficulties presented by material 
individuation is the subordination of the material to either a real, or a virtual 
immaterial higher power that cancels out material social disparity. Consolidation 
becomes both a means and an end; it is a means towards the erection of a single 
entity powerful enough to awe its constituency; it is an end in itself in so far as it 
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  To borrow Leibniz’s term.  
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  Although allegedly speaking of monarchy by divine right, King James VI of Scotland seems to 
have considered himself a God by his own right. This opinion is expressed in his speech before 
parliament: ‘For Kings are not onely GODS Lieutenants vpon earth, and sit vpon GODS throne, but 
euen by GOD himselfe they are called Gods. ‘ (King James VI and I and Sommerville Political 
writings 1994: 181)  
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 Historically leading to notions of hereditary of sovereignty that Hobbes appears to have shared for 
stability considerations. 
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displaces our sense of time, disguising itself as the immaterial and therefore the 
timeless unity we aspire to achieve. Whether this consolidation is distilled as by 
David Gauthier or publicly reasoned in the manner of John Rawls, changes very 
little.  Inevitably they share a rationalist demand for timelessness and placelessness 
that conflicts with a real human material existence. This in turn explains the contrast 
between the strong theoretical appeal of such stances, and the difficulties in their 
actual implementation.  
Locke's theoretical enterprise can be considered as an attempt to restore the 
political materialism that I have suggested is lost in Hobbes and in Gauthier. I 
propose that he may have achieved this by importing his dualist metaphysical 
discussion of material individuation in the Essay (An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding) into his discussion of politics in the Second Treatise (Second 
Treatise of Government). An apparently similar position is expressed by Ruth W. 
Grant:  
Locke maintained the same set of propositions in both the Essay and the Two 
Treatise. (Grant 1987: 26) 
 
Yet her subsequent explication of this statement:  
that there is natural law that is reasonable; that God has equipped men with 
natural faculties suited to the task of discovering its contents; and that men are 
obligated to follow its dictates as they are the workmanship of the Supreme 
Being whose will it expresses.  (Grant 1987: 26)  
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 The latter is endorsed by Jean Hampton as the only coherent understanding of authority by consent, 
and is attributed by her to G.E.M. Anscome (Hampton Political Philosophy 1997: 77) . 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 142 
seems hostile to the gist of the material individuation versus Godly unity argument 
advanced here. That is, the idea that the Godly cannot be duplicated and demands a 
distinctly human, materially individuated version. On the face of it, Grant’s version 
of Locke, much like the position I here associate with Hobbes, appears to maintain 
that the Godly can be imported by means of the gift of rationality, virtually without 
any need of amendment, from the ideational realm into the real one.  However, 
reading Grant more closely one appreciates that this initial impression may be false. 
Although she does not juxtapose Locke with Hobbes, she does label Locke as a 
cautious liberal and indirectly also as a cautious rationalist
106
:  
Locke’s attitude towards the political is the same as his attitude toward the 
problem of human understanding. Men cannot know everything, but they can 
know enough to govern their conduct rationally. Action need not be arbitrary; it 
can be guided by rational principles of conduct. But the application of those 
principles to practice will always involve an element of judgment and 
uncertainty. (Grant 1987: 203-204).  
 
It is the magnification of this element of caution which has prompted my 
classification of Locke’s pursuit as one of imperfect authority, as opposed to the 
Hobbesean ambition to attain a perfect one. Both Hobbes and Locke agree that 
‘What Adam fell from…was the state of perfect Obedience’ (Locke 1999 (1695): 6 
The Reasonableness of Christianity). However, while Hobbes attempts to recapture 
the original state of perfection by employing reason, Locke considers this ambition 
unattainable. As Kim Ian Parker notes, for Locke ‘….even though humans can be 
taught to be reasonable, they still fall short of the standard that God sets.’ (Parker 
                                               
106 Kim Ian Parker, enlisting to his aid a similar conclusion by both Richard Ashcraft and D.G. James, 
argues that Locke was sceptical about the capacity of reason. (Parker The biblical politics of John 
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2004: 61). Indeed, Parker finds that the limit Locke places on reason is intended to 
reserve for Christ the restoration of what was lost by Adam’s Fall.   
I will now return to the dualism I claim Locke imports from the Essay to the 
Second Treatise.  In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding he argues that:  
if matter were the eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal 
infinite cogitative being, but an infinite number of finite, cogitative beings 
independent one of another, of limited force and distinct thoughts, which could 
never produce that order, harmony, and beauty, is to be found in nature. Since, 
therefore, whatsoever is the first, eternal being must necessarily be cogitative: 
and whatsoever is first of all things——higher degree it necessarily follows, that 
the eternal, first being cannot be matter. (Locke 1997 (1690): 552).  
 
Locke makes the metaphysical claim that a unified order cannot be expected to 
emerge from the fragmentation and disorder inherent to all that is material. The 
political implication seems to be that reproducing the ‘order, harmony, and beauty’ 
of nature artificially in the social context would require the institution of an artificial 
political God. Indeed this is the conclusion at which I claim Hobbes has arrived.  
However, for Locke playing the role of God would amount to both 
contradiction and blasphemy. It would involve the mortal contingent disguising itself 
as the eternal truth, no doubt not long thereafter alluding itself to be the bearer of the 
Truth. Indeed, this is precisely his grievance against the wrongdoing of so called 
“great men”, who while engaged in lawmaking presume to be speaking in Truth’s 
name: 
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But laws are not concerned with truth of opinions, but for the safety and security 
of the commonwealth and of every particular man’s goods. Clearly this is no 
cause for regret. For the truth certainly would do well enough if she were once 
left to shift for herself. She has not received and never will receive much 
assistance from the power of great men, who do not always recognize or 
welcome her.(Locke 1968 (1686): 123 A Letter on Toleration)  
 
Wishing to avoid the impossibility of a transcendental and yet human 
consolidator, Locke proposes the property principle as the sole common 
denominator. The principle of property acts as a medium through which individuals 
can hold on to distinct thoughts. It is a harmoniser, as opposed to the unifier 
proposed by the rationalist Hobbesean tradition. In this respect Locke's position 
seems to coincide with the contemporary market harmony interpretation of Adam 
Smith, as portrayed in the works of Friedrich Hayek
107
. Locke and Hayek's 
interpretation of Smith are both intent on conserving individuation in the face of the 
threat posed by the hijacking of authority. Hayek's individuation occurs on the 
epistemological basis of an unattainable truth escaping an individuated grasp. 
Trapped within a particular body, no single human can truly capture the plurality of 
information. Moreover, we are vessels of limited capacity, carrying conflicting 
information that, without the moderation of the market, would inevitably clash. The 
market peacefully sorts and circulates this segmented information, providing a live 
update as to the relation between the positions taken, and thereby also indicating 
their relative costs and benefits.  
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 More specifically (Hayek Individualism and Economic Order 1949),(Hayek Freedom, Reason, and 
Tradition 1958) and (Hayek Law Legislation and Liberty 1982). 
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The following section argues that despite these similarities we are confronted 
by two distinct market theories in Locke and Hayek. For Locke the market, like the 
State, is legitimate as long as it acts to secure property. Property is considered as 
primary to the social order inducing mechanisms, and is therefore placed outwith 
their reach. It is untouchable, one could say, sacred. Order is secondary to property; 
it must remain subordinate and is justified so long as it serves its purpose.  By 
contrast, in Hayek order and property are equally primary. They are mutually 
evolving, to the extent that they may be considered two sides of the same coin. The 
market fuels individualism and individualism fuels the market. It follows that by 
protecting the market we are also protecting the individual. An entirely self-
contained system is born, a political 'perpetuum mobile'. The following section 
further explores the relation between market and self, questioning the complete 
reliance on the market as the guarantor of individual liberty. More specifically it 
rejects the notion that Locke shares this view.  
 
5.3 The free market - convention and Locke 
 
The purpose of this section is to distinguish Locke’s vision of the relation 
between the individual and the market from Hayek’s interpretation of the Smitho-
Humean one. It is intended to counterpose the associative link between property, the 
individual and the market in Locke, with the parallel concepts in Hayek’s 
interpretation of Smitho-Humean theory. It is argued that the Hayekian formulation 
of the relationship between the individual and the market, is not only distinct from 
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the Lockean one, but ultimately, due to its lack of a fixed idea of individuation, 
cannot match the Lockean safeguard to individual liberty. 
 Although the previous sections emphasise the prescriptive divergence 
between Hobbes and Locke, the motivation for their endeavours is presumed to be a 
shared concern over an empirically observed social instability. They find that the 
state of nature, albeit to different degrees, cannot generate sufficient regularity. 
Distrust among individuals is for both of them the product of a lack of consistency. 
Their political prescriptions are artificial structures aimed at solving the perceived 
irregularity, either by grinding the ‘fleeting reality’ to a halt as in Hobbes’s 
formulation, or by alleviating the social ramifications of it as in Locke’s. This 
essentially interventionist position is contrasted in this section with the Smito-
Humean school’s rejection of the claim that a state of nature scenario would be rife 
with instability. It outlines the Hayekian evolutionary argument that naturally 
occurring market-based convention would reign. 
 Hayek asserts that it was notions of spontaneous order, social evolution, and 
singular origin developed by the Scottish school that informed Darwin’s work; and 
finds it ironic that these notions later rebounded into the Social Sciences in a 
distorted and inappropriate form. In an attempt to draw a distinction between the 
application of these ideas in Biology and their application in the Social Sciences he 
writes:  ‘in social evolution the decisive factor is not the selection of the physical and 
inheritable properties of individuals but the selection by imitation of successful 
institutions and habits.’ (Hayek 1958: 233). The former is determined by 
physiological inheritance, the latter is socially acquired; biological evolution would 
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seem to be conditioned by nature, whereas social evolution appears to be dependent 
on nurture. The following model may be helpful in elucidating this difference.   
In Biology we witness random mutations, these mutations must contend with two 
reciprocally interacting variables and one constant: 
• Evolve (a)  - the reciprocal effect on other animates 
• Evolve (ia) - the reciprocal effect on the inanimate (e.g. minerals, sunlight, 
temperature fluctuation, etc.) 
• Constant (P) - the rules of Physics 
 
Whereas in the Social Sciences, Hayek contends, we witness a medley of evolution 
that is attached to no constant. This may be modeled in the following manner: 
• Evolve (i) – the reciprocal effect on other individuals 
• Evolve (r) – the reciprocal effect on resources 
• Evolve (p) – the reciprocal effect on social patterns 
The individuals play a much more substantial role in the Social Sciences, as 
they not only inform other individuals and affect the balance of resources, but also 
take part in the amendment of the social pattern database, which in turn instructs 
their own actions by way of education and imitation. By contrast, in Biology the 
constraints of Physics are set. They preside over the interactions but are themselves 
immune to change
108
. There is another striking difference at the model level: 
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 Interestingly a legalistic Kantian interpretation, which understands Kant to be attempting to 
convert contingent social patterns into moral rules, would reduce the Social Sciences into Darwinian 
Biology.  
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Darwinian evolution has a starting point. Evolution, as we know it, started with the 
Big Bang. Before the existence of the laws of Physics evolution seems difficult to 
fathom, since there is nothing held constant for the evolutionary factor to encounter. 
Yet, this is exactly what Hayek wishes us to envisage when it comes to social 
evolution. Society does not have a starting point, there is no ‘contractual moment’; 
just an endless trail of convention, followed by convention, followed by convention.  
For Hayek, in the political context this trail of conventions generates the 
concept of the market. Supposedly containing no fixed content and therefore no 
predetermined personal bias, this value-free intangible instrument of communication 
is said to combine the ultimate in personal liberation with non-coercive social 
coordination. The partiality of human manipulation is replaced by the marvel of the 
‘invisible hand’. Originating in Adam Smith, the concept is understood by Hayek as 
being an inducer of order in the absence of human intention (Hayek 1982: 37). It 
follows that the lack of planned order does not lead to chaos, but rather to a distinct 
form of order, which would not appear to have a particular source. 
Unlike the biological model of evolution, nothing is held constant in the 
social one; it has no grounding point whatsoever. The advantage of such an account 
of social interaction is that it is highly adaptable. It is a drifting system that 
assimilates changes or mutations in resources, individual expectations, and social 
patterns. Hayek maintains that this inherent flexibility prevents individuals from 
fixing the rules it produces, gaining unfair advantage, and imposing their own 
preferences on others. Yet this generates an epistemological difficulty. The fleeting 
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reality of Hayek’s market vision changes at an indeterminate rate. If the changes 
occur frequently and without intermission, human awareness of them would be put 
into question. In order to grasp the change we would need intervals of ‘normality’.   
Chandran Kukathas offers an interpretation of Hayek that appears to rescue 
him from this difficulty, by making use of an underlying pattern wrought in our 
minds - a hidden ‘pattern of patterns’. It is a mindset that Kukathas claims is 
borrowed by Hayek from Kant’s world-in-itself, and is similarly unapproachable 
(Kukathas 1989: 51). Trying to access it would be akin to entering an infinite loop. 
But Kukathas argues that unlike Kant’s world-in-itself, the ‘pattern of patterns’ in 
Hayek is reflexive. It not only projects on to the world as we know it, but is also 
reformed by the reflection of its projection. However, by amending the original 
Kantian position to fit Hayek’s reflexivity, Kukathas effectually reinstates the state 
of flux of the perceivable world: a never ending stream of reformations proceeding at 
a pace that humans might not be able to cognitively withstand. 
It was a similar epistemological and ontological confusion that I suggested 
prompted both Hobbes and Locke to offer their stability-enabling political measures. 
Moreover, even if Hayek’s position can be salvaged by somehow curtailing the rate 
of change, either on the model or in the real world, his understanding of the market 
and its relation to individuals and property suffers from further logical difficulties. In 
particular, I would argue that his insistence on the emergence of individuality out of 
the market risks undermining individual liberty. 
In order to prevent an external override of the market system, Hayek insists 
on leaving it to its own devices.  It would appear that the coordinating mechanism of 
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the market is ordering itself, and by exhibiting this attribute of autonomy it is often 
understood as having taken on ‘a life of its own’. The mechanism is commonly 
referred to as ‘growth’ that cannot be captured in single human moments and 
therefore does not take well to attempts to formalise it once and for all
109
.  
Furthermore, since we cannot gain an understanding of this unintentional order, we 
are advised not to act in a delusional manner and attempt to address it.  
But there is more at stake for Hayek than a fancy version of the 
commonsense dictum ‘if it ain’t broke don’t fix it’. Hayek views the mechanism as 
an instrument of liberty. A market society is one in which, by virtue of the humble 
presumption of human ignorance as to ‘the rationale’ behind social phenomena, no 
individual or group can legitimately monopolise the ‘once and for all’ truth. On this 
account the divide between political liberalism and economic liberalism collapses to 
form a single, capital ‘L’, Liberalism
110
. Once the distinction collapses it also 
becomes less and less clear whether selves and property allow for the market, or the 
market allows for property and selves.  
Hayek appears to portray the relationship between the market and the self as 
logically circular, in the sense that neither precedes the other. Yet this argument is 
difficult to accept. Consider that while Hayek’s market system supposedly functions 
merely as an indicator of prices, if there is to be any consequence to these prices, 
they must be attached to actual goods, which in turn are attached to actual 
individuals. Hayek must concede that the exchange that the market facilitates is not 
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 See also Hayek’s citation of Cicero with regard to the Roman constitution in (Hayek Freedom, 
Reason, and Tradition 1958: p. 231) 
110 See also (Hardin Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 1999: 59) 
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merely that of information, but eventually also the exchange of ownership. He must 
also allow that the stability of property is a condition of the market system, since in 
the absence of mutual recognition of ownership, trade could never be initiated. 
Moreover, having been initiated, should the foundations of property become 
unstable, commerce would experience breakdown and the market would cease to 
operate. Furthermore, the stability of property, to which I have argued Hayek’s and 
any other market system are compelled to commit themselves, presupposes the 
consistency of selves. The reciprocal acknowledgement of selfness, as demanded by 
G.W.F. Hegel in the master-slave dialectic, acts as a precursor to the establishment of 
property, since without individuation, property could not be attached and therefore 
could not be exchanged under the market. Yet for Hayek individuation, and by 
extension property and selves, do not precede the market; rather, they are a market 
effect.  
If we do not anchor the market with non-evolving concepts of self and 
property, there is no reason to think the market would not drift to the point where it 
no longer coincides with liberty. Without securing the self and property, as I will 
argue Locke does, the market itself may evolve and mutate undesirably. Some 
market economists have attempted to remedy this problem by extending ‘the 
invisible hand’ from its initial classification as an unintentional ordering factor, into 
an equilibrium-oriented self-balancing organiser. That this contradicts the 
epistemological boundaries set by Hayek is well demonstrated by Kukathas in his 
discussion of the role of competition in Hayek’s theory: ‘…Hayek was attempting to 
draw economists away from their tendency to characterise the competitive order as 
an equilibrium state, arguing that because equilibrium “presupposes that the facts 
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have already all been discovered and competition therefore ceased” (NS 184), such a 
concept was of limited theoretical use.’
 
(Kukathas 1989: 96). 
Yet if Kukathas is correct, then Hayek cannot rely on the self-preservation 
of the market through its attraction to equilibrium, and therefore it must be accounted 
for outwith the market system. The only remaining option, in my view, is that the 
concept of the self and its adjoined property be codified constitutionally outside the 
mutability of evolution. This Lockean proposition does not sit well with Hayek’s 
theory, since it would effectively create a prescribed truth. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of a special standing for the self and property, Hayek’s theory quickly 
morphs into postmodernism, a theory that, to my mind, begins with a genuine 
concern for liberty and ends in a confused drift that is unable to hold on to liberty at 
all.  
This can be demonstrated by critically tracing Hayek’s steps. For Hayek the 
market institutionalises openness. He therefore wishes to assert that the market 
continuously preserves both property and self. That the initial market-perspective 
requires equalisation of its participants is undeniable, however, that this feature is 
self-reinforcing is questionable. Hayek recognises that the market would require anti-
trust measures, but even such measures seem to be failing when confronted by the 
force of ‘market share economics’. I am here referring to the race between firms to 
capture market share in order to impose their standard, leaving their competition so 
crippled that they are quite often forced out of business. Such was Microsoft’s move 
against Apple in the mid 80’s, and again against Netscape and others in the 90’s.   
It may be suggested that the current race towards the standardisation of MP3 
playing formats between Apple, Microsoft, Sony and others, refutes my claim in that 
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it shows that the market allows companies to rebound. While this may be true, it still 
leaves the self and its adjoined property, under the modern label of ‘the consumer’, at  
a disadvantage. Adam Smith can be excused for not taking such phenomena into 
account, since his was an era in which firm sizes were constrained, resulting in an 
adherence to a fair-play equalising market theory (see also Heilbroner 2000: 58). 
However, in the current day and age, the sheer size of companies and their marketing 
forces create an imbalance of power.  
This concrete economic example reinforces the political theoretical argument 
I have been attempting to establish with regard to the anchoring of the value of self 
and property outwith the market. Otherwise, the market will drift, and the self will 
drift, and through their reflexive relationship they would alter individual liberty to 
the point where it ceases to pronounce individuality or liberty.   
 
5.4 Nozick and Locke 
 
In the previous section I argued that the Hayekian argument for liberty by 
virtue of the market alone is not shared by Locke. Yet there is another version of 
Libertarianism that is often associated with Locke, namely Robert Nozick’s, whose 
development of the idea of the minimalist role of the State is allegedly based on the 
model of Locke’s ‘night watchman’ State (Lacey 2001: 58). Despite this 
conventional association, a careful consideration of Nozick’s references to Locke in 
Anarchy State and Utopia reveals their differences, and arguably a closer affinity 
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with Hobbes. Alternatively, one could argue that Nozick follows the trend of reading 
Hobbes into Locke, blurring the differences between the two.   
Nozick himself links his political thought not only with Locke, but also with 
evolutionary and spontaneous order ideas (Nozick 1994), supposedly drawing upon 
the same sources that Friedrich Hayek employs in his attempt to revive this school of 
thought (Barry 1982: 1 electronic version).  The shared regard expressed by Nozick 
and Hayek for the rules and patterns that emerge from the market as the most fair, 
and perhaps the only epistemologically available measures for the administration of 
social interaction, has more often than not led to the conceptual subsumption of their 
theoretical positions under the Libertarian
111
 umbrella.  
I will argue against this, claiming instead that Nozick is neither Lockean nor 
Hayekian, but essentially a Hobbesean evolutionist, much like David Gauthier. In 
order to disentangle Nozick from his self-declared Smitho-Humean roots, I employ a 
useful differentiation on the basis of the criterion of reflexivity that David Lewis 
(Lewis 1969) makes between the concept of convention which I attribute to the 
Smitho-Humean school, and of pseudo-convention, which I attribute to the 
Gautherian evolutionary school.  
David Lewis’s study of convention (Lewis 1969), reiterates Hayek’s 
interpretation of the Smitho-Humean tradition, asserting that our attraction to a set of 
                                               
111 It should be noted that Hayek appears to reject the extreme version of the minimalist State that is at 
the crux of Nozick’s Libertarian response in Anarchy, State and Utopia (Nozick Anarchy, State and 
Utopia 1974) to John Rawls justification of State interventionism in A Theory of Justice (Rawls A 
Theory of Justice 1999): ‘Far from advocating…a ‘minimal state’, we find it unquestionable that in an 
advanced society government ought to use its power of raising funds by taxation to provide a number 
of services which for various reasons cannot be provided, or cannot be provided adequately, by the 
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basic patterns could be sufficient to create a complexity of intricate associations. 
Lewis argues that much of the social interaction of preference-oriented individuals 
may be explained by the formation of conventions. Furthermore, he proposes
112
 that 
although constructs such as express agreements or social contracts may exert 
influence on society, they are limited in life-span (Lewis 1969: 84-85). Indeed he 
maintains that the only way in which an express agreement can subsist is by being 
subsumed into convention.  
Although Lewis addresses the formation of order, or rules, mainly in the 
context of the philosophy of language, his discussion has clear implications for 
theorising spontaneous formations of order more generally. In his study he 
distinguishes between two types of orderly formations that present themselves in a 
similar fashion: convention and convention-counterfeits.  What distinguishes the two 
is the reflexivity that marks true convention. In other words, in cases of genuine 
convention, one wants to conform to convention if others do, and one wants others to 
conform to it if one does so oneself (see also Lewis 1969: 120) . As Lewis puts it in 
formal terms:  
A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are 
agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that and it 
is common knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of S among members of 
P, 
(1) almost everyone conforms to R; 
(2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R; 
                                                                                                                                     
for giving the territorial authority power to make the inhabitants contribute to a common fund from 
which such services could be financed.’ (Hayek Law Legislation and Liberty 1982: 41).   
112 Following very much in Hume’s footsteps. 
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(3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all 
possible combinations of actions; 
(4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R’, on 
condition that almost everyone conform to R’; 
where R’ is some possible regularity in the behaviour of members of P in S, such 
that almost no one in almost any instance of S among members P could conform 
to both R’ and to R. (Lewis 1969: 78).  
 
Lewis separately addresses ‘convention look-alikes’ or ‘counterfeits’. He identifies 
four
113
 pure species of regularity that, similarly to convention, are sustained by way 
of mutual imitation, but which nevertheless are not conventions. In essence his claim 
is that although convention is sustained through imitation, not everything that is 
sustained by imitation is convention. What is lacking in these ‘counterfeits’ is the 
distinctly reflexive feature of convention, an established link between the preferences 
of the parties to a convention that continually sustains it. 
 One can see the significance of these distinctions by noting that, on a 
traditional prisoner’s dilemma reading, Hobbes’s demand for reciprocal replicative 
behaviour relies on the establishment of one such convention-counterfeit, namely 
trust (see note 113)  rather than on the establishment of a convention114. If we can 
become convinced that others will act rationally, then we can be persuaded to follow 
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 Mannerism – often unknowingly mutual imitation with no preference involved. 
Preference copying – starting off with one unconditional preference and moving on to another 
unconditional preference, whereby the preference was influenced but does not remain conditioned 
by the preference of others. 
Trust – copying the preference of others because one trusts that they are acting upon information 
that one would act on in a similar fashion had this information been at one’s disposal. 
Partial conditioning – I would like to conform to a preference if others do, but I would better still 
like to conform if they don’t. 
114
 Arguably it is a combination of mannerism, preference copying, trust and partial conditioning, yet 
even so it remains a counterfeit. 
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suit and act rationally ourselves. Hobbes thinks that such assurance could only be 
provided by a powerful ruler who would monitor our actions and threaten us with 
repercussions against anti-social behaviour. Gauthier proposes that such external 
enforcement is unnecessary, as the mechanism of self-centredness can generate a 
sufficient amount of deterrence: we can do our own individual bookkeeping, 
eventually marginalising anti-social tendencies and achieving the required 
deterrence.   
 By contrast, conventionalists of the Smitho-Humean school, such as Jean 
Hampton, assert that since the problem to be solved is one of coordination and not of 
cooperation, deterrence is not required. As interaction occurs, intentions will become 
mutually apparent by means of communicative signalling, resulting in the natural 
emergence of a mutually satisfactory pattern of conduct. That is not to say that 
governance becomes redundant. It is the role it plays that is amended; it becomes a 
relay post that amplifies the communication of intentions. This amplification not 
only prevents misunderstandings, but also educates newcomers (i.e. both children 
and foreigners) as to the local conventions. Order is thus achieved without the need 
for intentional rational consideration of relations with others. Actors are assumed to 
take a malice-free, self-centred approach of self-betterment. They neither consider 
each others’ conduct as part of some meticulous bookkeeping process (as Gauthier 
does), nor concern themselves with the reasoning that others might apply; they 
simply keep attune to each others’ advertised intentions so as to avoid clashes. 
Which of the two positions has Nozick adopted? Nozick claims to use 
Locke’s description of the state of nature  as a backdrop for the development of his 
idea that social dominance resolution emerges from a conflict between competing 
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protection agencies (Nozick 1974: 9-12). According to Nozick, individuals turn to 
such agencies in the first place, because natural law proves inefficient as a governing 
method. Like Locke, he worries that although such a system would resolve social 
problems to a certain extent, it would ultimately be incomplete. Not only would it 
allow personal bias to infiltrate in the form of disproportionate reactions, it would 
also lack a recognised finality of due process, thereby risking an endless sequence of 
retaliatory actions. The protection agency addresses both difficulties: it is 
emotionally detached from the cases it deals with, and the eventual prominence of a 
single agency as the sole and final legitimate recourse produces a sense of closure 
that prevents endless feuding.  
Strikingly, a very similar argument can be made on Hobbesean grounds. 
Indeed, Hobbes does not rule out defensive associations in his state of nature: ‘in a 
condtion of Warre…there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend 
himselfe from destruction, without the help of Confederates’(Hobbes 1991 (1651): 
102 Leviathan Ch. XV). It is rather the sporadic nature of these coalitions and their 
vulnerability to the whims of ‘the passions’, which motivates the individuals to seek 
a more permanent haven. ‘getting themselves out from the miserable condition of 
Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as has been shewn) to the naturall Passions 
of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe.’ (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 
117 Leviathan Ch. XVII) 
The only difference I can discern between a Gautherian interpretation of 
Hobbes, as discussed in Chapter 4 section 2, and Nozick’s evolutionary 
understanding of social relations, is that the latter stresses the positive outcome of 
conflict in ‘knocking some sense’ into subscribers to the competing agencies, often 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 159 
resulting in a treaty or consolidation emerging out of a condition of anarchy (Nozick 
1974: 16-17). Gauthier’s Hobbes appears to merely qualify Nozick’s position, 
employing rationality so that we may skip the ‘educational conflict’ phase and enter 
directly into a state of consolidated sovereignty; along the lines of: ‘since it no less, 
nay, it much more conduceth to peace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease 
them being risen’ (Hobbes 1998 (1656, 1642): 178 De Cive, VI, 9). Although Nozick 
speaks against the explicit compact between individuals that Hobbes subscribes to 
and claims that his dominant protection association does not share the State’s 
monopoly
115
 over violence (Nozick 1974: 24), if one reads Hobbes along the 
invisible-hand lines, as Gauthier does, the  distinction between the two dissipates
116
. 
The difference between Gauthier’s evolutionary path and Nozick’s, boils down, 
respectively, to positive incentives versus negative ones.  
However, although Nozick does seem to develop the State in an evolutionary 
manner that resembles Gauthier’s, the same cannot be said of his approach to 
morality. He does not explicitly develop morality, like Gauthier, in a reflexive 
evolutionary mode. He may therefore require a Lockean grounding in order to 
                                               
115 Note that it is difficult to accept Nozick’s contention that his dominant protective agency differs 
from the State, when he himself ascribes the dominant agency with the role of providing closure. After 
all, if the competition between protection agencies does not generate a sense of finality of discord, the 
entire evolutionary rationale of these protection agencies becomes questionable.  
 
116
 Jean Hampton goes further to argue that Nozick is mistaken in thinking that his framing the social 
question as one of coordination, rules out a social contract solution: ‘Nozick cited his own invisible-
hand explanation of the creation of government to show that he did not have a social contract 
argument; however, I hope it is clear that he was wrong to say this. What his [Nozick] ability to tell us 
this kind of a story does illustrate is that the problem people face in choosing a ruler to lead them is a 
kind of coordination problem that can be solved either by explicit agreement or by some kind of 
invisible-hand process….battle-of-the-sexes problems have conflicts that can be resolved either by 
certain devices, such as an election or coin flip, that can cause one outcome to be rational for all 
people in this situation to pursue, or by use of selective incentives that are used to make it rational for 
enough people to change their preference orderings over the possible outcomes so that coordination is 
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establish his prerequisite claim that individuals’ property rights override those of any 
political construct, a claim that would be difficult to derive from a Hobbesean 
foundation; difficult, but not impossible, as Gauthier’s ‘decapitated sovereign’ 
version of Hobbes demonstrates. Indeed Nozick’s brief reconsideration of invisible-
hand explanations (Nozick 1994) reiterates  the indication in Anarchy State and 
Utopia (Nozick 1974: Ch. 2) that his political theory relies just as much on Adam 
Smith as it does on John Locke.  
Still, Ross Harrison contends that Nozick’s route ‘is meant to be from 
certainty about morality to enlightenment about politics’ (Harrison 2003: 254). 
Harrison further questions whether such an ambition is sustainable without sharing 
Locke’s ‘intellectual and argumentative context’, namely his belief that God is the 
source of moral law, ‘breach of which he will punish, and that he is entitled to 
impose on us because we are his “creatures”’ (Harrison 2003: 254). I believe that one 
can escape Harrison’s demand by subjugating oneself to Locke’s metaphysics, 
without coming under the influence of his religious beliefs. Whether Nozick himself 
retains Locke’s metaphysics and more specifically his premise that individuation is 
part and parcel of a human material existence, is another matter
117
; conceivably 
warranting Harrison’s doubts in the specific context of Nozick’s adaptation of Locke, 
                                                                                                                                     
finally reached.’   invisible-hand explanations : ‘ (Hampton Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition 
1986: 168-169) . 
117
 I will return to Nozick’s metaphysics, and more specifically to his closest-continuer theory as a 
contributor to the resolution of the continuous identity problem, in Chapter 6 section 3.  
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but as I will expand upon in the following chapters, inapplicable to Locke’s position 
as articulated here. 
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Chapter 6. Locke: The Self, The State and the Continuous Identity of Property 
 
In the previous two chapters I attempted to metaphysically distance Locke’s 
position from both the Hobbesean stance and Hayek’s version of the Smitho-Humean 
account. It is the objective of the current chapter to expound on the metaphysical 
stance attributed here to Locke, in order to demonstrate the anti-cosmopolitan 
implication this has on his political stance. We have so far explored two routes to a 
cosmopolitan outlook, namely an unconventional interpretation of Hobbes, and a 
conventional interpretation of the Smitho-Humean school, as developed by Friedrich 
Hayek. In both cases it was argued that one should be attentive to the influence of 
their respective metaphysical positions on the outcome of their political reasoning. 
While it has been maintained that both stances logically entail the advocacy of a 
cosmopolitan political order, their foundation in distinct metaphysical positions, 
carries over to the ‘flavour’ of the cosmopolitanism they imply.  
Hobbesean Cosmopolitanism demands a renaissance of an ‘original 
position’; a past paradise to which we will ‘come full circle’, should we employ our 
rationality to stop the insecurity that goes hand in hand with unpredictability. In this 
respect cosmopolitanism is the End of the Hobbesean endeavour. By contrast, 
Smitho-Humean cosmopolitanism is metaphysically in constant motion, along the 
lines of the argument put forward by Anne Conway and discussed above (Ch. 2, pp. 
49-55). As such it has no particular end, indeed it cannot have one, it must remain 
perpetually open to change. Cosmopolitanism for the Smitho-Humean school is a 
means, albeit an important one, for reducing restraints on movement. It is motion that 
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is therefore the essentiality that the Smito-Humean would have us preserve; the 




The first section of this chapter explores the definition of the Self within the 
Lockean argument and examines its relationship with property. It suggests that the 
Lockean attraction to the preservation of property has its roots in a joint metaphysical 
and political attitude towards coping with individuation. In other words, it is 
established on logical grounds that are well beyond reduction to the context of an 
apologetic defence of the bourgeoisie
119
. Instead, it is maintained that his defence of 
property is intended to defuse social difficulties that arise out of the condition of 
individuation.  Contrary to the Hobbesean stance, which as I have argued, seeks to 
escape the ‘cancer’ of individuation by its surgical elimination, it is proposed that 
Locke is instead prescribing medication for the condition. For Hobbes, individuation 
is a terminal condition, which if left untreated, will drag society back into the ‘social 
death’ that is the unproductive war of all against all. By contrast, for Locke we must 
make the most of the condition of individuation, precisely because we escape it only 
when we die.   
The second section explores the extent to which the Lockean individuated 
self survives in Locke’s political framework. It address Jean Hampton’s allegation 
that the Lockean self, much like the Hobbesean self, must be suppressed in order to 
                                               
118 Granted the main twentieth century thinker of this school, Friedrich Hayek does consider limiting 
market so it will not infringe upon fair-play or offer products that are unsafe, but these are in line with 
Nozick’s ultra-minimalist State, and moreover apply just as well to a world-State. 
119 The conception of Locke as a trumpet for bourgeoisie rhetoric can, according to Jeffery Isaac, be 
traced back to Karl Marx’s interpretation and is forcefully reiterated in C.B. Macpherson’s work. 
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avoid the ‘paradox of sovereignty’, namely, the circularity that afflicts the argument 
for the establishment of authority, unless the subjects forfeit their autonomy. It is 
here argued that although Locke may not have addressed the issue directly, his 
system of electoral representation and his affinity with constitutionalism, resolve 
much of the paradox.  
In the third section the role of the State as a vessel of memory is explored. 
It is suggested that the State acts to counter the inherent temporality of the self and 
the property attached to this self. Borrowing from Locke’s metaphysical discussion 
of identity and personal continuity, it is argued that the State safeguards the collapse 
of the rational individual into a momentary, discontinuous being that cannot hope to 
hold on to property and is thus stripped of selfhood. It is maintained that the State 
quite literally assures the integrity of individuals, thereby enabling their trust in 
strangers. Again, Locke’s position is contrasted with Hobbes’s, which is portrayed as 
a political expression of Berkeley’s solution to the continuous identity debate
120
.  
The key to the differences is identified as the human relationship with the 
time continuum, and the numbing effect that frequent erratic changes may have on 
rational individuals. Hobbes proposes, in effect, to stop the flow of time by means of 
an all-powerful consistent form of rule that emulates the ever-present, all-knowing 
God, whereas Locke offers to manage time by institutional continuity. The 
institutional function of the State as a registrar for undisputed information is further 
                                                                                                                                     
(Isaac Was John Locke a Bourgeois Theorist?: A Critical Appraisal of Macpherson and Tully 1987: 
107) . 
120
 I appreciate that this is a controversial statement. After all Berkeley was a staunch immaterialist 
whereas Hobbes is widely identified with materialism. Yet as I have stressed continually, the monist 
position adopted by Hobbes cannot help but upset his materialism. Moreover, what is advanced is not 
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explored, identifying it not only as a stepping stone for the conservation of stability 
and perhaps the source for the implementation of fairness, but also potentially as a 
means towards the assurance of heritage, as a vehicle that vicariously allows rational 
individuals to take part, and therefore take an interest, in happenings beyond their 
lifetimes. Hence the State is not only a provider of a secure stable environment in 
which to live and form property, it also acts to repress considerations of our eventual 
demise, preventing them from ’eating away’ at our motivation to contribute our 
property offerings to the world.  
 The fourth section is a prelude to the following chapter, which is concerned 
with the perdurance of elements of human activity that appear to be irreducible to 
‘cold currency’. The difficulty is introduced by examining the issue of Land 
ownership and the implications of the commodification of Land. It is argued that 
perdurance of Land by its commodification would effectively acknowledge a right to 
secession, thereby undermining the entire construct of the State.  
 
6.1 The Self and Property 
 
Prompted by his friend Willliam Molyneux (Kaufman 2006: 1), in the second 
edition of the Essay Locke included the additional chapter Diversity and Identity. 
This chapter has been extensively discussed and continues to set the tone in the 
metaphysical debate on the nature of the identity of objects and persons (Lowe 1995: 
                                                                                                                                     
that Berkeley and Hobbes actually had a shared metaphysical outlook, but rather that there are 
similarities between the role of God as the producer of both infinity and continuity in their reasoning. 
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102). This section touches upon Locke’s ideas of personal identity in order to 
establish a proposed crossover between these metaphysical views and his intertwined 
political ideas of self and property. It is maintained that both rely on an 
understanding of the human condition as a confused dualistic one. It is a condition 
that can neither deny its immaterial origin, nor escape the spatio-temporal continuum 
in which it has been trapped. The concept of property figures prominently in the 
discussion, very much mirroring Max Milam’s attempt to demonstrate a consistency 
between Locke’s political theory and his epistemology, based upon a shared 
principle of property (Milam 1991 (1967)).  
Locke’s dualism is manifested in his resistance to the corporeal reduction of 
living organisms. He appreciates that ‘the living’ do not retain their bodily 
constitution, yet seem to persist in our minds. Consider that over the seasons we 
continue to perceive the tree outside our window as the same tree, although it 
continually sheds its ‘skin’: changing its colour, gaining and losing physical 
dimensions, and so forth.  He is therefore led to conclude that the source of 
persistence relates to our mental picture of the corporeal as a sequence of connected 
occurrences.  
For this organisation, being at any one instant in any one collection of matter, is 
in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual life, 
which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in 
the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of 
the plant, it has that identity which makes the same plant, and all the parts of it, 
parts of the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that 
continued organisation, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so 
united. (Locke 1997 (1690): 298  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
Book II, Ch. XXVII §6) 
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For the most part we ‘connect the spatio-temporal dots’ collected by our sensory 
faculties and deposited in our memory, either causally or by means of probability. 
We stretch these events and organisms across a temporal continuance, thereby 
achieving their perdurance
121
.  As noted earlier (Ch. 3, p.76) the term ‘perdurance’ 
was introduced into the persistence discussion by David Lewis in order to denote 
persistence that has a stretched temporal dimension.  Still, as Garth Kemerling 
observes: ‘So long as our knowledge of bodies is derived from the observable 
qualities of bodies, in ignorance of their internal features and operations, we can have 
no certain universal knowledge of the material world.’ (Kemerling 2001: Nature/The 
Natural World). It would appear that if we come close to universal knowledge of 
anything at all, we would do so with regard to ourselves, since in this special case we 
would conceivably be jointly aware of the self and its bodily manifestation.   
While as far as existence in this world
122
 is concerned Locke does subscribe 
to a dualist position that entertains a difference between bodies and souls or selves, 
he appears to hold the view that, at least until death, they cannot be entirely divorced. 
Although certainly not one and the same, they appear to be interrelated, as if the 
body were a material extension of the self
123
, or perhaps more accurately a shadow of 
it. Locke may very well have been trying to make the point that our material 
existence and actions shadow our immaterial intentions, and we must therefore take 
                                               
121 For a thorough  discussion of why organisms and events in Locke perdure whereas atoms and 
masses are perdurance/endurance neutral see (Conn Locke on Essence and Identity 2003: Ch.5) 
Consider that it is Locke’s dualist position that allows for the differentiation between the animate and 
the inanimate, a distinction that it is worth noting is impossible for Hobbes. It is perhaps this monistic 
unity that has led to his strong association with materialism; an association which is continually 
questioned herein.     
122 As opposed to the afterlife. 




. He is concerned with discounting magical accounts or 
ones that lend themselves to placing a wedge between the material and the 
immaterial.  As Kemerling notes:  
…Locke took great pains in showing the Cartesian account of human nature, as 
an immaterial thinking substance existing in uneasy alliance with a differentiated 
portion of material universe, is inadequate for the allocation of just punishment 
to the same moral agent who commits an immoral act. Several of Locke’s 
notorious “puzzle cases” are intended precisely to undermine any attempt at a 
Cartesian explanation of moral accountability. [Essay II xxvii 10-14] (Kemerling 
2001: Moral Agents).  
 
I leave the intricacies of Locke’s puzzles to scholars of metaphysics. For my 
purposes it is sufficient to recognise that Locke considered personal memory as both 
the source of identity and a record that matches causes in the past with future 
consequences. On a personal, isolated level, identity would be an account that 
pertains both to internalities of the self to which one would have introspective access, 
and to externalities of the self derived from sensory data, the link between the two 
stemming from the attachment of one’s body to one’s mind. On an interpersonal 
level, there would be a ‘Rashomon Effect’
125
. Since in interpersonal engagement one 
is limited to the perception of externalities accessed via sensory data, each party to 
the encounter would resort to conjecture as to the relation between the perceived 
                                                                                                                                     
123 See also Karl Olivecrona: ‘Here we have a most unequivocal expression of the idea that the 
personality is extended to encompass physical objects.’ (Olivecrona Apropriation in the State of 
Nature: Locke on the Origin of Property 1991 (1974): 319) 
124
 On a light hearted note, James Matthew Barrie may have hinted at this demand for responsibility 
when he depicted Wendy sewing Peter’s shadow onto him in his famous Peter Pan tale.  
125 The term ‘Rashomon Effect’ was popularised following Akira Kurosawa’s film ‘Rashomon’. In the 
film Kurosawa questions the existence of a single truth by posing four equally plausible, yet 
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world, and the intentions or persona behind them. Assuming that the individuals 
taking part in the encounter are not identical (e.g. twins), their exchange would either 
lead to the imposition of one side’s conjectures on the other, or in the absence of an 
impartial referee, to outright conflict. In comes the State to sort our memories and 
avoid discord.  
For Locke, we require the establishment of the State in order to act as a 
mechanism for the preservation of the extended self. That is, the self and its property 
shadow. As Locke states unequivocally:  
The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and 
the end why they chuse and authorise a legislative , is, that there may be laws 
made , and rules set, as guards and fences to properties of all the members of the 
society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and 
member of the society: for it may never be supposed to be the will of society, 
that the legislative should have the power  to destroy that which every one 
designs to secure, by entering into society (Locke 1980 (1690): 111 Second 
Treatise of Government Ch. XIX §.222) 
 
I argued earlier that Hobbes’s argument for the State cannot be reduced to corporeal 
safety concerns. Indeed, I asserted that remedying the insecurity of the state of nature 
has more to do with enabling prosperity than with removing the physical threat of 
death. I maintained that for Hobbes the state of nature was a sorry, but not an 
impossible condition in which to exist. The question that arises is whether the 
Hobbesean and Lockean theories converge on the rationale for the establishment of 
the State. 
                                                                                                                                     
conflicting, testimonies to a criminal event, including: a raped woman, the alleged perpetrator,  an 
onlooker, and even the woman’s murdered husband via the assistance of a medium.  
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I will not deny that there is a strong parallel between the rationale I have 
proposed for the Hobbesean State and the one that is supported by the above 
interpretation of Locke. Both enact the State in order to address the problem of 
continuous identity. They both require a solution to the problem of the ‘fleeting 
integrity’ of individuated beings. As I will reiterate shortly, once individuated beings 
have the autonomy to assert themselves, they might very well reinvent themselves, 
thereby causing havoc in interpersonal relations. The State is the provider of the 
integrity that would otherwise be absent from these interpersonal engagements. Yet, 
there is a crucial difference between the preservation offered by Hobbes’s State and 
the one offered by Locke’s.  
Recall the difference between perdurance and endurance (p. 76) as suggested 
by David Lewis and implemented here. Briefly, endurance allows for preservation by 
setting the characteristics of a body in stone, whereas perdurance is open to change in 
the characteristics, as long as there is an external observer that can guarantee its 
identity. I would argue that Hobbes offers preservation of the integrity of 
individuated beings through a mechanism that provides endurance. As I asserted 
earlier the Hobbesean State is one in which all motion, and by extension all change, 
has been brought to a halt.  It freezes a ‘shot’ of the world and establishes an infinite 
loop wherein that very same frame is continuously fed back into individuals’ 
perception. It creates the ultimate in conservative scenarios, thereby generating 
predictability that eliminates the stress associated with the unknown. As long as the 
subjects obey the sovereign they can remain at peace, as the world is guaranteed to 
unfold itself in a predetermined fashion. By contrast, Locke offers preservation of 
individuated beings by means of perdurance. Their identity and by extension their 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 171 
integrity is held in check, as opposed to being held constant, by the institution of the 
State. The individuals submit to this new external body’s ‘observation’, in order to 
referee problems that might occur in interpersonal exchange. The State is an honest 
broker that works according to procedures that are laid out in the open. 
 
6.2 The represented Self – Is self-ownership fictitious? 
 
The difference between Hobbes and Locke in the method applied by the State 
to preserve identity has implications for the sort of State that they envisage.   
Hobbes’s position requires the ruling body to gain an absolute control over events. 
At least publicly, there can be no lengthy discussion and no swaying of opinion, 
there needs to be just a single line of governance. The Hobbesean reasoning behind 
this absolutist stance is expressed in Margaret Cavendish’s renunciation of 
democratic rule. Among other arguments she states that such rule would be so 
‘Inconstant’ as to have no ‘Assurance’ (Cavendish, Orations, in Boyle 2006: 282). In 
other words, it would not generate the degree of stability necessary in order to secure 
social peace. Locke’s position does not demand anything near the control required by 
Hobbes’s. Admittedly, in order not to render perdurance meaningless, it needs to 
curtail the possibility of constant appeals to change in identity or opinion. It does so 
however by putting in place certain procedures. For example, in the realm of 
registration of change in opinion, the electoral procedure places constraints on the 
intervals in which one can apply one’s change to the registrar. In turn ‘fair play’ is 
achieved by constitutional elements that discourage the frequent amendment of the 
procedures themselves.  
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 However, Jean Hampton argues that both Hobbes’s and Locke’s positions 
suffer from the ‘paradox of sovereignty’, the problem of explaining how the people 
can be both the master of their ruler and yet subject to her. Hampton illustrates the 
difficulty by way of the metaphor of a babysitter and a group of unruly children 
(Hampton 1997: 63). The situation of the people vis-à-vis the ruler is portrayed as 
circular. The babysitter is appointed to take charge of the unruly children, yet it 
would appear that the unruly children in Locke are in charge of appointing the 
babysitter. So who is in charge of whom? There certainly is something circular about 
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in an agency system. One could even 
suggest that such a relationship is inherently circular. The tension this puts on 
stability, as I have suggested above, has been more or less alleviated in modern 
agency regimes, by setting up cyclic intervals at which the unruly children are 
allowed a limited amount of intervention. That said, it is a matter of fact that this 
limit is constantly being questioned in contemporary debates over representation.  
 In recent years technological development has rejuvenated direct rule 
through various forms of gauging public opinion, from opinion polls to referendums 
to e-government. More and more the unruly children are referred to as clients and the 
services provided as products. This semantic shift no doubt reflects an attempt to 
emulate the private sector, hoping to mimic their productivity and quality of service; 
a reaction to the dubious name politicians have gained.  This popular, or rather 
populist, trend undermines one of the agency relationship’s most treasured  ‘side 
effects’, the responsibility and accountability that Machiavelli identified in it (See 
Balaban 1990). As the general public interjects more and more into the ruling realm, 
the rulers do much less ruling and much more serving, to the point where they 
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become mere servants that obey commands. But did we not instate them because we 
could not command ourselves?  
 Locke can be said to have steered clear of direct rule
126
, and by doing so 
circumvented much of the paradox. Yet in order to avoid it altogether, one would 
need to adopt a somewhat unconventional and limited notion of representation. A 
rule of representatives is often taken quite literally to mean that we elect agents to do 
our bidding, as if we do the ruling through them (Hampton 1997: 106). But if they 
are doing our exact bidding, how can they be expected to overcome the conflicts 
between our biddings that prevented us from doing our bidding ourselves in the first 
place? In order to avoid the recurrence of conflict, they would seem to need to 
dissociate themselves from us, or at least from our direct requests. But then in what 
sense do they represent us?  
 Here I must agree with Hampton that if they represent us at all, they do so in 
a very limited manner. However, Hampton is wrong to commit Locke to any stronger 
‘moment by moment’ notion of representation, giving rise to instability as discontent 
that quickly translates into the language of misrepresentation.  
He himself comments on this: 
… such revolutions happen not upon every mismanagement in public affairs. 
Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the 
                                               
126
 His writings may be seen as very much in accord with Hampton’s own statement about America: 
 
‘So our government is by the people, for the people and of the people – except that this last 
preposition is misleading. Unlike in ancient Athens, in the United States most of us aren’t actually in 
the government; only a few of us are. What makes this a government “of the people” is the fact that 
built into the governing convention are not only rules that define the object political game but also 
rules that grant the people the power to create and dissolve portions of the object political game if the 
choose to do so at relatively little cost.’ 
 
See (Hampton Political Philosophy 1997: 107). 
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slips of human frailty will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But 
if a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way, 
make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie 
under and see whither they are going, it is not to be wondered that they should 
then rouse themselves and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may 
secure to them the end for which government was at first erected… (Locke 1980 
(1690): 113 Second Treatise of Government Ch.XIX §. 225) 
 
In this respect it is important to make a distinction, as I believe Locke does, between 
two types of breach of contract: a breach in good faith, and a malicious breach. In 
more political terms these would correspond to a majority rule policy change versus 
a revolution. We may be inclined to think that the policy of the current regime hurts 
our property, however, unless the regime is acting with malicious intent, we would 
not be justified to revolt against its authority.  
 We now come again to touch upon the question of the extent of the ruler’s 
authority.  An issue that Hampton claims is exacerbated by the following statement:  
 It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit 
every one who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out his estate his 
proportion of the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent – 
i.e., the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves or their 
representatives chosen by them. For if any one shall claim a power to lay and 
levy taxes on the people, by his own authority without such consent of the 
people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property and subverts the end 
of government; for what property have I in that which another may by right take, 
when he pleases, to himself? (Locke 1980 (1690): 74 Second Treatise of 
Government Ch. XI §140) 
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In order to get a clearer picture of the troublesome aspects that Hampton identifies, it 
might be helpful to break this argument down. 
 
Step 1: A self-centered justification of taxes, without which public goods cannot be 
provided.  
Step 2: Qualification of the right to levy taxes, the logic of which connects with the 
previous step: since property is by definition exclusive to the property owner, 
only he can relinquish its ownership by means of consent. 
Step 3: Consent is defined as majority rule. 
Step 4: Majority rule is enacted either directly or indirectly. 
Step 5: Contrasting ‘his own authority’ – illegitimate authoritarian tyrannical rule –
with ‘consent authority’, i.e. legitimate majority rule. 
 
Step 1 is rather straightforward and I think raises little concern. Step 2 is an integral 
part of Locke’s understanding of the notion of property. While it may be opposed on 
various grounds, it does not seem to raise a problem within Locke’s own system and 
the argument he is proposing. Step 3 is troubling as it stands on the shaky obligatory 
grounds of  majority rule. One could try to resort to justifying it by means of 
practicality, submitting that it is entirely arbitrary, but extremely useful for ending 
endless discussion. Yet a disturbingly similar argument can be made to justify 
authoritarian rule. So if step 5 is to be maintained, the legitimacy of majority rule 
needs to be recast more solidly. Step 4 may be understood in two fashions: one 
would be an advocacy of both direct or indirect rule with regard to policy making, 
the other is that these two options are presented as a means of achieving authority in 
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general and not, as Hampton would have it, in each particular instance of tax levy. 
To conclude this point, I believe Hampton puts too much emphasis on steps 4 and 5, 
whereas the true problem lies elsewhere – in step 3. 
Still, we remain at a loss as to the sense in which representation is being 
employed, perhaps because we too often envisage representation according to the 
ancient Greek model, in the sense that ruling actions are either dictated by the public, 
or at the least represent a compromise that the prevailing majority of the population 
would adopt. Locke’s interpretation of representation is a much more modest one. 
For him to represent means to adhere to certain basic ideals, not to be swept by 
current agendas. Representation is maintained as long as the ruler reveres the sanctity 
of the self. It is important to note that this is a departure from Hobbes, who believes 
the ruler, by definition, represents the united interest of the selves. However, all in all 
Locke’s understanding of what representation entails is quite similar to Hobbes’s. 
The ruler’s positions are not dictated by the people; instead the ruler, like the 
entrepreneur, must innovate, and only over time, through elections, is his ingenuity  
assessed by his public. It is perhaps this superficial convergence that has contributed 
to the disregard of the completely opposing perspectives of pluralism and holism 
respectively, which coincidently lead to a similar conclusion. 
 
6.3 The State as an answer to continuous identity problems 
 
In the famous metaphysical debate between Berkeley and Locke, Berkeley 
asserts that human identity is preserved thanks to God’s omnipresence: 
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There is therefore some other mind wherein they [sensible things] exist, during 
the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did 
before my birth and would do after my suppodsed annihilation. And as the same 
is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows, there 
is an omnipresent, external Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and 
exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules as he 
himself has ordained, and are by us termed the laws of nature. (Berkeley 2004 
(1713): 201 Three Dialogues between Hylas an Philonous). 
  
It is God’s eternal gaze that integrates us and allows us to subsist
127
. He is the source 
of the human perception of individuation, the keeper of order and the lord of time. In 
Berkeley’s view we constitute no more than immaterial projections made in God’s 
image; without the safekeeping he provides, we would literally disintegrate, meshing 
into indiscernible singularity. God not only enables plurality, but is the conduit for 
memory and uninterrupted consciousness.  
The consequences of interrupted memory and consciousness are well 
demonstrated in the short story Memento Mori by Jonathan Nolan and its subsequent 
film adaptation Memento. Due to an ‘incident’ the main protagonist of the story 
suffers from the inability to form a continuum of new memories. He has not lost the 
basic cognitive skills acquired throughout his past, but he is incapable of recording 
and subsequently recalling events beyond his current waking state. His world 
disintegrates every time his attention is distracted. As a result he loses touch with 
time, he is trapped in the ‘here and now’ of the moment:  
                                               
127 See also    (Johnson Personal survival and the closest-continuer theory 1997: 10) 
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But you're different. You're more perfect. Time is three things for most people, 
but for you, for us, just one. A singularity. One moment. This moment. Like 
you're the center of the clock, the axis on which the hands turn. Time moves 
about you but never moves you. It has lost its ability to affect you. What is it 
they say? That time is theft? But not for you. Close your eyes and you can start 
all over again. Conjure up that necessary emotion, fresh as roses. (Nolan 2001) 
 
Nolan is not strictly speaking ‘out of time’, for he is not dead and he keeps waking 
up; nevertheless, his autonomous existence is in jeopardy.  By laying a physical trail 
of documented evidence in the form of Polaroids and notes, he hopes to artificially 
secure the continuity of his identity. However, he soon realises that these ‘facts’ are 
untrustworthy, his condition having left him prey to the manipulation of the 
‘strangers’ he encounters every time his mind is ‘reset’. He is essentially being 
programmed by others, his independent existence has been placed in question.  
Gabriella Slomp argues convincingly that Hobbes’s political thought is an 
attempt to solve an identity problem similar to that with which Nolan confronts his 
protagonist. 
 In the Hobbesean state of nature, a person’s identity is endangered in two ways: 
(i) in a crude and drastic sense: physical life is threatened; (ii) in a more 
sophisticated sense the ability of the mind to detach itself from the present and to 
plan the future is wasted. For Hobbes the state of nature  is a state of uncertainty, 
where one cannot trust anybody and least of all one’s experiences of the past…In 
other words in the state of nature people are victim of the present; the time of the 
mind is forced to coincide with the time of nature, which for Hobbes is the 
present. (Slomp 2000: 20).  
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She even suggests a thought experiment of remarkable similarity to Nolan’s storyline 
in order to uncover the crucial importance of imagination and memory for Hobbes’s 
conception of man: 
 Let us suppose that the ability of the mind to store images of what we have 
perceived through our senses were to disappear. In other words let’s suppose that 
we had no imagination and thus when the object is removed, so is our 
consciousness of it. If we were conscious of external objects only at the very 
moment when they “act upon us” (i.e., if we had no memory), then each moment 
would be spent (and wasted) in making ourselves conscious of the elementary 
objects around us. It is because what we have perceived has become knowledge 
that we can proceed to learn new things. Without memory, it would be as if we 
were reborn again at each moment. (Slomp 2000: 18). 
 
Putting together Nolan’s and Slomp’s accounts of identity difficulty, consider 
a scenario in which we all suffer from this odd amnesia condition. This would be a 
world of ‘fooles’ in Hobbesean terms. Each individual might strive to maximise their 
gain between the moment they wake and the moment they fall asleep. Yet to what 
avail? Upon waking they would have no verifiable recollection of the previous day, 
neither of their gains nor losses, and would therefore repeat the cycle anew. 
Additionally, as noted both by Slomp (Slomp 2000: 20) and by Borris Henning 
(Henning 2005: 7), they could not be held responsible for their prior actions, since 
there could be no verifiable testimony to them.  Even worse, if they were to have 
foresight of the recurring death-rebirth cycle
128
, they might refrain from any action 
whatsoever, save one that leads to immediate gratification. Under such 
                                               
128 Not unlike the Buddhist state of  Samsara. 
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circumstances, reduced to animal-like existence, one would live for the moment, 
attempting to pack as many pleasures into one day as possible.  
If one were interested in putting an end to this unproductive and worthless 
condition, one would require a trusted vessel that is immune to memory loss as well 
as protected from manipulation. I would agree with Slomp that: ‘according to 
Hobbes the sovereign power is created to guarantee the minimal condition necessary 
to be a person, namely, physical continuity. But in order to guarantee physical 
integrity, each individual’s mental self-continuity has to be acknowledged in full so 
that rules can be enforced and punishment administered.’ (Slomp 2000: 20). 
However, it is unclear how a collection of individuals who all suffer from the same 
condition could produce an individual that does not, and Slomp never pursues this 
matter. 
A natural candidate for such a role would be Berkeley’s all-seeing, all-
knowing God. His records would be official and tamper–free. Yet, while his 
insulation from manipulation is a blessing, one could argue, as I have claimed Locke 
does, that it also makes the records themselves humanly impenetrable. While these 
records may be well and good for conducting the afterlife, they do little to 
communicate secure order in this life. Henning’s related insight, that: ‘In §20 [Essay 
II, xxvii], Locke only claims that I cannot be made responsible for something that I 
forgot “beyond a possibility of retrieving”. God will certainly be able to remind me 
of anything that I had better remember.’ (Henning 2005: 7), leads to the conclusion 
that in the absence of access to Godly memory, in order to rescue accountability one 
must construct an alternative stately one. Moreover, if one holds that the records are 
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decipherable, one opens the door to Robert Filmer’s divine right theory, wherein 
would-be sovereigns could make claims to a direct link to the divine truth.  
Hobbes’s solution, as has been proposed here, was to construct a replica of 
God on earth. Imitating the original, the facsimile’s records would require insulation 
from public distortion; however, unlike the original, the replica’s records would not 
be impenetrable to human reason. Devoid of contingent particulars the sovereign 
produces a solid trail of evidence, a set of causally connected authoritative Polaroids 
and notes that cannot be disputed. Trust among strangers is achieved via a synthesis 
of rational humans and a super-rational disinterested third party proxy. The sovereign 
issues an identity insurance policy to the citizens, one that assures them a non-
collapsible span of existence. But unlike Nolan’s character who  attempts to escape 
his condition by reintroducing himself to time, the ultimate security offered by 
Hobbes’s sovereign leaves no room for contingencies, effectively halting time. 
Although Hobbes’s social diagnosis is materialistic and individualistic, the state of 
relief he offers is strikingly similar to the Buddhist state of Nirvana, in which the 
suffering of an endless cycle of Samsara is escaped only by the annihilation of both 
time and self. 
For Hobbes the acknowledgement of the fragility of the individual leads to a 
relinquishment of social aversion in favour of the creation of the State. Hobbes 
suggests that in the establishment of Statehood we surrender to the sovereign our 
power to hurt, thereby creating an aggregate of forces strong enough to put a stop to 
foolishness. The strict rational environment he argues for relieves the citizens of their 
worries by establishing a contingency-free existence. One remains secure because 
one appreciates that everyone has submitted themselves to a single legal decree. 
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Apprehension of what the future may hold is replaced by a trust in the sovereign’s 
ability to conserve over time, the conditions of the present. We become interested in 
the future, because the future promises to be very much like the here and now. It is a 
future that is firmly set within rules dictated by the sovereign; one that allows us to 
engage with each other according to predetermined causal rules.  
An alternative view is offered by Locke in which rule is achieved by the 
accumulation of choice rather than of force. He would appear to reject the idea that 
one might accumulate enough force to counteract the miseries of the cycle of change 
and replace them with the soundness of perfection. For Locke, the shifts within the 
plurality of the material cannot be cured once and for all; instead they need to be 
managed. The key to such management is in an artificial institutional containment of 
the natural course of revolution, in the form of the controlled revolutionary act of 
voting and representational government. Locke is concerned with developing a 
workable material existence, not a heaven on earth. His sovereign is charged with 
manipulating time in order to appease an individuated condition that is left ‘wanting’.  
 Consider the three wantings Locke suggests are our motivation to give up a 
portion of choice towards the creation of the State:  
a.  There wants an established, settled, known law...and the common measure to 
decide controversies between them... 
b. ...there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all 
differences according to the established law... 
c. ...there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and 
give it due execution. 
(Locke 1980 (1690): 66 Second Treatise of Government §. 124,125,126) 
Our wantings could be summarised as a deficiency in order and stability, a lack of 
institutionalisation, in modern terms. It can be said that we surrender to the 
 M6]: Is there a problem with]הערה
your lines here? 
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regulation of the State in order to realise our choices. The strength of these 
institutions is that they outlast us, thereby creating the stability we inherently lack. 
The transient particular that rules our existence is replaced by the perpetual general 
rule. Acknowledged public records are kept, and replace particular disputed ones. It 
follows that the trust invested in the State to settle disputes among individuals does 
not draw upon utilitarian considerations of the consolidation of law enforcement 
alone; rather it draws upon the benefits of the entire bureaucratic corpus of the State.  
We register ourselves, our possessions and even our ideas
129
 with the State 
for the purpose of safekeeping. Subsequently, its records become an objective 
reference in cases of dispute. Delegating our protection to the State involves more 
than giving up arms against each other and surrendering them to the State, it also 
demands the surrender of information. The amount of information about ourselves 
that we surrender depends on how much ‘safekeeping’ we desire or require, and is a 
matter well worth discussion elsewhere; in any event there must be a minimal 
amount of information at the State’s disposal.  
The State functions in a threefold manner: it collects and compiles 
information into its ‘memory’, creating public records for future use; it uses gathered 
information in order to gather even more information and to foresee future events, 
and it attempts to manipulate future events with the information at its disposal. The 
result is the creation of a stabilising factor in a seemingly chaotic world. This data 
collection apparatus arguably   has the added value of enabling the implementation of 
fairness considerations.  A concern highlighted by Rawls in contemporary political 
                                               
129  In the form of patents and copyrights. 
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discussion, it appears to be implied in Locke and his contemporaries, as is suggested 
by Lessnoff: 
 
 ‘In summary, so far as the issue of self-interest is concerned, social contract 
theory occupies what might be called a middle-of-the-road position. Up to a 
point, it appeals to the self-interest of the individual (and certainly does not call 
for self-abnegation), in so far as self-interest is assumed to be the motive for 
contracting. But the standard of legitimacy that it proposes is not the self-interest 
of any individual, but rather a (hypothetical) contract that promotes or reconciles 
the interests of all concerned. Thus the theory appeals not only to self-interest, 
but also to a due concern for the interests of one’s fellows. It seeks to balance the 
equally legitimate interests of all. This fact, no doubt, accounts for the 
continuing popularity of the idea in present-day political discourse; and also 
makes intelligible the fact that the modern philosophical revival of contract 
theory has been, above all, as a theory of justice.’(Lessnoff 1990: 121-122)  
 
Fairness, whether in Locke or in Rawls, is an economic measure towards 
stability and a moral stance in itself; nonetheless, it is not a synonym of equality. On 
the contrary, fairness presupposes material inequality and acts as a mere 
countermeasure against it. Fairness is keeping track of the cards Fortuna
130
 has dealt 
us, and, over time, counterbalancing them. This is what differentiates fairness from 
the notion of revolution. Revolution needs no institutional backing, as it simply 
reshuffles the stack according to a prescribed ideology, whereas fairness must rely on 
the collective memory bank of State institutions in order to intervene in the turning 
of the wheel from time to time, subverting it from taking a turn for the worst. These 
                                               
130 In the sense often employed by Machiavelli. 
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institutions follow our track record and compensate us accordingly via material 
redistribution. 
However, the institution of the State goes beyond the general provision of 
stability and even beyond fairness. It provides a platform for our heritage. The State 
enables us to preserve the short impression our lives make on the world, allowing us 
to transfer our achievements to our kin
131
 by means of the State’s records and the 
general security it provides. Our kin being an extension of ourselves both on a 
biophysical level and on a cultural level, we are able to live on through them and 
through our other physical and mental ‘creations’ in this world. An enhanced version 
of Hobbes’s ‘aversion of death premise’, the motivation for the formation of the 
State, may be said to be transcending time. By transcending current events, we are 
able to take part in the future, either in the flesh or in spirit. We deposit our person 
and our possessions into the hands of the State, where they are held in safekeeping 
on the condition that we submit to the government of the State. 
It is proposed here that the State is the caretaker of bodily continuity. The 
State contends with the difficulty presented by severed continuity, be it a momentary 
lapse as demonstrated in Nolan’s Memento, or the inevitable, biological death 
(Johnson 1997: 1). It is anachronistically suggested that the State is employed to 
preserve personal identity as defined in Robert Nozick’s ‘closest continuer’ theory. 
Nozick devised the ‘closest continuer’ theory as a schema for elucidating competing 
identity claims. He is responding to the classic Ship of Theseus dilemma employed 
                                               
131
 This position is similar to that expressed by Edmund Burke with regard to the social contract: ‘As 
the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not 
only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those 
who are to be born.’ (Burke Edmund Burke: Selected Writings and Speeches 2007 (1790): 566) 
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by Hobbes in De Corpore. In the tale, over an extended period, the Ship of Theseus 
goes through incremental repairs and  over time all of its bits and pieces are 
gradually replaced with spare parts. Yet instead of disposing of these bits and pieces, 
they are individually refurbished and attached to each other, until a competitor for 
the title ‘The Ship of Theseus’ is formed.  Nozick claims that incremental changes to 
an original identity do not confuse us, unless we are confronted with a competing 
claim for the same identity (Nozick 1981: 34). He goes on to suggest how we might 
solve such a problem by taking into account ‘closeness’ considerations such as 
causality, spatio-temporal continuity and retention of properties. Yet Nozick refrains 
from composing a strict formula for the closest continuer, instead offering criteria to 
be applied in a case by case manner.  
It is here argued that the Lockean State is in place to assist with both the 
preservation of personal identity and the resolution of interpersonal identity disputes. 
In the first instance it is a trusted depository for the preservation of identity. As such 
it allows individuals to transcend their short life spans, and to concern themselves 
with a future in which they can take part vicariously. It supplements them with a 
continuity that they individually lack. In the second instance, relying somewhat on 
the accumulated records volunteered by its citizens, it provides a closest continuer 
procedure that resolves disputes between competitors over the same identity, which 
in the Lockean frame of mind extends to property.  
Compare this with the Hobbesean view as presented above. Confronted with 
the instability of competing claims, the Hobbesean concludes that such claims are 
irreconcilable. Still, far from giving up on the prospect of a peaceful existence, he 
proposes to eliminate the conflict by rooting out its source. He traces back competing 
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identity claims to the motion of change and its partner individuation.  He eliminates 
the dilemma of The Ship of Theseus by disbarring the element of change that gives 
rise to it.   In order to perform this feat he requires an all powerful State that would 
contain change. By contrast the Lockean State is a measure for living with motion 
and change.  The Lockean position engages with the difficulties presented by the 
corporeal restrictions of time and space, while the Hobbesean position proposes to 
escape them altogether. 
 
6.4 Property and Land  
 
It has been suggested here that depositing one’s property for safekeeping with 
the State allows for its perdurance. Yet Jean Hampton has identified an inconsistency 
in the Lockean attitude towards property, which has yet to be addressed here.  She 
asserts that on the one hand, Locke undoubtedly argues that property rights precede 
the State, and consequently that the State lacks any claim of possession over Land; 
on the other hand, the Lockean stance places Land under direct governmental 
jurisdiction, when it denies individuals, even ones who  have only given their tacit 
consent to its establishment, the right to take the Land with them if they choose to 
leave the State. 
 I believe that Hampton is misreading Locke on Property, and specifically on 
the crucial issue of Land possession. This leads her to a paradox, which on a different 
reading of Locke does not arise. I would argue that there are substantial grounds for 
thinking that Locke distinguished between the right to the benefits of Land and the 
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right to the Land itself. Admittedly, taken at face value, Locke’s own statement in the 
Second Treatise of Government would seem to refute my claim: ‘But the chief matter 
of property being now not the fruits of the earth and the beasts that subsist on it, but 
the earth itself, as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest, I think it is plain 
that property in that, too, is acquired as the former.’ (Locke 1980 (1690): 21 Second 
Treatise of Government Ch.V §32). However, a more careful reading, in the context 
of Chapter V in its entirety, reveals that ‘the earth’ is only property in so much as it 
‘carries all the rest’. The title to ‘the earth’ is an instrumental form of property, rather 
than an essential one
132
. In fact there are strong reasons for holding that Locke 
believed that the right to Land belonged to God
133
 and not to man. George Gale 
proposes that in Locke Land falls under a complex category of multiple ownership. 
At the least, Land is owned dually by individuals and government, although 
ultimately it is subject to God  (Gale 1991 (1973): 515). Indeed, Locke, relying 
heavily on the Scriptures throughout the Treatise, never expressly states that God 
gave up his right to the Land. Rather, it may be inferred (Locke 1980 (1690): 21 
Second Treatise of Government Ch.V §34) that Locke holds that God, out of his 
                                               
132
  This position is, I believe, shared by Alan Ryan when he contrasts Locke with Kant: 
 ‘Locke’s mode of argument reverses Kant’s – Kant sees ownership as a claim to sovereignty over the 
substance of external things and therefore sees landownership as prior to ownership of crops, which 
are “accidents”; this is a thoroughly Romanised conception. Locke builds up towards ownership in the 
full, liberal sense defined by Honoré, by extending the functional requirements of “use”‘ 
(Ryan Locke on Freedom: some second thoughts 1988: 44) 
 
133  While this presentation makes use of the concept of God in a way I believe to be shared by Locke, 
it does not rely on a belief in God or on a belief in the stories of the Scriptures. One could easily test 
this by replacing every occurrence of ‘God’ with ‘No Man’ or ‘Non Man’. It is worth noting that 
doing so is in stark contradiction to the views of Alan Ryan and Shirley Robin Letwin summed up by 
Lauchlan Chipman’s statement that:  
 
‘If a secularist analysis of the defence of  the institution of private property can be constructed, it will 
be [read: can only be] essentially non-Lockean’ (Letwin John Locke–liberalism and natural law Ibid.: 
59) 
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benevolence, allowed man to benefit from the Land after his  banishment from the 
Garden of Eden and into the hardships of the state of nature.  
 This position is reiterated in Menachem Lorberbaum’s comments 
(Lorberbaum 2003: 22) on the idea of the holiness of the Land in (Lev. 25:12,23) : 
‘That fiftieth year shall be a jubilee for you…It shall be holly to you…But the land 
must not be sold without reclaim, for the land is Mine; you are but strangers [gerim] 
resident [toshavim] with Me.’ [My Highlights].  
Clearly the only conclusion to draw from the Locke’s text is Lorberbaum’s: 
‘Holiness here severely limits entitlement. Ownership is here a divine attribute; it 
precludes human ownership…The land does not belong to the people; it is God’s.’ In 
an endnote (Lorberbaum 2003: 35 note 6) Lorberbaum addresses the stress this puts 
on ownership of any kind, since other passages in the Scriptures suggest that the 
entire universe belongs to God. This raises the question of how, on Locke’s account, 
man  can gain recognised possession of anything at all. To which he replies with  his 
famous ‘mixing of labour’ argument (Locke 1980 (1690): 19 Second Treatise of 
Government Ch.V §27). While the same ‘mixing of labour’ rationale is used by 
Locke to justify entitlement both to benefits from the Land and to the Land itself, it is 
still possible to argue that the same action creates two distinct forms of property. 
Moreover, I would argue that unless Locke makes this qualification to property 
rights, the State will have to acknowledge a basic right to secession, which would 
inevitably erode the State’s existence. 
 But if Land belongs to God, how can the State make claim to it? Clearly it 
cannot. The State is a man-made construct, not a heavenly one, and therefore by 
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definition cannot gain rights of possession over Land. It does, however, have the 
capacity to gain authority or dominion over it, since its artificial authority is achieved 
through consent. Still the question remains, why a retraction of tacit consent to the 
authority of the State by its inhabitants would not also automatically release Land 
from any obligation
134
. Why does Land seem to be bound to the State ‘once and for 
all’ by mere tacit consent?  
 Allowing individuals to withdraw from the State with the Land from which 
they benefit, is granting an effectual right of secession
135
.  By accepting the right to 
secession ‘willy-nilly’, Land becomes a commodity to be sold, in auction format, to 
the highest bidding sovereign. Quite apart from the sacrilegious aspects
136
 of this 
action, this would not only result in a conflict between self-declared sovereigns, but 
would also promote a state of war between non-aspiring individuals. As long as Land 
is not reduced to a commodity, the right to the Land’s benefits remains secure. 
However, if the right to the Land’s benefits is secondary to the right to the Land, then 
it is easy to see why the lack of criteria of ownership, together with the prospective 
gains to be had by pledging the ‘Land’s allegiance’ to a certain sovereign, would 
result in a feud over it. 
 The implications of Land commoditisation don’t stop there. Consider the 
following three scenarios: 
                                               
134
 One could attempt to resolve these questions by arguing that the State’s authority over Land cannot 
be revoked by tacit consenters, since they never enacted it. Rather they were placed under the 
authority of the State by an act perpetrated by express consenters.  But this logical parlour-trick comes 
at a  price. It would put into question to what extent tacit consent is consent at all – See also 
(Plamenatz Man & Society 1963: 227). 
135
 Although Locke himself does not follow up on this point, by disenfranchising Land from 
individuals he is laying the groundwork for negating irredentist claims by minorities. 
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i. Egalitarian  
Express consenters, like their tacitly consenting counterparts, are allocated 
the right to Land itself.  In this case the argument above carries over to 
express consenters and for the reasons there mentioned the path to dissolving 
the State and a return to the state of nature has been set. 
 
ii. Free Market 
The Land assets held by tacit consenters are free of constraints. It follows 
that such assets may have higher value than those held by express consenters. 
The added value may attract the buy-out of the express consenters by tacit 
consenters, thereby literally undermining the State. 
 
iii. Restricted Market 
Only express consenters are allocated Land rights. This scenario effectively 
drains tacit consenters of any constituency. Even if tacit consenters are left 
the right to benefit from the Land, they become subordinate to the Lands’ 
owners, so there is good reason to believe they will be coerced into express 
consent. A similar argument works for children (the natural constituency of 
‘tacit consenters’ as they have yet to develop the rational capacity that 
would allow them to give their express consent). Under a restricted market, 
fortunate children can only inherit their fathers’ Land through express 
consent. Less fortunate children would only inherit their fathers’ 
                                                                                                                                     
136
  Bear in mind that on my reading of Locke, regarding Land as a commodity is an act of sacrilege, 
or in secular terminology a contradiction of terms.  By definition the Land itself never exchanges 
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subordinated right to benefit from the Land. While this scenario leaves the 
State in tact, it makes a mockery of the concept of consent, and moreover of 
liberty itself. 
 
Avoiding the commoditisation of Land would seem to be essential both to the 
makeup of Lockean theory and to an escape from the inconsistency suggested by 
Hampton. Additionally it fits the view, to be introduced in the following chapter, that 
Lockean theory indirectly endorses a Nation State rather than merely a State. Since 
the Lockean State is defined by its enablement of the preservation of identity by 
means of commodification conservation, it is not equipped to deal with the 
preservation of matters of identity that have no monetary value. The division 
between the Land and the proceeds from it  leaves the Land outwith the hold of the 
State. The difficulties discussed above create a demand for a body of identity that 
corresponds with jurisdiction of the State and preserves the annex of non- 
commodified property, one that, as shall be argued shortly, reinforces the State rather 
than challenging it. 
                                                                                                                                     
hands, rather it is the right to benefit from the Land that is being bought and sold. 
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Chapter 7. Locke: The Nation – A depository of Heritage  
 
Conventionally Locke’s position has been allied with the cosmopolitan 
camp, yet the legal scholar Jeremy Rabkin textually and conceptually demonstrates 
that Locke’s epistemological ‘nurture’ approach lends itself to the adoption of a 
cultural nationalist position. The cultural differentiation between societies, that 
Rabkin claims (Rabkin 1997: 308) carries over to Locke’s moral theory. 
Furthermore, he finds that Locke’s statements on property, and especially his 
contentions as to the right of the conquered to reclaim their property under their own 
‘banner’
137
, could be construed as an outright endorsement of ‘national rights’. While 
he concedes that Locke’s theory offers aliens legal safeguards, and that conquerors 
would not necessarily abuse the strictly legal aspect of property ownership, he finds 
Locke to be implying that property under a consented sovereignty holds added value.  
Making much of what he recognises as a striking parallel between property 
and nationhood, and controversially associating Locke’s perception of ‘society’ with 
a perception of nation (Rabkin 1997: 315), he views Locke’s government as an 
instrument for the effective administration and increased efficiency in the trade of 
naturally occurring property, as well as the sophistication of  the semi-natural ‘pre-
political agreement to band together’. Finally, he draws further confidence from the 
coherence between his position and the one that emerges from Nathan Tarcov’s 
study of the fence metaphor invoked by Locke (Tarcov 1981), indicating a 
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 ‘”the people who are the descendants of, or claim under those who were forced to submit to the 
yoke of a government by constraint, have always a right to shake it off and free themselves from 
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propensity towards division and borders, thereby uniting concepts of property and 
nationality again.  
Rabkin appreciates his position is not without difficulties. He recognises 
that stressing the familial descent aspect of nationalism weakens the Lockean 
argument for rule by consent, playing into the hands of Filmer’s Patriarcha. He is 
equally aware that strongly insisting on ‘the pre-existing cultural unity’, invites 
troubling questions as to its original source. Still, he remains convinced that: ‘It is 
not political constitution that makes a nation, in Locke’s account, but the prior 
existence of a nation that makes it possible to have a liberal constitution.’ (Rabkin 
1997: 317). But apart from a few communitarian hints
138
, the aforementioned ‘added 
value’ he alludes to with regard to property under a government with which one is 
affiliated, is not sufficiently theoretically grounded. Moreover, the importance of his 
identification of a relation between property and nationality not withstanding, I think 
he exaggerates the parallel between the two.  
Relying too heavily on sporadic textual evidence of Locke’s national 
inclinations, he fails to demonstrate that the strong theoretical grounds on which one 
may claim that for Locke property is pre-political, carry over to nationality. 
Furthermore, had the parallel between property and nationality been as strong as he 
suggests, one would expect the State to take on a similar role in both respects. Yet 
the administrative efficiency-enhancing role of the State in relation to property does 
not have a clear-cut parallel in nationality. I struggle to imagine how the advantage 
                                                                                                                                     
usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought upon them”‘ John Locke,  Second Treatise § 192, 
in (Rabkin Grotius, Vattel, and Locke: An Older View of Liberalism and Nationality 1997: 312) 
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 He is hesitant to pursue these, no doubt, fearing inconsistency with Locke’s insistence on a 
consent-based society. 
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of ‘care-free’ trade mediated by the State is transferred to a comparable advantage in 
nationality, unless one reduces nationality to an extreme individualist form similar to 
that expressed by Robert Nozick (See Hampton 1997: 62). Moreover, Rabkin 
struggles to explain the emergence of a multiplicity of particular nationalities out of a 
potential joint global national pool that corresponds to a seemingly global Lockean 
society. While Locke may very well have had a national division in mind, the 
theoretical foundation for it needs to be uncovered; it can’t be assumed to be self-
evident. 
That said, I agree with Rabkin, that Locke has been misclassified as a 
precursor to cosmopolitanism, probably due to his focus on natural law with a 
seemingly universal application that has been re-labelled in contemporary discourse 
as universal human rights. I am not disputing Locke’s contribution to the 
development of the concept of human rights. I do, however, claim that if one wishes 
to attach human rights to some political body of a cosmopolitan nature, one cannot 
do so on the basis of Locke’s theory. Indeed, I wish to demonstrate that his 
metaphysical stance is incompatible with such a form of governance.  
In an effort to distance Locke from the proto-cosmopolitan outlook he has 
been attributed with, this chapter examines the limits of the solution offered to 
‘future anxious individuals’ by the Lockean State. It reveals that the State can only 
preserve the individuals’ past and present by converting it into currency and 
commodifying it. The “advantage” of currency is its inherent artificiality. Currency, 
or money, does not succumb to the forces of natural degradation that face mortal 
beings. It might be susceptible to artificial loss in its valuation, however, this can be 
compensated for by the artificial manipulation of interest rates. By transcending the 
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effects of time, effectively achieving immortality, currency becomes an instrument of 
vicarious perdurence. This invaluable trait facilitates care-free inter-personal 
exchange, as well as cross-generational inheritance. By opening the future, it makes 
sense of investing in the present.  
Still this chapter argues that the ‘service’ provided by the State does not 
satisfy the full extent of human preservation requirements.  The chapter explores 
forms of property that individuals strive to preserve although they are inconvertible 
into currency. It links such forms of property to the human restriction to a single 
space in time. Unlike the constriction to time, however, the constriction to space does 
not seem to be either controllable (Hobbes), or manageable (Locke). It is outwith the 
administrative capacity of the State. The capacity to bank immaterial legacy must 
therefore lie elsewhere. The chapter therefore goes on to identify various types of 
associations that have been historically entrusted with the preservation of non-
commodities, suggesting that the nation may have emerged as dominate because it 
forms the perfect match, in terms of size and counterbalance to the State. Moreover, 
it proposes that with the exception of certain historical contingencies, the most 
notable of which is The United States of America, resetting
139
 national heritage 
might act as a ‘spoiler’ to social contribution on the part of the human rational 
individual, since it would at least partially rob him of the pursuit of continuum.   
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7.1 The National Continuum140  
 
I have suggested in the previous chapter that the State is enacted as a 
countermeasure against the inherent temporality of human existence. Consequently, 
its first order of business, as identified by Hobbes and concurred to by Locke, is 
prolonging the life expectancy of its constituency by way of keeping the peace. 
Keeping citizens out of harm’s way involves mediating potential conflict with others 
both within and outwith the State’s sovereign borders. This is achieved, as noted by 
Locke, by the State taking the form of a registrar that serves to watch over social 
integrity. Acting against those reckless individuals who threaten social stability, it 
allows the law-abiding counterparts to look away, or go to sleep
141
 and wake up in a 
largely unchanged environment, thus giving credence to the Hobbesean notion of the 
State as an anti-revolutionary, if not counter-revolutionary, measure.  
This tempered stability establishes the minimal requirements for trust among 
strangers, thereby providing the perfect backdrop for future-oriented trade 
relationships. Devoid of State regulation, both individual identities and their 
association with goods would be in a state of constant flux, a state of revolution. 
Even staunch libertarians should concede that such is the situation not only in 
malfunctioning States, challenged by widespread corruption, in which one can 
reinvent one’s identity for a negligible amount of cash, but also in the common 
practice of untrustworthy individuals disguising their dubious past business 
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performance under the guise of a formally ‘new’ commercial entity. Perhaps this is 
why Hobbes, intent on providing the utmost in trust, was so adamant on discouraging 
any kind of reform outwith an original ‘once and for all’ constitutional moment.  I 
have ventured so far as to say that he envisages a sovereign so powerful as to make 
even changes of time irrelevant. His ideal, super-rational ruler freezes time, and his 
ideal citizen acts accordingly to reinforce this welcomed condition in which planning 
is made worthwhile. Consequently, acting against an established lineage of stability 
is pronounced irrational.  
I have argued that the impetus for Lockean social theory may have been a 
fear that Hobbes had positioned himself on a slippery slope of rationality that would 
inevitably lend itself to idealism, that Hobbes’s striving for perfection would result in 
unreal expectations from mere mortals and would ultimately lead to an imposition of 
the manufactured super-rationality of the sovereign on the natural, moderately 
rational individual. The Lockean alternative is a ruler who is potentially fallible, yet 
also attainable. It is a position that shifts the attention from perfect uninterrupted 
lineage as a source of stability, to the tradition of a ruling institution embodying an 
image of timelessness.  On this account our real sense of time is not being negated; 
rather it is being managed. Through institutionalisation we harness time to our 
advantage, we make it productive by accumulating our actions and ‘banking’ them 
into a shared artificial currency form that we can exchange under the rules set by the 
State arbitrator.  
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In the proposed Lockean understanding, the State does not act as a rational 
distillery, in the style of John Rawls, nor is its sole purpose, as suggested by Robert 
Nozick, the mere provision of corporal security. Rather, it performs the necessary 
function of a material banker. In the hope of defeating our individual 
inconsequentiality we commit ourselves (including lives, liberties and estates) to the 
State, for the purpose of safekeeping
142
. As a ‘banking’ institution, in addition to 
sheltering our property from the natural elements and the harmful intentions of 
others, it offers a horizon for our individual contributions to this world. The State 
administers its banking by way of conversion into currency; it provides security by 
assuring us compensation in kind, in case our property is encroached upon.  It is, 
however, by its own definition as a banker of currency, unable to preserve legacies 
that do not have a monetary value. Therefore, in order to fulfil its safekeeping 
function it would need to be complemented by a banker of non-material 
contributions to the world. It is suggested here that this role is fulfilled by the Nation. 
Let us reconsider the solutions offered by Hobbes and Locke to a society 
populated by Nolan’s amnesia stricken ‘Mementonians’ (see above, section 3, 
Chapter 6). The future is availed to the populace of such a society by ensuring the 
integrity of its members.  For the Hobbesean this is for the most part an assurance of 
corporeal continuity through the provision of security. One needs assurances that one 
might live to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour, otherwise the motivation to invest one’s 
labour in the world ceases. The ultimate in security is, however, achieved by 
extinguishing the threat of contingency. As the undisputed authority, the ruler issues 
his own  image of the worldly order and if  left undisturbed will continue to do so 
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perpetually. We need not worry about our own continuity because the ruler 
vicariously supplies us with it, from the moment we are born to the day that we die. 
Even in our death the order that ruled us supposedly lives on.  
Locke offers an alternative, less stifling, form of order. He opens the door to 
contingencies in the governing rules, save ones that might impinge upon the sanctity 
of property. One’s motivation to ‘mix one’s labour’ with the world is secured by the 
assurance that one’s efforts will not have been in vain. No one, not even the 
sovereign, will be able to unduly reap the benefits of their contribution to the world. 
Moreover, the institution of a common currency allows us to convert our activities, 
as extensions of ourselves, into an artificial, non-decaying medium, that may be 
transferred not only in the process of exchange, but as a cross-generational 
inheritance. Thus, while we as embodied creatures decay, the added value that we 
contribute to the world through the disembodied medium of money does not.  
Indeed, much of the modern State’s responsibilities lie in the management of 
currency. It is charged with retaining the value of currency at a stable level by means 
of State banks. Additionally, it oversees currency transactions, and at least in civil 
proceedings, issues financial penalties to parties whose conduct has been out of 
order. Criminal proceedings, arguably, employ a currency of their own. Although 
they do not convert one’s actions into their artificial alienated monetary value, they 
do offer an orderly alternative to retaliatory vengeance, converting actions that 
impinge upon the sacredness of another’s property into restrictions upon the liberty 
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of the harming side. These might include varying measures against one’s property
143
, 
from having one’s assets frozen to being incarcerated.  
Essentially the State, as Marx recognised, is an instrument of 
commodification by means of alienation. Valuation is achieved either by the means 
of the market or by the decree of law. Either way, once converted into a formulaic 
format, mathematical laws are assumed to apply. But what of activities that form 
elements of our property in the Lockean sense, but that are not easily convertible into 
currency? Consider religious beliefs, cultural practices, work etiquette or even the 
architectural aesthetic of city skylines. These defy commodification, and accordingly 
if we are to rationally justify our investment in them, we require an alternative proxy 
to carry them through time.  
Historically this function has been carried out by a range of institutions: 
various churches have preserved beliefs; cultural practices and aestheticism have 
been sustained by appreciation societies; and production standards, as well as work 
etiquette, were at least originally, conserved by guilds. More recently, assisted by 
advances in communication technology, these types of associations have in many 
cases achieved the cross-border global membership that was not so long ago the 
preserve of religious churches. Much like the majority of religious churches, in an 
effort to fill their ranks, they have appealed to universal commonality that is 
dislodged from local, particular experiences. Yet these attempts to transcend borders 
have not been successful at dethroning boundary-defined national identity of its 
prominence, if not dominance, in the preservation of cultural identity.  
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I would argue that by detaching themselves from the particulars of time and 
space, they have enlarged their potential constituency, but they have lost their 
foothold in reality as experienced by humans. Moreover, they have lost the sense of 
assurance that palpability, and more specifically the palpability of space, lends to 
experience
144
. Once we attach ourselves to a palpable part of space, i.e. Land, we 
gain a sense of perdurence. Our own bodies might not survive, but through our 
connection with territory we can leave an impression on an alternative body that 
does.  
Granted, our attraction to the assured perdurance of territory may sway us 
from reliance on enterprises that have no such grounding, but then why not associate 
at the local level rather than the National one? Why are the county, the town and 
even the village not enough? What is distinctive about the National level that makes 
it the default level of association? If cosmopolitanism fails, what prevents 
Nationalism from meeting a similar fate and disintegrating to lower associative 
levels? Indeed, some have challenged the supposed dominance of the nation in the 
‘real’ experiences that form individual identity.  
Andrew Vincent comes to the conclusion that the ranking of the nation 
against alternative forms of association has not shown any generalisable promise 
(Vincent 2002: 99). Firstly, in terms of intensity of influence on identity, he finds 
that the nation offers no match for the day-by-day formative influence of family, 
friends and occupation. Secondly, even if in certain circumstances national 
association does trump other forms, it does so on a context dependent basis (for 
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example the World Cup), rather than as a generalisable rule. Thirdly, he rules out 
ranking as a function of size, since in this regard he observes the national argument 
to be self-defeating. If it establishes itself on comparative sizable constituency, it 
loses out to larger groups such as regions or religion. If it counters these larger 
associations by citing ‘feeling and everyday presence’ it loses out to smaller 
associations. Fourthly, he dismisses the suggestion that the nation is a perfectly 
matching collaborator of the State, on the grounds that the link between them is 
merely an illusion, ‘a transient phenomenon of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries’, which has since been dispelled by the appreciation of the reality of 
multiculturalism.  
I wish to reconsider Vincent’s assertions vis-à-vis the matching of nation and 
State, not on the historical empirical grounds he puts forward, but, in line with the 
general theme of this thesis, on metaphysical grounds. My claim is that the State and 
the nation complement one another, by forming two elements of a rational effort to 
manage the difficulties of corporeal separation. These are joint measures that provide 
response to the disharmonising effects of individual fragmentation. They administer 
anxiety-free interaction in a society that would otherwise be rife with debilitating 
distrust. That is not to say that there is a strict division of power between the State 
and the nation. Quite the contrary, on the proposed model, strictly speaking, the State 
deals with perdurance of currency-convertible property, while the nation deals with 
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the perdurance of non-currency convertible property; however, the majority nation 




7.2 Is the Nation necessary - Statisist and extra-Statist alternatives 
 
  Recall that the rationale suggested earlier for the social grouping of self-
centred individuals was to open the future and escape the destructive logic of the 
momentary. It was argued that this is achieved by the stability of institutions that are 
able to account for the past and present, thereby manufacturing a future. One is 
tempted to continue along this line of argument and seek out the ideal dimensions of 
the assurance-provider
146
 or ‘banker’. In a contrived theoretical exercise of this sort, 
size would have a gravitational effect. Strength being in numbers, seekers of security 
and stability for their worldly achievements would gravitate towards assurance 
providers with enduring large constituencies, thereby reaffirming the provider’s 
perceived power. The ideal size for both state and national affiliations is, as can be 
read into Hobbes, one in which we all ‘bank’ with one cosmopolitan entity, putting 
an end to conflict and replacing it with legal exchange. Indeed, it would be most 
                                               
145 This was the relationship envisaged by Zeev Jabotinsky (the Zionist political activist and thinker of 
the early 20th century (Bilski Every Individual, a King: The Social and Political Thought of Ze'Ev 
Vladimir Jabotinsky 1993)):  
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shall be bi or tri national and so forth…and all the equity of rights…even if it is held sacred, will not 
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its National majority.’ (Jabotinsky The story of my days 1972: 38) 
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product of collective coercion.    
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fortunate if we shared a single banking currency
147
, but lacking one we might resort 
to an exchange rate. Since the motivation for the setting up of our banks is presumed 
to have been a shared sense of lack of security, our attitudes towards banking would 
appear to be commensurate. 
In a chapter entitled Honor among Thieves: Hoarding and Stealing, Paul 
Seabright theorises about the role of financial banks in the development of trust 
among strangers. He contends that 'banks have flourished because of their ingenious 
capacities for helping people to live with risk.'
148
 (Seabright 2004: 79); they allow us 
to 'hoard' safely. He goes on to state that 'The ingenuity of banks rests on their using 
the law of large numbers to create the illusion that anyone's hoard is accessible even 
while most of peoples' hoards are being made to perform useful service [by being 
lent out].' (Seabright 2004: 81). For the illusion to be sustained the clientele is 
required to be of considerable size and exhibit a degree of diversity. Too small a 
community, or an over cohesive one, would put the bank itself at risk, as too many 
clients may wish to access their resources at any given moment
149
 (Seabright 2004: 
79). 
Along the same lines, perhaps too small a community would put the vested 
interest in it at risk as well. Since I have no hold over my fellow villagers and 
townspersons, I stand the risk of too many of them deciding to withdraw from our 
common enterprise at once. The cloud of uncertainty hanging over the continuity of 
our joint project might give cause for preemptive action, eventually leading to its 
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 As adopted by an overwhelming majority of European Union. members  
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 Note the similarity to Hobbes’s claim with regard to the role of the State in enabling trust. 
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 Note the similarity to the ‘overload’ problem as identified in the mid 1970’s by Samuel Brittan, 
Giovanni Sartori, Samuel Huntington and others (see above ref. 87 , p. 23).  
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complete collapse in the form of a market crash.  Does Seabright’s insight not lead to 
the conclusion that bigger is better? The larger our community, the smaller the risk of 
it sinking with all our memories and vested interests onboard. 
It has been suggested that humankind is too large a group with which to 
associate. This would be a valid response if one would also be willing to state, and 
perhaps empirically demonstrate ‘the ideal’ size of association. Michael Taylor has 
endeavoured to do both (in (Taylor 1982) and (Taylor 1988) respectively). Taylor 
has an admiration for the coercive coordination tools at the disposal of a close-knit 
community of a certain size. To use a phrase from familiar language ‘it is a place 
where everybody knows your name’. In his view, if there is anything at all that can 
hold grand associations together it is that they can be broken down into familiar 
relations that exert an authentic form of social glue. Accordingly Nationalism and the 
State would stand somewhere between genuine communal association and grander 
scale associative projections, such as Humanity.  
David Miller can be said to be making a similar argument. The difference 
between Miller and Taylor is that Miller believes the clan and the village have been 
dismantled by modernity and therefore the remaining appropriate level of solidarity 
is Nationhood: ‘Nationality, one might say, is the appropriate form of solidarity for 
societies that are mobile - so that clan and village can no longer serve as the primary 
forms of community - and egalitarian - so that people are no longer bound together 
by vertical ties to overlords and dependants.’ (Miller 1995: 184). Nationality is in 
Miller’s account ‘as good as it gets’ in terms of social cohesion in modern societies.  
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I tend to accept David Miller's assertion that the locality has been dismantled 
by modernity. Indeed, I would like to stress the significance of the role the modern 
State has played in this process and the symbiotic relationship that has been forged 
between Nationalism and the modern State. Historically, the synchrony with which 
these phenomena rose to prominence suggests a possible connection between them. 
Post World War II they have been, for the most part, portrayed as competing forces; 
one a conservative legacy of the past, the other a revolutionary striving towards the 
modern
150
. Contrary to this, I would claim that these enterprises were and continue to 
be mutually reinforcing.  In the literature attention has already been drawn to their 
shared antagonism towards ‘dynastic absolutism and of the censorship and 
oppression that they brought’ (Hobsbawm in Mentzel 1992). Anthony Smith 
attributes David Bell with the additional observation that ‘the concept of the nation 
only gained popularity in eighteenth-century France when God was seen to recede 
into His heavens and leave civil society and political discourse to humanity.’ (Smith 
2005: 414).  
The age old debate between primordialists, perennialists and modernists
151
 
not withstanding, this last insight coincides with the idea trumpeted here regarding 
the place assigned to God and religion in the political thought of Hobbes and Locke.  
Recall that it was proposed that introducing the State as the referee on disputes of 
earthly property prevented God from being ‘dragged through the mud’ in the efforts 
of opposing sides to allege Godly endorsement.  It was also argued that the State as 
defined by Locke inherently lacks the tools to deal with the preservation of property 
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that was currency-irreducible. Therefore a complementary currency-irreducible 
‘insurance agency’ needed to be established. The question however remains: Why 
should this agency take on the national form? Why should other forms of association 
not serve just as well?  
I will now consider some of the major historical association alternatives: 
class, guild, religion. Class as understood by Marx is most certainly not 
complementary to the State. Marx’s staunch objection to the State is voiced in his 
familiar consideration of it as an oppressive entity. Marx’s depiction of the State as a 
necessary evil, a step in the development of social awareness, which will eventually 
give way to the emancipation of the individual, can be restated in terms of its attitude 
towards currency and time. A class outlook opposes the idea of currency because 
currency artificially ‘fiddles’ with time in a counterrevolutionary way. It attempts to 
interfere with the natural, individually liberating progression, by allowing individuals 
to hold on to a past that is replicated in the future.  
On a Hegelian interpretation of Marx the future will naturally contain 
something of the past; any artificial means of intervention ‘messes with’ the direction 
of the ‘lord of time’. The ultimate direction in which class division leads is to the end 
of time, not to its management. It wishes to let time run its course, but it assumes that 
once it has, it stops. Being a revolutionary position, unlike the Hobbesean stance, it is 
opposed to the halting of change by imposition. Nevertheless, it shares the 
Hobbesean basic idea that humanity will truly prosper only when time is put to a 
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halt. In the Hobbesean version time is halted by imposing rationality on it, whereas 
for Marx time draws to a halt as rationality imposes itself on actuality. 
Religion seems a much more likely candidate to complement the State in the 
preservation of elements of identity that are irreducible to currency. As an institution 
it can preserve individual contributions that have no exchange value. Yet this 
complementary relationship is dependent on a lack of conflict of interests between 
the State boundaries and the church. Historically, religious and State functions, as the 
latter have been here defined (i.e. currency-reducible identity) were meshed together. 
Ancient temples doubled as treasuries (e.g. Solomon's Temple (Wright 1948: 53)) 
,and religious orders (e.g. The Knights Templar (Barber 2003: 272)) dabbled not 
only in matters of salvation, but in the provision of corporeal security of lives and 
estates, even founding a rudimentary banking system.   
Later western history does, however, reveal a growing tension between the 
church and the modern State. This tension may have arisen due to the church’s 
aspiration for expansion beyond the borders of particular states to form a holy 
empire. One way of resolving such tension is by making the borders of a 
cosmopolitan church coincide with a matching cosmopolitan State. While the papacy 
and the Holy Roman Empire were engaged in a power struggle amongst themselves, 
they shared a cosmopolitan outlook. Indeed it has been implied above that Hobbes 
advocates a holy empire of sorts. In his version of empire the struggle between 
sovereign and church is resolved not by subjugating the church to the State, but by 
subjugating the State to God. However, while the church might complement the State 
it does so by altering the function of the State. It transforms it from a depository of 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 210 
individual memories, contributions and identities into a platform through which the 
original shared identity of creation can be reestablished.  
By contract to class and religion, the guild or the association would appear to 
be compatible with the idea of the State as a depository of individual rather than 
collective identity. On the condition that the guild supports the State’s functions 
rather than undermining its authority, a non-competing hierarchy appears feasible. 
Indeed, Antony Black has argued that Jean Bodin, and  Johannes Althusius even 
more so, put forward systematic corporatist political theories in which States were a 
conglomeration of guild-like associations. The State was an overarching guild that 
administered the plurality of associations in a confederative manner. Moreover, 
Black contends that these corporatist ideas permeated Lockean contractarianism 
through Grotius and Pufendorf (Black 1984: 151). The Lockean consent-based 
democratic parliamentarianism and conceptualisation of the State as a ‘joint stock 
company’ are understood by Black to be indebted to guild practices and conduct. 
Black notes that G.P. Gooch has uncovered an explicit use of such a stock model, in 
the words of Peter Cornelius, a Dutchman who visited England during the 
Commonwealth: ‘individuals were to form joint-stock associations in which they 
lived together, but in which they might retain control of their property…They were 
to elect a governor from among themselves for a year, and might re-elect him if they 
chose’ (Gooch in Black 1984: 151-152).   
Not only is the guild or the association not incompatible with the State, it can 
be understood to provide for the aforementioned ‘non-currency’ preservation 
ambitions of the individuals that form them. Anything from an artisanal style, 
through the aesthetic of a skyline, to a linguistic dialect could be preserved through 
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an association revolving around that particular interest. Each ‘influence group’, in 
addition to conserving knowledge and traditions, would also engage itself in an 
attempt to influence State policy, and especially State funding, for causes close to 
their hearts. So why would the mediation of an overarching association of ‘non-
currency’, namely the nation, have any advantage over influence groups as a partner 
to a currency-based State? Moreover, in such a relationship does not the State make 
the nation redundant? 
William B. Allen (Allen 1996) argues that modern sovereignty has all but 
replaced nationhood with statehood. He contends that citizenship is the bond that 
holds modern societies together, while nationhood is but a legacy in the liberal State; 
thus the age of the state-nation has replaced the age of the nation-state. In an effort to 
elucidate his point by way of example he observes that:  
A Czech Republic becomes a Czech Republic not by virtue of being Czech 
but by virtue of consciously adopting republican goals. Thus far it is no more 
Czech than Slovak or American. Founding its statehood on universal 
principles rather than local claims means that the local claims no longer 
determine membership. Hence, the republic’s Czechness is an accident, 
morally speaking, rather than a necessity. This accident occurs for sufficient 
reason – the Aristotelian reason – that every essence appears (becomes 
phenomenal) via agencies whose accidental qualities condition being-in-the-
world. Thus, universal principles are made manifest only in particular forms. 
(Allen 1996: p. 7 Electronic version).  
 
Allen’s argument is that universal principles in the modern age are offered by default 
to inconsequential, pre-packaged historical groups. These affiliations survive only as 
administrative labels, empty convenient receptacles for universal content. They are 
therefore particular and exclusive in name only. Yet, Allen seems to be missing the 
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defining features of local historical ‘baggage’. He seems to be begging the question 
of universalism by downplaying the role of national identity. 
  
7.3 Nationalism, particularity and individuation 
  
In the tradition of political theory, as has been repeatedly observed, 
discussion of the State has drawn the attention of many a great mind, whereas 
nationalism seems almost suspiciously under-addressed. This has fueled speculation 
that either nationalism is an inconsequential relic of the past, or represents a 
backward irrationality that deems it unworthy, if not outright dangerous. The events 
of the post-Soviet era have all but silenced the voice of the inconsequentiality 
argument, while the branding of nationalism as a war-mongering foe of the peace-
making project of the State persists. That numerous atrocities were committed under 
the label of nationalist ideals is undisputable. Although these acts were first and 
foremost racially inspired, the ease with which racialism latches onto patriotic 
sentiment is disconcerting. Yet, I find the inclination in the literature, arguably 
initiated by Hans Kohn (Kuzio 2002: 21),  to draw a Manichean line between benign 
civic manifestations of nationalism and violently inclined ethnic ones unsatisfying. 
Moreover, I suspect that civic nationalism can be reduced to the idea of the State, as 
developed here afore.  Indeed civic nationalism might be no more than a celebration 
of the rule of law
152
, extending legitimacy to the administrative role performed by the 
State, and as such enabling an inclusive citizenship-based membership
153
.  
                                               
152
 Chaim Gans observes that in his justification for the unification of the Federal Republic with 
Eastern Germany Jurgen Habermas lends support to the notion that civic nationalism is encapsulated 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 213 
As an illustration, consider the contrast between the historical formation of 
the United States and the unfolding European Union project. From its inception to 
this day, the prospects of wealth that drew so many to the United States have been 
intertwined with a strong sense of a legitimate rule of law. This perhaps explains the 
prominence, if not fascination within the American psyche, with legal matters in 
general and the supreme court in particular. Thus it should come as no surprise that 
the phrase: 'sue me' originated in the land of opportunity. For many immigration was 
an escape not only from stratification, but also from corruption. America was 
conceived as a level playing field with legal institutions in place to counteract unfair 
advantage
154
.  The land of opportunity has in return demanded a civic allegiance, 
most pronounced in its naturalisation procedures, as well as allegiance ceremonies 
incorporated into the education system.  The strictly civic or Statist nature of these 
demands would seem to challenge the assertion I made earlier as to the symbiotic 
connection between State and Nation.  
Indeed, I suspect that much of the cosmopolitan argument relies on the 
prototype of the United States as an exemplar of a 'nationless State'. The 
Cosmopolitan view finds great appeal in starting the world anew, a clean slate, free 
of past National baggage
155
. In what follows, I argue that this approach encounters 
                                                                                                                                     
in a loyalty to a set of political principles. See Habermas ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ in (Gans 
The Limits of Nationalism 2003: 11) 
153 Although I am unaware of empirical data to substantiate my claim, I suspect that in the UK the 
identification with Britishness is strongest among recent migrants. Indeed gauging whether second 
and third generation migrants retain the Britishness of their forefathers, or convert into Scots, Welsh 
and English, would constitute an empirical extension of this study.  
154 What constitutes a fair advantage is a matter well worth discussing. But without going into such 
intricacy, the institutional balance of power, as well as anti-trust laws, constitute attempts to curtail the 
influence wielded by any one body.    
155
 Contrast with David Miller: ‘the majority of people are too deeply attached to their inherited 
national identities to make their obliteration an intelligible goal. People value the rich cultural 
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two substantial difficulties: firstly that starting anew in the current era is virtually 
impossible, and secondly that even if it were possible, it would quickly “regress” to a 
quasi-national existence. 
The United States may be one of the few examples of resetting the play of 
history and redistributing the pawns. This was the initial motivation for settlers to 
cross the Atlantic, and it became a continuing pioneering motif in the history of the 
expansion into the west. Anyone who was discontented had the opportunity to move 
on and start anew. Indeed in the perception of the time, which excluded the native 
population, America was a clean slate. America has since been the oddball of 
Nationalism. Some (for instance Zangwill 1917) have regarded it as an ‘evolving 
National identity’, others (Hans Kohn's position in Gans 2003: 8) have tried to 
capture it as a ‘National vacuum’
156
 that exemplifies how the State is capable of 
answering all our wants. In many respects ‘the American experiment’ has been a 
model for cosmopolitans. They see no reason why the world as a whole could not 
become America. Indeed, consistent cosmopolitans may very well view the current 
attempts to unite Europe, as a tactical step towards the goal of world unification
157
.  
I would argue that the American model cannot be followed in the current era, 
since the conditions of 'the original experiment' cannot be replicated. Europe being a 
case in point, unlike its American cousin, the EU does not yield to reorganisation 
                                                                                                                                     
inheritance that membership of a nation can bring them; and they want to see continuity between their 
own lives and the lives of their ancestors.’ (Miller On Nationality 1995: 184) 
156
 The distinction between the former and the latter is roughly equivalent to the distinction between 
ethnic Nationalism and civic Nationalism introduced by Hans Kohn, or more appropriately, stripped 
of moral connotations, as termed by Haim Gans, cultural Nationalism versus statist Nationalism 
(Gans The Limits of Nationalism 2003: 15) 
157
 Certainly there may be Europhiles that would object to this claim, but they are not truly in the 
cosmopolitan camp, and should be labelled Euro-Nationalists.  
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 215 
because it already contains a legacy of order. Preserving this legacy is not merely a 
matter of conservative policy, it is an indispensable part of the individual’s future- 
oriented contribution to a social corpus. Much as in the case of the State, without 
assurances that one’s efforts to leave a mark on the social culture beyond one’s 
singular corporeal existence, the motivation to create for an audience outwith oneself 
regresses to nil.   As accommodating as the notion of civic nationalism may appear, 
citizenship tests not withstanding, those who seek to join established nation states are 
required to either leave their national baggage at the door or conceive a formula of 
converting the old to the new.  
Consider the ease with which the Euro zone was enacted as opposed to the 
difficulties surrounding the acceptance of a European constitution. Economic 
incentives aside, I would suggest that conversion of currencies into a common Euro 
denominator proved a relatively easy feat, as the principles of conversion, and indeed 
an actual common exchange rate, were already in place. Moreover, I would argue 
that economically-oriented laws lend themselves to a cost-benefit calculation. Thus 
the famous 'chocolate dispute'
158
 could be overcome by means of an agreed financial 
settlement. By contrast, the commensuration, if not unification, of certain elements of 
law has proven difficult due to a fundamental problem with the conversion formula. 
If all the participants were neutral ‘historyless’ States, the consolidation of 
law and order would have been a difficult yet manageable task; however it is 
doubtful whether the inhabitants of these States would accept an imposed 'amnesia' 
                                               
158
 A discord between the British and other European Community members over the labelling of 
products as ‘chocolate’ that was finally resolved in 1999 by the compromise of selling the British 
product on the continent under the label ‘family milk chocolate’ (Pilkington Britain in the European 
Union today 2001: 130). 
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of the type required. Having served for some time as the historical continuum 
platform for their respective majorities, such Nation-States have accumulated 
content. They have come to embody cultural memory banks of non-currency that 
make it rational for individuals to contribute something of themselves. If such 
endeavours are at risk of ‘cultural revolution’ they offer no more security to 
individuals than they may find in their own individuated temporally limited 
existence. Consequently individuals would recede back into their solitary shells.    
Recall that our rational individuals suffer from ‘the human fault’ - they are 
trapped in time and space. It was suggested that some relief from the detrimental 
effect that time has on our capacity to aggregate property was provided by the 
institutionalisation of an authority that was perpetual for all goods and purposes, 
earthly in the sense that it was comprehensible and rationally undisputable. Its 
perpetuity was achieved either, as Hobbes suggested, by ‘freezing’ conditions, or by 
introducing a conservative counter-revolutionary civil society framework as Locke 
did. It was earthly and comprehensible due to its human rather than Godly origin. 
Finally, it was indisputable because it relied on consent, either of the Hobbesean, 
once and for all submission to rationality variety, or of the Lockean renewable 
consent by rational consideration type. By freezing time, Hobbes ‘kills two birds 
with one stone.’ By halting the effects of time, he eliminates both time and space 
from the equation of our existence. I have already shown the difficulties in 
performing this ‘trick’, yet I must concede that it is an elegant one.  
The Lockean version is not as elegant. It decreases the unwanted effects of 
time, but does not take it out of the equation. As a result, space remains a human 
constraint with which to be contended. Yet our perception of space remains at odds 
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with our perception of time. The artificial extension of ourselves through time to 
form the future, albeit perhaps an illusion, does not seem to have a corollary in space. 
Our perception of space is captured in the singular, whereas our perception of time is 
potentially continuous. Our voluminous manifestation suggests that we are not 
singular in the same sense as a point in space is singular. Still, while we are extended 
in space we do not extend through it in the same sense that we extend through time. 
Moments in time seem to connect together into a time continuum, whereas moments 
in space merely connect serially to each other.  
This intuitive notion that although time and space are intrinsically connected, 
they are not mirror images of each other, is further strengthened by the established 
fact that one is unable to be in two places at the same time, yet one can easily be in 
one place at two different times. Our extension in space, as opposed to our contrived 
extension through time, is defined by our confinement to clear physical boundaries. 
In other words we can artificially extend ourselves through time, whereas we cannot 
do so through space. Whether we consider ourselves metaphysically to be 
‘substances’ or ‘events’
159
, makes little difference. In either case we would take up 
an exclusive delineated volume in space.  As a ‘substance’ we could not share our 
exact position with other ‘substances’; alternatively, as an ‘event’ we would need to 
be scheduled at a ‘venue’ such that our appearance doesn’t conflict with others 
scheduled for the same ‘venue’.  
As we cannot overcome these spatial constraints, neither physically nor 
mentally, we must submit to them. Moreover, I would contend that these are not 
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obstacles, but defining features of our existence as ‘property-enabled’ individuals. If 
we could, by some technological wonder, relieve ourselves of the singularity of 
spatial existence, our effective omnipresence would relieve us of time restrictions as 
well. This would return us to the Hobbesean model of perfection, wherein my 
property would be indiscernible from your property. Indeed, as I have suggested, our 
whole notion of selves would collapse into a singular collective self
160
.   
While we appear to be able to resist time by artificial means, we cannot and 
quite possibly should not resist our ‘hardwired’ spatiality, since as I have hinted it 
may serve to preserve our individuality. Spatial singular exclusivity coincides with 
individuation, without which it is doubtful if we could form an idea of property that 
was not collective. This combined notion of individuality and spatiality is easily 
converted into territoriality or jurisdiction. Robert Nozick has taken this idea to its 
extreme by concluding that this ‘hardwired’ singularity demands a matching spatially 
singular association. Accordingly he envisions an ideal society composed of 
individual territorial jurisdictions sanctioned by the inalienable right to property, to 
be policed by essentially territorially detached competing law enforcement agencies. 
As David Miller correctly points out:  
…there is nothing in Nozick’s argument to rule out protective agencies 
competing for clients on a non-territorial basis. So there are no jurisdictional 
boundaries in a Nozickian world, except in the sense that one may pass from a 
                                                                                                                                     
159 Recall the earlier reflection (see above p. 23) on the difference between the two with reference to 
Christopher Hughes Conn. 
160
 Related notions may be found in the monistic Hindu aspiration to Moska (liberation) by uniting 
Atman (self) with Brahman (transpersonal, universal), as well as in the annihilation of the illusion of 
the self offered by Buddhist Nirvana as the resolution to the misery of the perpetuation of its illusion 
Samsara  (reincarnation). Unfortunately lying outside the scope of this work, the suggested crude 
parallel between Hobbes’s position towards the individual and the Hindu and Buddhist attitude 
towards Atman, is worthy of thorough examination elsewhere. 
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region where most people have signed up with agency A to a region where most 
people have signed up with agency B. The only firm boundaries are those that 
demarcate individuals’ holdings of property. (Miller 2003: 264).  
 
On the basis of Allen Buchanan’s preceding contribution in the same volume, Miller 
goes on to discount the ‘picture’ painted by Nozick, claiming that it ‘collapses as 
soon as we observe that there is no “natural” system of property, but instead property 
entitlements depend upon the positive laws of the state.’  
I believe Miller is reading Nozick, and by extension Locke, too literally on 
this matter. The property rights that exist in the State are not necessarily a formalised 
replication of property rights that precede the State in Locke and Nozick. An 
alternative reading proposes that property rights exist in natural form as a general 
‘liberty’, but do not as yet take on the particularity of licensing. While our right to 
property is not granted by the State, it is effectuated by it. I would suggest that 
Miller’s confusion arises from the administrative role of the State in the licensing of 
property. For clarification consider the role of the State in the administration of ‘the 
right to pollute the air’ (probably an extension of property rights from a Lockean 
perspective).  In the state of nature there is a general liberty to pollute, whereas in the 
State there is particular license to do so.  
 Nozick’s ultra minimalist version of the State is, however, confronted by its 
own difficulties. Even after an evolutionary process has declared the dominant 
protection agency, private individuals are within their rights to abstain from joining 
up, potentially forming a ‘Swiss cheese’ sovereignty in which there are ‘internal as 
well as external boundaries’. (Nozick 1974: 54). Nozick is not unaware of the 
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problems that might arise in such an arrangement. Island-like sovereignties could 
potentially be trapped in their terrestrial isolation. His solution to this difficulty 
would seem to rely on a lean version of the Lockean proviso, namely that you can 
not prevent me from entering into a free market exchange with you over the right to 
passage, since by doing so your acquisition of the land surrounding mine would not 
leave me access to ‘passage’ of the same quality and extent as you have appropriated 
for yourself. Nozick does not concern himself with the possibility that these islands 
might become safe havens for criminals originating in the surrounding territories, or 
alternatively that they might utilise their seclusion to free-ride on the defensive ring 
provided by circumfusing territories.  Still these issues might be moot, as ultimately 
he seems to be implying that an ultra minimalist State would gradually evolve into a 
minimalist one, in which sovereignty is monopolised. Moreover, there is nothing to 
bar the consolidation trend from reaching global proportions.  
Surprisingly, although hardly an advocate of Nozick’s social conclusions, 
recent commentary by Lynn Dobson on supranational citizenship in the context of 
the emerging European Union suggests a convergence of her view with his on the 
function of the traditional nation state. There would be no reason for Nozick to reject 
Dobson’s redefinition of citizenship:  
Citizenship is not about being, but about doing…citizenship defines the space 
and the possibilities for certain kinds of action within highly structured, 
impersonal, multitudinous and multisystem worlds, where each of us engages 
in hundreds or thousands of interactions with others – mostly unseen and 
unsuspected others – every day; and where each of us is socialised into 
networks of rules and roles and codes structuring our behaviour and our 
expectations, most of which we do not even notice. (Dobson 2006: 171).  
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For both Nozick and Dobson the nation state is a contingent, perhaps even 
anachronistic, yet effective administrative zone. If nation states are reduced to 
convenient administrative postcodes, nationalities in themselves are rendered defunct 
altogether, as they serve no purpose save perhaps a folkloristic one. As far as the 
nation survives within the nation state it survives in a ‘civic nationalism’ form. 
Equally, both would champion boundary-free governance – under complete ‘laissez 
passer’ immigration. They would differ only on the degree of such governance, or on 
‘laissez faire’. For Nozick governance would be restricted to the provision of global 
corporal security, whereas for Dobson it would extend into the provision of global 
social security, thereby curtailing ‘laissez faire’. 
Following Nozick and Dobson, consider now that I am wrong, that 
individuals might not be easily converted to global Human Nationality, but 
nevertheless they are convertible all the same. I envision that such a perception of the 
individual would generate two major strands of ‘world government’ policies
161
: a 
planned egalitarian one and a free-market one. In what remains of this section, I 
develop simulations of these policies aimed at demonstrating that even if the 
demographics of the world could be completely reshuffled, the attraction of 
corporeally constrained beings to social frameworks of stability, will ultimately 
regenerate boundaries and borders.   
 
a. Planned egalitarian distribution  
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 222 
 
A global government would devise a grand central plan for the even 
distribution of humankind across the globe. Such a plan would take into account 
resource distribution in order to assure that choice is not curtailed by our access 
to goods. But realising the resources may become depleted over time, or their 
value may change according to technological development, the government must 
reserve the right to redistribute the world population to accommodate its 
speculation as to what the future foretells. It would be attaching individual fate to 
the collective fate of humankind at large.  
This would not come without a cost. We could count on very little 
stability. Our investment, our attachments to anything from skylines to 
relationships would become extremely limited in their scope. Figuratively, much 
like the travelling salesman, we would be living in a hotel room without much 
point in unpacking our suitcase. Furthermore once we left one place for another, 
there would be nothing to secure its existence in the form we recalled it. For 
some this may seem too extreme a scenario,  describing an exaggerated rate of 
change. They would perhaps hold  that governmental wisdom would curtail the 
rate of change by applying relocation programs only every so often. In this more 
moderate account we would be able to live a more stable life and would form 
attachments to people and places. After a while we would develop local traits and 
quirks and would become attached to those as well. We might even develop 
regional traditions.  
                                                                                                                                     
161 I realize there could also be combined strains but I do no think this would necessarily affect my 
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For the sake of the argument, consider that the tradition we have developed is 
sports and exercise. We take it so seriously that we elevate it to the degree of 
body worship, and as we are not shy about it, our tradition is to conduct sports 
exhibitions in the nude. Now a generation or two have come to pass and the 
central government has decided that redistribution of the populace can no longer 
be avoided. But the newcomers who are being transported to our community do 
not approve of our cherished practice, in fact they consider it vile and immoral. 
In fear of this increasingly vocal influx of immigrants we demand our own 
sovereignty so as to protect our cherished practices. We wish to demarcate our 
borders and exclude these ‘others’ so as to preserve our invested interests. 
 
b. Free Market  
 
Global government wishes to make our laissez-faire, laissez passer liberty as 
effortless as possible. It acts to bring down any formal boundaries between 
territories in order to allow us to move freely and settle anywhere we like for as 
long as we like. It is thought that market values of supply and demand will 
coordinate our migration so as to best accommodate the occurring changes, be 
they technologically influenced, resources related, etc. Again individual fate is 
attached to the fate of humankind, albeit in a different manner.  
This policy seems to lend itself, even more easily than the centrally controlled 
one, to a volatile existence with no stability whatsoever. Once more this can be 
                                                                                                                                     
argument. 
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challenged as an extreme scenario. Still, if humans are indeed stability and 
prosperity seeking beings, as reflected in the preceding discussion of the 
aspiration for the establishment of the State in Hobbes and Locke, they will 
challenge the ‘fleeting reality’ that they encounter. They will attach themselves to 
a spatial location, rather than become drifters and wanderers. So a generation or 
two would come to pass and our community might  develop a tradition of 
‘boozing’. Our  successful society might attract an influx of immigrants that think 
that drinking is a vile habit. We soon realise that these immigrants could come to 
threaten our culture and therefore wish to enact our own sovereignty to protect it.   
 
On both accounts, I would argue that the seeds of a Lockean, corporeal-
constraint-prompted national identity have been sewn. A mandate for borders is 
sought in order to secure personal perdurence through time, which does not expect 
human beings to dislodge themselves completely from their unrelenting spatial 
limits. In the absence of such boundaries the assurance of continuity is lost, and with 
it the entire rationale of social interaction. Cosmopolitans may respond by claiming 
that this materially oriented, physical portrayal of the world no longer holds, that 
transport, commerce and especially communication have transformed us from 
physically constrained beings into virtual ones. That interest groups can converge 
through the web from across the world to intervene in some calamity is all very well; 
still, we do not live our lives virtually. The technologically developed part of the 
world may be headed in this direction, but in our haste we must not forget that we 
quite literally feed on the material world, populated by real people across the globe. 
We may at some point overcome all material constraints, but I am not sure we want 
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to reach that point, because if Locke’s argument as to our corporeal boundedness 
holds, it would seem to imply that we would be dead. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion – A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 
This thesis questioned the widely held assumption that cosmopolitanism is 
rooted in liberal individualism, and more specifically in John Locke. It proposed a 
match between cosmopolitanism and Hobbeseanism, based on a holistic 
understanding of the Hobbesean enterprise that argued for the indispensability of the 
overlap between the scientific, the theological and the political in the Hobbesean 
system of ideas. Hobbesean cosmopolitanism was portrayed as the political aspect of 
a Hobbesean yearning to restore the original unitary order of creation; part and parcel 
of a scientific quest for the truth and a parallel of a theological ambition to reconcile 
with the creator. Hobbesean political theory was portrayed as an attempt to achieve a 
renaissance of a lost moment of perfect equilibrium, a moment of indisputable 
boundaryless truth that would put an end ‘once and for all’ to the debilitating 
apprehension of ‘the stranger’ in a society in which encounters are no longer 
restricted to the familial.  
It was maintained that Hobbesean theory merges its mechanics with its 
politics. Change, the social parallel of mechanical motion, is perceived as the 
initiator of friction between bodies and persons. Motion is presumed by Hobbes to 
have been absent since the moment of creation, a perfect moment of rest and peace 
that motion could only disturb. Consequently it was argued that he aspires to reverse 
the introduction of motion, and return to the initial bliss of stillness.  This is achieved 
by artificially manufacturing a condition, the State, that would insulate its inhabitants 
from motion and by extension from change altogether. The eradication of instability 
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accompanied by change required the collapse of the particular into the general, the 
erratic individual into the regularity-exhibiting rational citizen. Moreover, it required 
the halting of time in order to assure the conservation of the identity of individuals.  
Accordingly the association of Hobbeseanism with both modernism and 
individualism were here disputed.  
Indeed, it was proposed that individualism for Hobbes, far from being an end, 
was a symptom of a malignant social syndrome. It was the social extension of a 
metaphysical split in creation between corporeal particularism and incorporeal 
generality, which occurred as a consequence of human insubordination. The 
treatment for this rebelliousness was humankind’s reintroduction to the 
indisputability of rationality. It was argued that Hobbes’s intricate examination of the 
mechanics of individuation, while often mistaken for an appreciation of it, is in fact 
investigated for the purpose of constructing a countermeasure against it. The 
Hobbesean State was here portrayed as an antidote for combating the disorder of 
individuation. 
 Having established that the Hobbesean route to cosmopolitanism involved a 
procedure of harmonisation by unification founded on anti-individualist principles, 
alternative paths towards social harmony and their relation to cosmopolitanism were 
examined, namely the distinctive Smitho-Humean and Lockean approaches; despite 
not sharing the Hobbesean holistic foundation of a singular moment of creation, they 
too were treated here as an ensemble of metaphysical, theological and political ideas. 
This has been adopted more or less as a premise, although at least in Smith one can 
find the appropriate grounds for supporting a holistic scientific approach. It was 
further postulated that not only the Smitho-Humean stance, but also the Lockean one, 
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could be interpreted on logical grounds as a response to the holistic Hobbesean 
position. Indeed the political differences of both from Hobbes were purported to be 
the result of preceding theological and metaphysical differences.  
It was maintained that contrary to conventional thinking, Lockean political 
theory was at fundamental odds with Hobbeseanism. Again the divergence was 
sourced to a metaphysical discord that carries over into a political one. The Lockean 
objection was to the Hobbesean presumptuous attempt to force monism on an 
evidently dualist reality, and to construct an existence in which change and by 
extension time and space were suspended. It found the Hobbesean prescription of an 
emulation procedure that would root out observable unruly elements to be begging 
the question. Hobbeseanism was charged with achieving synchronisation between 
creation and its unruly creatures by taking charge of creation and rearranging it to 
suit itself.  
Locke considers attaining unification with the incorporeal, while sustaining 
humankind’s corporeality, a contradiction. Indeed dispensing with individuality 
would dispense with corporeality as well. The Lockean position, as purported here, 
argues that both are equally inescapable. Under Lockean dualism, human souls and 
bodies are married, and remain so until death.. Unification with the incorporeal 
would have to wait until death dislodges one’s incorporeal element, the spirit, from 
its corporeal partner, the body. Meanwhile, due to administrative difficulties arising 
from corporeal individuation, a mechanism needed to be devised in order to make 
corporeal life as pleasant as possible. Just as the body and the soul were conceived as 
married to one another, so too was the self considered married to property. This 
fusion made the terms interchangeable in an earthly existence and required the State 
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to oversee both at once. The Lockean State provided mutual assurances that enabled 
secure interaction among strangers. In other words, it allowed for the development of 
exchange relations between them, based on trust in the continuum of identity of the 
parties to the exchange. It thus accommodates motion and change, while offering a 
reasonable degree of stability. 
Like the Lockean position, it was suggested that the Smitho-Humean stance 
(represented initially by Anne Conway and later by Friedrich Hayek) was a reaction 
to the Hobbesean understanding of motion. In an effort to rehabilitate motion it 
proposed that peaceful harmony required communication between particulars, rather 
than a draconian fusion into singularity. It offered an alternative holistic approach 
that utilised the market as an instrument for the propagation of a ‘pantheon’ of 
equilibrium points. As such, it liberated the seeker of peace from recapturing the 
single authoritative moment of perfect creation.  This revision seemingly retains law 
and order without a commitment to perfection. By adopting an evolutionary 
understanding of the relation between individuated bodies, it dismisses the 
Hobbesean aversion to motion as well as its glorification of rationality. For the 
Smitho-Humean, motion allows for the exploration of various nodes of stability.  
Fluidity encompasses ‘the rationality of nature’, and any attempt to bind it 
causes a disruption of the seamless drift between points of equilibrium. Moreover, 
the disruption of the natural motion of ideas, individuals, or assets is not only 
unwarranted, but also harmful. Artificially suspending the attraction towards 
frictionless coordination, it ‘messes’ with the proclivity of nature to equilibria. 
National borders and boundaries being part and parcel of such artificial disruption, 
they should ideally give way to a global cosmopolitan market that would facilitate 
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free movement. Yet, it was argued that while Hayek’s model seemingly produces a 
cosmopolitanism that cherishes particularity, its insistence on allowing nothing, not 
even individual liberty, to be anchored outwith the forces of change, threatens to 
mutate the concept of the individual in a way that would redefine and distort its 
liberty. It was further suggested that Locke’s ‘material anchoring’ of the self is what 
differentiates his market vision from Hayek’s and Nozick’s adaptation of an idea 
originating in Smith and Hume.  
Having distanced Locke metaphysically from Hobbes’s holistic attack on 
individualism on the one hand, and from Smith and Hume’s holistic attempt to 
defend individualism on the other, attention was turned to the exploration of the 
political implications of the distinct dualist and pluralist metaphysical position which 
is here attributed to Locke.  I examined the function of the State as a medium for the 
preservation of the otherwise momentary, and therefore inconsequential, human 
existence in a state of individuation. This attention to the role of the State as an agent 
of conservation led to the substantiation of Locke’s so-called anthropological 
discussion of the development of the use of currency in order to achieve perdurance. 
It was argued that State institutions fulfil a combined human ambition, to stay true to 
the inherent (created) metaphysical particularity, while ameliorating the discouraging 
effect that the realisation of our constraint to time and space has on our motivation to 
contribute our thoughts and actions to the world.  
The focus on the legacy function of the State, and the coupling of the 
application of the State and the purpose that money serves in Locke, raised the 
question of the perdurance of particularities that individuals may wish to preserve, 
but which do not lend themselves to commodification. Consequently it was observed 
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that the State in itself was an insufficient means for the provision of the full scope of 
human perdurance. Moreover, it was argued that national identity stands out in its 
ability to balance the tension between the ambition of the particular (the individual) 
for immortality, and the reality that particularity is by definition constrained by time 
and space. It was therefore concluded that Locke’s conjoined metaphysical-political 
stance is conducive to the idea of national identity. 
In the remaining two sections of this conclusion I would like to briefly 
address the implications that the metaphysically saturated reading of the founding 
fathers of modern political theory, and more particularly such a reading of Hobbes 
and Locke, have on the foundations for cosmopolitanism on the one hand and 
nationalism on the other. The following section reconsiders who the custodians of the 
Hobbesean legacy are within the various schools of thought in international relations. 
It applies the metaphysically inspired conclusion that Hobbes’s political aspiration is 
for rest and peace, to challenge the traditional association of Hobbes with the realist 
school and the vision of international relations as a struggle for domination. By 
contrast, according to the unconventional understanding of Hobbes presented in this 
thesis, he becomes a proponent of a world absolutist State, as a direct extension of 
his own argument for the peace-generating benefits of the State.  The final section 
explores the type of national identity to which Locke’s metaphysically saturated 
political position lends itself, differentiating it from communitarian versions, as well 
as from the liberal-nationalism ‘branded’ ideas of such thinkers as David Miller and 
Yael Tamir.  Finally, it attempts to define the national, or at least the anti-
cosmopolitan aspect of Locke’s metaphysically saturated political position, by 
contrasting it with Jeremy Waldron’s definition of cosmopolitanism. 
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8.1 Hobbes: Metaphysical Politics and its implications for IR theory 
 
The realist school in international relations theory has, not entirely without 
textual foundation (Hanson 1984: 332), claimed Hobbeseanism for their own, 
consequently placing it at odds with cosmopolitanism. They make much of the few, 
but unequivocal statements in DeCive and Leviathan, in which Hobbes addresses the 
meagre prospects of civil interaction between states. They claim to share with 
Hobbes the postulation that convergence under a single umbrella of sovereignty, on 
the general realisation of the irrationality of conflict, is reserved to individual 
interaction at the State level, beyond which an irrational state of chaos is 
unavoidable. Moreover, this position is encouraged by theorists of nationalism, such 
as David Miller, who defend the uniqueness of the social glue offered by the nation-
state. In the realist view, lacking a foreseeable body of overwhelming sovereignty to 
deter them, interaction between states is thought to be doomed to a clash of 
irreconcilable interests. The international arena is understood as one in which the 
most one can hope for is short-term treaties which will effectively be revoked at the 
first sign of a shift of power. The Hobbesean contribution to the discipline of 
international relations is thought to capture  inter-state interaction as a power struggle 
that is guided by nothing but selfish opportunism. 
Yet as Michael Williams teaches us (Williams 1996: 213), within 
international relations theory there are other contenders for ‘the custody of Hobbes’.  
The English school of international relations has challenged the couching of Hobbes 
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism 
 233 
as a staunch realist. Martin Wight originated a distinction between three contending 
patterns of thought in international relations: a realist approach grounded in 
Machiavelli, a rationalist approach grounded in Grotius and a revolutionary approach 
grounded in Kant. John Vincent deliberates which category Hobbesean theory falls 
under. Vincent is reluctant to accept the realist ‘literal’ equation of international 
relations with the inter-individual state of nature. Intent on demonstrating that 
Hobbes occupies ‘the marshland’ between Realism and Rationalism, with one 
‘keeping check on the enthusiasm of the other’ (Vincent 1981: 96), he explores two 
alternative accounts of the Hobbesean position. The first is a rationalist account, the 
second a revolutionary one.  
The rationalist account maintains that although Hobbes uses the same name 
‘state of nature’ for both a theoretical pre-political condition and the actual 
interaction between states, there are in fact several crucial differences between the 
two situations. Firstly, states are more resilient and self-sufficient than individuals, 
especially at withstanding conflict, and sometimes even benefit from it economically. 
Secondly, states, more so than individuals, would be compelled to ‘bandwagon’ with 
the few mighty superpowers, and the latter would be inclined to negotiate amongst 
themselves and curtail their respective proxy states’ actions. Thirdly, states are not 
inclined to involve themselves in situations that would be life threatening to their 
inhabitants, since that would undermine the very legitimacy of their existence.  
By contrast the revolutionary account of Hobbes, like the realist account, 
contends that the term ‘state of nature’ is used consistently with the same meaning in 
both descriptions of the pre-political and inter-state interaction.  Where it differs 
from the realist vision is in the contention that not only does the logic of the 
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Hobbesean inter-individual argument impel a theoretical ‘spill over’ of its peace-
seeking rationale beyond the state level (Vincent 1981: 95), but that nothing bars the 
actual realisation of such a ‘spill over‘ and the world-governing cosmopolitan order 
it entails.  
Vincent, aided by the respective arguments of Hedley Bull, Charles Brewin 
and Murray Forsyth, asserts that Hobbes most probably rejected the ‘spill over’ 
rationale for any of the following reasons:  
a. He projected the self-preservation of the individual onto a State that could 
not surrender its independence. 
b. His patriotism would not allow him to forsake Englishness. 
c. The State was no less a product of external threat than of internal strife; in 
other words, external demons sustain the legitimacy of the State. 
 
Having, in his mind, ruled out the revolutionary proposition, but still left with two 
strong contenders, Vincent seizes the middle of the road position developed by 
Murray Forsyth. In the latter’s somewhat Lockean adaptation of the Hobbesean state 
of nature, a differentiation is made between a ‘raw’ brutish state of nature, ‘a 
deliberately fabricated “not-world”, and the viable Leviathan, or perhaps Leviathan- 
conducive social condition. Employing this ‘bi-focal’ approach, Forsyth achieves the 
merging of the realist and rationalist positions. The split of both the inter-individual 
and the inter-state interaction into matching ‘bi-focal’ manifestations of the state of 
nature, one theoretical and the other actual, retains the realist insistence on a strict 
parallel between the inter-individual and inter-state account, as well as the rationalist 
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insistence on an inter-individual peace agenda
162
 that repeats itself in international 
relations. The grim realist forecast is thus curtailed, as is the implication by the 
rationalist interpretation that Hobbes himself had committed the highest offence 
against his own scientific method; convolution of terms. Moreover, the recognition 
of the ‘bi-focal’ composition of the state of nature assists in sorting out the historicity 
controversy regarding it. The resolution is that the Hobbesean argument is at once 
both ahistorical and historical (Boucher 1990: 213), one focal point being a fictional 
thought-experiment, the other being an actual pre-civil description.  
In the understanding of Forsyth, Vincent, Hanson and Boucher it is rationality 
that is the driving force behind social peace, leaving little if any effective role for the 
Hobbesean sovereign. In their interpretation, while the sovereign oversees the 
execution of rationality, it ceases to emanate from her. She is not the source of social 
order, rather they are. Indeed she is not sovereign; she is a servant to their 
sovereignty. Their submission to her rules is contingent upon her devotion to 
preserving the peace as they understand it. Whether they can collectively form a 
shared idea of peace not withstanding, her rule is neither absolute, nor beyond 
contention. The foundation for her sovereignty is therefore Lockean and not 
Hobbesean.  
Yet I would argue that the implication is not that if one wishes to remain true 
to the Hobbesean argument, one must choose between a realist position and a 
conversion to a Lockean stance. Rather, it is the conclusion of this thesis that 
proponents of the English School have been too quick to discount the third, 
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revolutionary option.  It is argued that they have been inclined to do so due to a lack 
of attention to the holistic nature of the Hobbesean endeavour, not giving enough 
consideration to the integration of Hobbesean monist metaphysics and Hobbesean 
politics, as well as overlooking Hebraic influences, as opposed to the Greco-Roman 
ones.  
In order to reinstate the revolutionary position one needs to revisit and 
remove the three English School ‘blockages’ to the ‘spill over’ of the singular 
sovereignty rationale from the inter-individual level to the inter-state level. I propose 
to remove the initial two obstacles, and lift the third obstruction by cooptation into an 
understanding of Hobbesean rationality that is modelled after the by now familiar 
‘Russian Doll’ model. The first obstacle to be removed argues that the artificial State 
is by implication an individual in its own right, thereby carrying with it the same 
concern for its own ‘life’ as the individual it was modelled after. It would therefore 
be just as instinctively disinclined to lose its independency. Yet just as in the case of 
the real-individual, so too in the artificial individual, this argument works both ways. 
Even if the State is acting in its own right, like the individual, it would be compelled 
to reach the rational conclusion that its self-preservation interests are better served 
under global governance. The second obstacle pertains to Hobbes only ad hominem. 
As such, I am not sure that this thesis is qualified to address it. As I have professed 
from the onset, I am much more concerned with framing a coherent Hobbesean 
theory, than with adjudicating historical or biographical accounts of Hobbes himself, 
or indeed of the context which defines his writings. My bias towards coherent logical 
argumentation may be getting the best of me, but I find it improbable that in a project 
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embarked upon by an extremely meticulous mind, specifically in order to produce a 
science of politics cleansed of logical error, patriotism would have been allowed to 
subtly creep in without a proper causal explanation.  
The third obstruction echoes the inter-individual state of nature. It presumes 
that the rational state-building process of inter-individual interaction is bound to 
leave someone as an outsider. It can be argued that this is not a theoretically 
necessary condition, but rather a stipulation of actuality. Still, it is a state of affairs 
that effectively occurs in inter-individual interaction, and therefore according to the 
strict parallel between the situations, should find itself mirrored in the international 
arena, thereby preventing the formation of a truly global Leviathan. I would argue 
however that discounting the possibility of a Hobbesean foundation for world 
government is a reflection of inattentiveness to a theological-metaphysical mould 
that informs Hobbesean rationality.  
Throughout this thesis I have used the imagery of the concentric Russian 
Dolls to denote the relation between phenomena as understood by Hobbes. On this 
model each level or sphere echoes the previous layer, going back to a primal mould 
that was responsible for shaping the layers in its own image. Consider the 
proposition that until an ‘incident’ derailed natural order, creation had set the layers 
in a state of frictionless harmony. Post ‘incident’, humankind finds itself faced with a 
potentially harmonic, yet broken mechanism. Without access to a definitive ‘service 
manual’, the only recourse left to Hobbes is to piece it back together, to seek out and 
emulate traces of the original order. Such traces are to be found in the laws of nature 
as they manifest themselves in the physical world, as well as in the remnants of 
social laws of nature in biblical accounts of the Hebraic chosen People. Indeed, both 
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these accounts should be reducible to a synthesis that would ‘distil’ the original 
order.  
It is the biblical account that is helpful in understanding how a particular 
State of limited size is set to promote the eventuality of a cosmopolitan Leviathan. 
Consider that the original Hebraic society, prior to falling out of favour for not 
keeping to the set rules, is not only deemed in scripture to be the chosen People, but 
also literally translates from the Hebrew as ‘light to peoples’. They are considered a 
beacon, an example to be followed. In this context it is worth considering Arrigo 
Pacchi’s assertion that  
The history of the Jewish people in their relationship with God, a relationship 
that had become archetypical of the whole Christian world, had to be assimilated 
and directed, thus interpreted, in such a way as not to contrast with the results of 
scientific examination of human society, nor with the similarly scientific project 
of a well ordered State… (Pacchi 1988).  
 
It should also be noted that the eventual public revelation of the truth of creation, as 
opposed to ‘private audiences’ with a selected few, does not occur instantly. It is a 
process in which a righteous People replicating the original rules do not instantly win 
over humankind. They must face opposition, and indeed a final war, with those who 
would oppose the renaissance of natural order. From within the proposed 
perspective, the attitude of Hobbesean theory towards a global Leviathan is not only 
unhindered by the advocacy of a limited Leviathan, but rather supported by it.  
Having digested the Russian Doll model, it is worth revisiting the definition 
of the ‘revolutionists’ category as originated by Martin Wight and inspired by 
Christopher Dawson’s Religion and the Rise of Western Culture :  
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… those who believe passionately in the moral unity of the society of states or 
international society…and experience an overriding obligation to give effect to 
it, as the first aim of the international policies. For them the whole of 
international society transcends its parts; they are cosmopolitan rather than 
internationalist, and their international theory and policy has a missionary 
character.’ (Wight 1994: 8).  
 
Unless one takes ‘first aim’ in a literal ordinal sense, rather than as a synonym of 
primality, the Russian Doll version of Hobbesean theory fits snugly into the 
definition of ‘revolutionist’ as drafted by Wight.  
In order to avoid confusion it is worth noting the other revolution with 
which Hobbeseanism is conventionally associated, and to which the Russian Doll 
model stands in contrast; the modernist revolution. In this last sense the revolution is 
a conceptual one, which replaces submission to God with individual autonomy.  On a 
modernist account, Hobbesean theory is engaged with building anew a mechanically 
synthesised social and physical order, from the most primary building blocks it can 
identify, i.e. the individual. The rational individual is the architect of an artificial 
primary State that sheds the natural atomised condition in which individuals would 
otherwise find themselves, but retains their inherent individuality. On the modernist 
understanding the individual is the starting point. A collection of such individuals, all 
equally endowed with a will to preserve their own well being, allows for ascension 
into peaceful coexistence on the State level. It may or may not also allow for a 
similar ascension into a peaceful inter-State existence, depending on whether one 
takes the realist or the rationalist approach.  
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On the Russian Doll model individuality, far from being the building block 
for society, is the very obstacle in the path of a defragmentation process. The original 
master mould for the sequence of doll layers is a rational system of order, shorthand 
for which could be the term ‘God’.  It is God therefore, and not the modernist 
rationalised individual, that is set at the core of creation. It is God from which all 
orderliness thereon emanates. The rationalised individual is merely rediscovering 
(related to the Platonist remembrance process as discussed on p. 48) the rules of 
social and physical creation; he is not inventing them. By a combination of empirical 
observation of social friction, and conceptual analysis of the Creator as peaceful, the 
Hobbesean identifies a rift between God (order) and humankind. It is has been 
argued here that what he is offering is a healing process that is designed to achieve 
closure of this rift between the peacefulness of God (order) and the clash proneness 
(disorderliness) of humankind. Employing a scientific method that examines the 
mechanical cause-effect logical trail, Hobbes sets out to ‘repair’ humankind, by 
tracing its steps back to the cause of the current contradictory condition between its 
orderly creation and its disorderly conduct. 
As has been proposed, since the Hobbesean conceptual analysis disorder 
cannot have been bred by order, the Hobbesean logical backtracking must reveal a 
moment of rebellion of the created in the orderly image against the rules of their 
creator. It is an incident that caused an interruption of the original harmonious 
existence, the consequence of which is the fragmentation of humankind into 
distinctive individuals. But humankind, having been part of the original order, is by 
its own nature also inclined to return to an orderly existence. It has the impetus to 
escape its completely fragmented state to reverse the chain of cause and effect, 
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thereby facilitating the return to the original orderliness by entering into a condition 
that is conducive to it - the State.  
Since this stately existence is contrived, it is not properly original. It is an 
attempt to replicate the original lost order. Ultimately if one were to be careful 
enough in one’s rational reconstruction of the original truth, and if one were to avoid 
the pitfalls that befell, for example the ancient Hebraic attempt to do the same, one 
would hope to complete the full circle from God through the sin of disorderliness 
into fragmentation, and from fragmentation through the perfection of orderliness 
offered by the State, back to one, true, cosmopolitan unity with God. Coming full 
circle is a revolution in itself, yet it is a revolution in a renaissance sense. Moreover, 
if one can return to the original order, one has in fact reversed the effects of original 
sin. One has stopped the repetition of the fragmentation cycle, allowing one to 
remain at rest and at harmony with one’s surroundings. One has arrived at a perfect 
state in which one is no longer required to exert force.  
On this understanding, while the realist school of international relations 
correctly attributes Hobbeseanism with the introduction of power relations to the 
analysis of social interaction, it is wrongly projecting its own positivist inclinations 
on to it. The Hobbesean theoretical stance does not stop at description. Hobbes is 
neither observing conflict for observation’s sake, nor in order to manage it, but rather 
in order to uproot it. He is studying the causes of conflict so that it may be 
eradicated.  It has been argued here that his study leads him to identify a dichotomy 
between the unison of (Godly) order and the divisiveness of (UnGodly) disorder. It is 
within the framework of this black and white division that Hobbesean theory 
organises all its conceptual understandings: rationality versus irrationality, wholeness 
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versus partiality, unity versus division, submission versus rebellion.  Moreover, it is 
in order to achieve the ‘once and for all’ peace that it aspires to, that the Hobbesean 
logic is compelled to eliminate the ‘dark side’ altogether. The unification of 
humankind with God into the original cosmopolitan monism of creation can only be 
achieved by disposing of humankind’s corporeality. By contrast, this thesis has 
questioned the ability of human beings to mentally shed their corporeality, making 
their considerations from a purely impersonal rational stance. It has claimed that the 
demand for a standpoint that is dislodged from the defining features of human 
existence, namely time and space, is an otherworldly inhuman one. It is a vacuum in 
which real human life cannot exist.  
 
8.2 Liberalism and Nationalism conjoined 
 
It has been a key objective of this thesis to disprove the widely held 
antithetical relation between nationalism and liberalism. The portrayal of 
nationalism, from Ernst Renan onwards, as a communal defining factor of human 
consciousness, has deemed it illiberal
163
. Jeremy Rabkin (Rabkin 1997) identifies the 
source of the conventional conceptual rift between liberalism and nationalism with 
the post WWII legal attempt to shelter private individuals, under the umbrella of 
international law, from gross misconduct by their own governments. Moreover, he 
contends that we are witnessing a contemporary departure from the original liberal 
tradition, which was highly committed to nationalism, as characterised in the work of 
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Swiss legal theorist Emerich de Vatell and the political thought of John Locke. While 
supportive of the general gist of Rabkin’s argument, I find that his documentation of 
the parallels between Locke’s attitude towards property and his attitude towards 
nationality, relies too heavily on communitarian argumentation.  
Combined with its antagonism towards the abstraction of cosmopolitanism, 
and the historical lack of substantial theoretical discussion of nationalism, 
communitarianism is often considered as the missing theoretical foundation for 
nationalism. In the contemporary debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians 
each side is seen to be aligned with a corresponding philosophical enlightenment 
tradition. The cosmopolitan is commonly understood to draw upon the Lockean 
liberal tradition, with the historical American experiment as its ‘case study’ of an 
unencumbered individualist rational existence. The communitarian position probably 
has more ‘flavours’, with a spectrum ranging from rationalist to anti-rationalist 
depictions of the human psyche, the foundations of which are traced back to the 
Aristotelian tradition, varying from a rationalist reading of Rousseau that focuses on 
his organic notion of society, which both Hegelians and Marxists have tended to 
adopt, to a postmodern perception that builds upon the scepticism towards formalised 
rationalism that one finds in Rousseau’s tract on education, Emile.  
Rabkin seemingly challenges this traditional association by arguing for a 
national conception of Locke’s pre-political society. However, in doing so he 
combines communitarian argumentation with his essentially liberal position. One 
could argue that he ‘piggybacks’ a collectivist national argument on a liberal Locke. 
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The weakness of this method is that it leaves nationalism just as easily detachable 
from Locke.  Thus, even if Rabkin is correct about Locke’s actual convictions on the 
matter, the trimmed down version of Locke adopted by cosmopolitans still logically 
stands. By contrast, the argument that I have put forward logically undermines the 
Lockean foundation for cosmopolitanism on strictly liberal grounds, by claiming that 
it does not follow from the fundamental metaphysical tenets that lead Locke to his 
liberal political position.  
My own liberal justification of national identity also differs radically from 
Yael Tamir’s effort in Liberal Nationalism (Tamir 1993). Tamir professes (See 
Tamir 1994) to working within a Rawlsian framework, attempting to demonstrate 
that nationalism should be classified as morally relevant, and therefore deserving of 
inclusion within the public discussion of the reasonable. She is concerned with the 
‘well being’ of individuals and more specifically with the recognition that a sense of 
belonging plays a significant role in this well-being. In the first instance her project 
wishes to establish that liberalism does not logically exclude nationalism. In the 
second instance it contends that the contribution that they both make to individual 
well-being accords them equal stature. Indeed, she is reluctant to chart a general 
theory of the relation between them, to the extent that she is more than willing to pay 
the theoretical price; namely, that the balancing of conflicting intuitions would 
probably need to be resolved case by case on a particular basis.   
Building up to this conclusion much of Tamir’s effort is directed towards 
synthesising an understanding of nationalism that fits the mould of Rawlsian 
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reasonableness. My own Lockean-labelled effort, although arguing for a 
compatibility between nationalism and liberalism, neither focuses on a concept of 
‘well-being’, nor employs Rawlsian reasonableness. Instead it puts forward a liberal 
argument for the nation that is a parallel of the liberal argument for the State, 
contending that both are necessary implications of difficulties in applying 
individualism outwith an isolated atomistic existence.  The nation, like the State, 
promotes in the rational human
164
 individual, a social, future-oriented industrial 
approach, without which his motivation to join the social enterprise would be 
questionable.  
 This should not be confused with David Miller’s conception of nationality 
(Miller 1995) as an institution that enables social caring. Miller’s motivation would 
seem to be salvaging the last frontier
165
 of social obligation. My own concern is with 
defeating the growing tendency, beginning in Hobbes and epitomised in Kant, to 
prescribe social conduct by an appeal to an ideal rational individual rather than to a 
constrained human one. As I have already suggested it should also not be 
misconstrued as an adoption of a communitarian ‘embeddedness’ line of argument, 
with which both Rabkin and Miller appear to flirt. The communitarian position 
stresses the determining impact that our social surroundings have on us. It emulates 
developmental psychology’s analysis of the opening and shutting windows of our 
formative years that establish our identity. Thereon, since the self and society are 
forged together, their unison cannot be interrupted. The universal individual is 
regarded as a dream-like concept that has no bearing on the real world, reflecting the 
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impossibility of detangling the intertwinedness of self and society that make up our 
identity.  
In this respect, communitarianism is a voice against abstraction, which is said 
to drain discussion of essential content. Yet, unlike communitarianism, the position 
considered here does not juxtapose unreal-abstracted with real-embedded, it 
juxtaposes unreal-incorporeal with real-corporeally bound. The detachment it speaks 
against is not the discounting of the formative nature of our original community, 
rather it is a critique of the disregard for the basic metaphysical human constraint to a 
single physical space. It turns on its head the orthodox concept of Humanism, as a 
Rousseauean rationalised universal outlook, using it instead as a corporeal boundary 
that divides mortals from deities. 
National identity as employed here is considered a manifestation of the 
human constraint to a single spatial place. Unlike communitarian nationalism, it does 
not bind the individual to a particular determining place; rather, it binds her to the 
choice of a single place. In other words the position defended here negates the idea 
of multiple, vagrant-like, equally binding attachments to an array of spatially distant 
places, as outlined by H.G. Wells in his portrayal of cosmopolitanism (See 
Partington 2003); and reiterated in Jeremy Waldron’s contemporary cosmopolitan 
proposition:  
The cosmopolitan may live all his life in one city and maintain the same 
citizenship throughout. But he refuses to think of himself as defined by his 
location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language. Though he may live in 
San Francisco and be of Irish ancestry, he does not take his identity to be 
compromised when he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in 
Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori Princess on Japanese 
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equipment…He is a creature of modernity
166
, conscious of living in a mixed-up 
world and having a mixed-up self. (Waldron in Lichtenberg 1996-7: 63). 
 
 The stance being advanced here does not necessarily oppose multiple 
identities, or Waldron’s, modernised, mixed-up self, rather it wishes to highlight the 
inescapability of the underlying physical aspect of our being. As mixed up as we may 
be, at some point in our lives most of us are forced to choose a primary place of 
attachment. Contrary to Judith Lichtenberg, I would assert that even in this age of 
technological breakthroughs, the cosmopolitan self, if it exists at all, is at best the 
preserve of free-thinkers and jet-setters (See Lichtenberg 1996-7: 63).  
While it is true that modern transport allows for a globalised outlook on the 
manufacture and perhaps even on the marketing of goods, seemingly closing the gap 
between the economic environment one is subjected to on the streets of Rome versus 
the streets of Hong Kong; in practice, observing the conduct of highly resourced 
business people, equipped with state of the art video communication systems, one 
will note that the business-trip including the ' ‘sealed with a handshake’ approach, is 
far from being made redundant. Seeing might be believing, but touching closes the 
deal. That in this savvy, cost-conscious environment, communication has not 
replaced the ever more costly physical meeting suggests that we are mentally 
attached to our physical existence.  
But what if the marvels of technology in the field of communication were 
replicated in the field of transport? Provided with a means to commute door-to-door 
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in a reasonable amount of time
167
, from our residence in the outskirts of Edinburgh to 
our place of work, at the Toyota factory, just outside Tokyo, would we then become 
equally attached to both? Where would our children be schooled? En-route to our 
partner's job in Seattle, or around the corner from their retired parents in Capetown? 
Indeed, would these physically distant places continue to be distinct, or would they 
morph into street addresses on our globe-trotter's route.  
One could argue that such a technological breakthrough is unnecessary. We 
do not require instant transportation, as we can stay put, while the world, or one 
should say: the world of commodities, is delivered to our doorstep. On the recent 
release of J.K. Rowling’s latest novel
168
, a news reporter approached two London 
teenage girls, dressed up in Witch costumes, who had been queuing in the wee hours 
to get their hands on the Harry Potter novel. When questioned as to why they could 
not wait for the regular sale of the book the following morning, they replied 'we 
wouldn't miss this experience for the world'.   
While we have been trained to follow events via mediums such as television 
or the web, we recognise that true experiences are physical and unmediated, anything 
else, is only second best. This thesis puts forward that our attraction to ‘hands-on’ 
experience married with our incapacity to be present in several places at the same 
time, renders our spatial experience at the top of the hierarchy of our sense of 
identity. Where we are located influences who we will meet, where we will meet 
them and how often, but most importantly, in what context we will meet them. While 
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the context is always the present, it adds up in our mind to establish the past, which is 
entangled with other's perceptions to form a sense of history.  
In reply to Jeremy Waldron, the position purported here is that the identity of 
an American of Irish descent living in San Francisco is not compromised when he 
learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, listens to arias by Verdi 
sung by a Maori Princess on Japanese equipment, because he is doing so in an 
American context with a reminder of his roots in the Irish context. Even if the grand 
EU state vision is triumphant, and Ireland does not survive as an independent 
political entity, the context of Ireland will not cease to exist. The place identified as 
Ireland will continue to exist, but more importantly the context of Ireland in the 
minds of Irish Americans could live on. How long it would live on, is difficult to say, 
but the experience of the Jewish historical phenomenon demonstrates that when a 
culture thoroughly bonds a people with a place, the context of the land of Zion may 
live on for thousands of years, eventually to be recaptured in practice
169
.  
It is argued that we, as individuals, are drawn to participate in such social, 
long-lasting enterprises because they complement the finite limitation of our 
individuality. By incorporating ourselves we salvage something of our individuality 
from its inevitable corporal demise. Again it is our human physicality that defines us. 
We are not deities; we are neither immortal nor omni-present. As impressive as 
technological leaps have been, an omni-presence-enabling gadget does not seem  
                                               
169
 It might be worth mentioning the fearsome dispute within the Zionist movement in the early 20
th
 
century, when under the title ‘the Uganda Scheme’, it was suggested that a Jewish homeland might be 
realised in East Africa. 
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around the corner, nor is the fountain of eternal youth.  We are, in this life, forever 
both physically and mentally contained within the spatio-temporal experience. 
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